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INTRODUCTION

In the post-Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals era in which
federal trial courts have been assigned the gatekeeping responsibility
concerning the admissibility of scientific expert testimony, 1 the confluence
of two trends is affecting expert testimony in cases involving business
damages 2 in ways that are presenting new challenges for the courts and
enhancing the risks for damages experts. 3 One trend, the increasingly
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1. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. In this paper, we define the word "damages" in a general sense to mean a potential
monetary award stemming from litigation in cases involving businesses. In this context,
damages can arise from tort, breach of contract, divorce, infringement, and tax actions. The
word "valuation," as used herein, is generally intended to mean the actual process of
estimating damages.
3. See, e.g., PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000-2006 Financial Expert Witness Daubert
Challenge Study 5 (2007) (“In the Ninth Circuit, 68 percent of financial expert witness
testimony challenged under Daubert between 2000 and 2006 were excluded in whole or in
part.”)
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sophisticated content of expert testimony, stems, in part, from the changing
nature of business in the U.S., which is becoming intellectual-capital
intensive. 4 This intellectual-capital intensity is increasing both the amount
of litigation associated with this capital 5 and the complexities associated
with estimating damages in civil litigation involving commerce. 6
4. See Lutz Kaufmann & Yvonne Schneider, Intangibles: A Synthesis of Current
Research, 5 J. INTELL. CAP. 366, 373-74 (2004). The authors note that there is no consensus
on one set of terms and definitions for intellectual capital, which includes such categories as
intangible assets, intangible capital, intellectual assets, and intellectual property. The term
“intellectual capital” is used herein to refer to a wide variety of assets that have no physical
existence. These include assets traditionally defined as intellectual property (including
copyrights, patents, and licenses) and also such “assets,” used here in an economic as
opposed to an accounting context, as customer accounts. The term “intellectual capital” has
been defined as the difference between the market value and financial capital of that
enterprise at a given date. See Indra Abeysekera, Intellectual Accounting Scorecard—
Measuring and Reporting Intellectual Capital, 3 J. AM. ACAD. BUS. 422 (2003). We,
however, follow Contractor in defining intellectual capital to include intellectual property
that is registered (such as patents, copyrights, and brands), intellectual property that is
unregistered but codified (such as drawings, software, blueprints, written trade secrets,
databases, and formulae), and uncodified organizational capital (such as customer accounts,
collective knowledge, skills, and knowledge). See Farok J. Contractor, Valuing Corporate
Knowledge and Intangible Assets: Some General Principles, 7 KNOWLEDGE & PROCESS
MGMT. 242, 245 (2000). Further, Abeysekera notes that “[a]lthough there is ambiguity as to
whether intellectual capital represents all intangibles, the more popular definitions indicate
that they refer to intangibles not recognized in the financial statements.” Abeysekera, supra,
at 422. It is also important to make a clear distinction between intellectual capital and
human beings. “[P]eople are not assets, but the services which people are expected to
provide for an organisation comprise the asset.” Michael Litschka et al., Measuring and
Analyzing Intellectual Assets: An Integrative Approach, 5 J. INTELL. CAP. 160, 164 (2005)
(citing ERIC FLAMHOLTZ, HUMAN RESOURCE ACCOUNTING 32 (Kluwer Academic Publishers
2001)).
5. See, e.g., John E. Jankowski, Measurement and Growth of R&D Within the Service
Economy, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 323, 327, 330, 335 (2001), for data on the growth of
research and development (R&D) in U.S. industry and evidence that the trend toward
greater concentrations of R&D in service businesses has a higher development component.
See also Gregory Tassey, R&D Investment Trends: U.S. Needs More High Tech, 46 RES.
TECH. MGMT. 9, 11 (2003). A 2002 survey conducted by Kroll, Inc. led to the following
conclusion: “‘Intellectual property is at the heart of modern business, everything from
technology to pharmaceuticals to music,’ said Michael Cherkasky, president and CEO of
Kroll. ‘With more than half our survey respondents estimating the value of their company’s
intellectual property in excess of $5 million, and nearly half reporting at least one incident
of unauthorized use in the past year, IP infringement is clearly a multi-million dollar global
problem.” Press Release, Kroll Inc., Kroll Survey Highlights Corporate Vulnerabilities to
Growing Billion-Dollar Problem of Intellectual Property Abuse (Apr. 16, 2002), available
at http://www.kroll.com/news/releases/index.aspx?id=151.
6. “The greatly increased importance of intellectual property rights in worldwide
business has, not surprisingly, been accompanied by a steady increase in the number and
complexity of disputes concerning the use and value of such rights.” Robert Goldscheider,
Measuring the Damages: ADR and Intellectual Property Disputes, 50 DISP. RESOL. J. 55
(1995). See Manuel Garcia-Ayuso, Factors Explaining the Inefficient Valuation of
Intangibles, 16 ACCT. AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 57, 59 (2003), for an assertion that
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A second important trend—growing partisanship in damages expert
testimony 7 —is creating greater difficulty on the part of judges in
determining what expert testimony meets the threshold of admissibility and
is resulting in more frequent rejection of testimony by the courts. 8
Evidence of this partisanship can be found in recent court decisions, with
Daubert hearings on expert qualifications becoming the norm and
increasing allegations of bias being aimed at business valuation
professionals. 9 Partisanship goes to the heart of the reliability of expert
testimony, and is alleged to be contributing to what one commentator has
described as an explosion of successful Daubert challenges over the past
five years, with a success rate of 30-60%. 10 Combined with the U.S.
Supreme Court’s trilogy of cases bearing upon the admissibility of
scientific evidence in federal and some state courts 11 —in contrast with the
adherence of other states to the older Frye standard or to neither Daubert
nor Frye 12 —these trends portend growing difficulty for the courts in
assessing the reliability of expert testimony and growing uncertainty for
testifying experts about courts’ reactions to their reports and testimony. 13
the failure of accounting-based financial reports to capture the underlying values of
intellectual capital has contributed to a growing body of securities-related litigation. See Nir
Kossovsky, Fair Value of Intellectual Property: An Options-Based Valuation of Nearly
8,000 Intellectual Property Assets, 3 J. INTELL. CAP. 62 (2006), for the comment that
existing financial reporting is not responsive enough to capture the value of volatile
intellectual assets; and Kaufman & Schneider, supra note 4, for the fluctuating differences
between market and book [accounting] values as indicative of the rising importance of
intellectual capital.
7. See, e.g., PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 3; Robert James Cimasi, BV on Trial
in Bankruptcy—Exclusive Insights from the In Re Med Diversified, 47 BUS. VALUATION
UPDATE 3 (Aug. 16, 2006); Gary L. Freed, When Will It Stop?—The Sequel, 6 NAT’L LITIG.
CONSULTANTS REV. 7 (2007).
8. PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 3.
9. Id.
10. Id. (citing a study, “Daubert Challenges to Financial Expert Witnesses in Federal
and State Courts, 2000-2005,” by Price Waterhouse Coopers, a leading public accounting
firm).
11. See generally Margaret A. Berger, The Supreme Court’s Trilogy on the
Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 9 (2d
ed. 2000).
12. J.A. Keierleber & T.L. Bohan, Ten Years after Daubert: The Status of the States,
50 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1, 1 (2005). The Frye standard referred to in the text came from Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). It contemplated that expert evidence of a
scientific nature would be admissible only if the methodology or technique employed by the
expert reflected general acceptance in the relevant scientific community. Id. at 1014. For a
discussion of Frye, its current applicability in some states, and its former applicability in the
federal courts, see infra text accompanying notes 26-39.
13. Although court decisions in patent cases have an obvious focus on intangible assets
and intellectual capital, we do not specifically address damages issues associated with patent
cases because patent law is a specialized area of law that has been deemed sufficiently
complicated to have its own appellate venue with specialized judicial expertise.
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Past remedies for partisanship have proven largely unsuccessful, 14 and
given partisanship’s intersection with the increasing complexity of business
damages cases, a fresh approach is needed to curb its adverse effects.
Pre-Daubert, experts were introducing novel analyses that even other
experts had difficulty understanding, thereby presenting serious issues for
the courts. 15 In Daubert, 16 the first piece in what has been termed “the
Supreme Court’s trilogy on the admissibility of expert testimony,” 17 the
court provided basic criteria with respect to the admissibility of expert
scientific testimony. The Daubert criteria, however, represent only general
guidelines and fall well short of providing definitive guidance with respect
to the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the use of particular
scientific methodologies. 18 In the second piece of the trilogy, General
Electric Co. v. Joiner, 19 the Court rejected the notion that lower courts
should apply a standard more stringent than Daubert in excluding expert
testimony. 20 A major import of Joiner for purposes of this study is that in
the future courts are unlikely to establish a more complex, well-defined,
universally applicable set of rules for admissibility of expert scientific
testimony in cases involving computation of damages related to intellectual
capital.
In the third piece of the trilogy, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 21 the
Court rejected the notion that there is a dichotomy in expert testimony
between experts who rely upon science versus those who rely upon
personal experience. 22 Further, the Court said that the pertinence of certain
factors set forth in Daubert depends upon the nature of the case, expertise
involved, and topic of the testimony. 23 In combination, Daubert, Joiner,
and Kumho therefore create the potential for both considerable flexibility
and concomitant ambiguity with respect to decisions by the courts
regarding the appropriate use and admissibility of expert scientific
evidence. 24
Nonetheless, we occasionally draw what we believe to be useful analogies to the manner in
which patent cases are handled in the U.S. system.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 483-514.
15. Michelson Stephan, The Expert and Law, NAT’L FORENSIC CENTER, Apr. 29, 1983,
at 5.
16. See Daubert, 509 U.S. 579.
17. Berger, supra note 11, at 9.
18. Id. at 38.
19. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
20. See Berger, supra note 11, at 13.
21. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
22. See Berger, supra note 11, at 17-18.
23. See id. at 19.
24. See id. at 21. Moreover, “[n]othing the Supreme Court said in Kumho is explicitly
inconsistent with what it said in Daubert. As Justice Breyer’s opinion stated, Daubert
described the Rule 702 inquiry as ‘a flexible one,’ and made clear that factors it mentions do
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This study proceeds as follows in exploring the intersection of these
trends in the post-Daubert era and in proposing a new trial regime for
dealing with complex business damages cases. Part II reviews the
requirements for the admissibility and management of expert testimony
established by the Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho courts. It then examines
several recent court decisions related to the admission of expert testimony
at the federal and state levels and the inconsistencies presented in some of
these decisions. Part III deals with damage experts’ backgrounds and the
enhanced risks for these experts that accompany the provision of expert
damages testimony in the post-Daubert era, including a discussion of
increasingly expansive discovery and its adverse implications for attorneyexpert communication. Part IV explores the art and the science of
valuation and provides examples of the types of technical issues with which
courts have had to deal—issues that have on occasion, like admissibility
issues, been dealt with inconsistently. This discussion provides a sense of
the illusion of objectivity in business damages estimation and the
complexities that have challenged both courts and damages experts who
must anticipate various courts’ positions on technical issues. Part V relates
the business environment dynamics giving rise to increased complexity in
business damages cases and explores how these dynamics, in turn, are
affecting the complexity of expert testimony and necessitating the use of
increasingly sophisticated methodologies to provide the most accurate
estimates of damages. In addressing this business complexity trend, we
briefly discuss some of these methodologies to foster an understanding of
the types of problems courts are increasingly likely to face in assessing the
reliability of expert testimony in the future. We also provide illustrative
examples from recent cases that involved these methodologies.
Part VI discusses the problem of growing partisanship on the part of
some damages experts, together with an analysis of remedies that have
been proposed in the past and reasons for their ineffectiveness. Part VII
presents a novel approach for dealing with the sour fruits of expert
partisanship through the bifurcation of the trial regime, augmented by the
selective, tightly controlled use of independent experts to temper opposing
parties’ expert testimony. Part VIII summarizes our arguments and
conclusions regarding their future impact on the quality of jurisprudence.

not constitute ‘a definitive checklist or test.’ Nevertheless, Kumho may indicate that the
Court has somewhat backed away from laying down guidelines for particular categories of
expert testimony . . . . The Court seems less absorbed in epistemological issues, in
formulating general rules for assessing reliability . . . . It appears less interested in a
taxonomy of expertise and more concerned with directing judges to concentrate on the
particular circumstances of the particular case at issue.” Id.
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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY

Courts must inevitably decide whether to exclude expert testimony,
which is almost always flawed in some respects, or to admit it and rely
upon opposing counsel to draw out the testimony’s weaknesses. 25 The
requirements for expert testimony to be admissible have evolved at the
federal level from the Frye standard to new standards established by
Daubert and its progeny. 26 Some states have embraced the Daubert
standard while others have clung to Frye. 27 Still others have attempted to
meld the two in various ways, at times giving rise to hybrid case law. 28
Further complicating this cluttered landscape of conflicting rules for
admissibility of expert testimony are conflicting decisions by courts
regarding such admissibility matters as whether all potentially relevant
variables have been considered by the expert and whether applications of
financial methodologies are admissible in various contexts. 29
A.

The Daubert-Joiner-Kumho Trio

Prior to three landscape-changing Supreme Court decisions during the
1990s, 30 most federal courts subscribed to a several-decades-old test for
determining admissibility of expert testimony on scientific matters. 31
Under that test, enunciated in Frye v. United States, 32 an expert witness
would be permitted to furnish opinion testimony employing a particular
scientific methodology or technique only if the methodology or technique
had earned “general acceptance” in the appropriate scientific community. 33
The Frye approach remained dominant among federal courts even after the
mid-1970s adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), though some
courts and commentators had begun to question the general acceptance
test’s soundness and viability. 34
In a 1993 decision, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 35
25. Robert M. Lloyd, Proving Lost Profits After Daubert: Five Questions Every Court
Should Ask Before Admitting Expert Testimony, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 379, 421 (2007).
26. Berger, supra note 11, at 10.
27. Keierleber & Bohan, supra note 12, at abstract.
28. Id.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 113-42.
30. The three cases are Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); and Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). The cases will be discussed at infra text accompanying
notes 35-100.
31. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585.
32. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
33. Id. at 1014.
34. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585, 586-87 & nn.4-5.
35. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Daubert was the first of the three Supreme Court decisions
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the Supreme Court resolved the viability issue by holding that Rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded the general acceptance test. 36
Frye’s “austere” test struck the Court as incompatible with Rule 702, 37
which read this way at the time of Daubert: “If scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.” 38 Having cast Frye aside, the
Daubert majority turned its attention to what Rule 702 contemplates
regarding expert evidence of a scientific nature. 39
The Court stressed that even though the FRE did not call for
application of the general acceptance test, the FRE still placed limits on the
admissibility of expert testimony. 40 Reading Rule 702 alongside other
provisions of the FRE, the Court concluded that the trial judge “must
ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only
relevant, but reliable.” 41 The “reliab[ility]” requirement stemmed from
Rule 702’s reference to “scientific . . . knowledge,” 42 which the Court read
as contemplating expert testimony that was grounded in the scientific
method and reflective of scientific validity rather than mere speculation. 43
alluded to earlier. See supra text accompanying note 30.
36. 509 U.S. at 587, 588-89 & n.6; see FED. R. EVID. 702.
37. 509 U.S. at 589.
38. FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588. In 2000, an amendment to Rule 702
changed the concluding period to a comma and added the following language: “if (1) the
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably
to the facts of the case.” FED. R. EVID. 702.
39. See 509 U.S. at 589-97.
40. Id. at 589. The plaintiffs sought to offer expert opinions that a mother’s ingestion
of Bendectin during pregnancy could cause birth defects in her children. The district court
excluded such testimony because it did not appear to have been based on a generally
accepted principle or technique. Id. at 583-84. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 584.
Because the lower courts had applied the discredited general acceptance test, the Supreme
Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for further consideration
under the guidelines set forth in Daubert. Id. at 587, 597-98.
41. Id. at 589. The court noted that its interpretation of Rule 702 was informed by Rule
402’s provision that relevant evidence is generally admissible and by Rule 401’s “liberal”
standard of relevance. Id. at 587; see FED. R. EVID. 401, 402. In addition, the Court noted
the “’liberal thrust’” of the Federal rules of Evidence and their “general approach of relaxing
the traditional barriers to ‘opinion’ testimony.” 509 U.S. at 588 (quoting Beech Aircraft
Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
42. FED. R. EVID. 702; see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-90.
43. 509 U.S. at 590. Because Daubert involved scientific testimony, the Court limited
its discussion to that context and offered no view on whether the same relevance and
reliability requirements would govern admissibility determinations regarding opinion
testimony that would rely on “‘technical or other specialized knowledge.’” Id. at 590 n.8
(quoting FED. R. EVID. 702). In a later decision, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S.
137 (1999), the Court would address the question reserved in Daubert. For discussion of
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An expert’s opinion, therefore, would not be admissible unless it had “a
reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of [the expert’s]
discipline.” 44 As foundation for the further requirement that the expert
testimony be relevant, the Daubert majority pointed to Rule 702’s
statement that such testimony must be capable of “assist[ing] the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” 45 Such
assistance could only be provided by relevant expert testimony-testimony
that holds “a valid scientific connection to [a] pertinent inquiry” at issue in
the case. 46
With Daubert having identified a trial judge’s “gatekeeping”
responsibility 47 to allow expert testimony of a scientific nature only if it
would be relevant and reliable, 48 Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion
proceeded to furnish guidance for courts attempting to discharge this
responsibility. The Court offered a nonexclusive list of factors bearing
simultaneously upon the relevance and reliability requirements. 49 First
among the listed factors was whether the theory or technique the expert
seeks to employ “can be (and has been) tested.” 50 The Court also noted the
importance of considering whether the expert’s proposed theory or
technique had been “subjected to peer review and publication.” 51 In
addition, the error rate associated with the expert’s proposed theory or
technique qualified for the nonexclusive list of factors to consider, as did
Kumho, see infra text accompanying notes 79-100.
44. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
45. FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590-91.
46. 509 U.S. at 592; see id. at 591-92.
47. Id. at 597; see id. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
48. Id. at 590-92. FED. R. EVID. 104(a) calls for courts to make preliminary
determinations on matters such as evidentiary admissibility and the qualification of a person
to serve as a witness. FED. R. EVID. 104(a). Noting this provision, the Court stated that
“the trial judge must determine at the outset” whether an expert’s proposed testimony would
be admissible. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. In doing so, the judge would need to make “a
preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony
is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied
to the facts in issue.” Id. at 592-93.
49. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-97. Giving the “general observations” label to its list
of factors, id. at 593, the Court noted that various considerations would be relevant to the
discharge of the trial judge’s gatekeeping responsibility and that “we do not presume to set
out a definitive checklist or test.” Id.
50. Id. According to the Court, scientific methodology depends upon the generation of
hypotheses that can be tested for apparent truth or falsity. Id.
51. Id. Although peer review and publication are traditional aspects of “submission to
the scrutiny of the scientific community,” id., the Court recognized that some scientific
knowledge may not have led to publication because it was too new or of interest to too small
an audience. Id. Therefore, the Court concluded that “[t]he fact of publication (or lack
thereof) in a peer reviewed journal . . . will be a relevant, though not dispositive,
consideration in assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or methodology on
which an opinion is premised.” Id. at 594.
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any professional standards applicable to the operation of the theory or
technique. 52 Finally, the Daubert majority noted that even though the
general acceptance test no longer controlled the inquiry into admissibility
of expert testimony, 53 “[w]idespread acceptance” of a theory or technique
is a factor that may help point toward admissibility. 54 The Court concluded
its discussion of the gatekeeping responsibility by emphasizing the
“flexible” nature of the trial judge’s inquiry into admissibility 55 and by
stressing that the inquiry must be focused “solely on principles and
methodology [to be employed by the expert], not on the conclusions that
they generate.” 56
General Electronic Co. v. Joiner 57 was the second of the Supreme
Court’s expert testimony decisions during the 1990s. The district court had
disallowed the proffered scientific testimony of the plaintiff’s experts
concerning a critical causation issue and had gone on to grant summary
judgment to the defendants. 58 However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed after
concluding that “a particularly stringent standard of review” should apply
to lower courts’ exclusion of expert testimony, especially when the
exclusion was outcome-determinative. 59 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari on the standard-of-review issue. 60
52. Id.
53. Id. at 586-87, 588, 594. Answering expressions of concern by the respondent and
by certain amici curiae that elimination of the general acceptance test’s controlling effect
would result in the admission of expert testimony based on “absurd and irrational
pseudoscientific assertions,” id. at 595, the Court noted that effective cross-examination, the
presentation of opposing evidence, and appropriate jury instructions on the burden of proof
would be appropriate ways to attack “shaky but admissible evidence.” Id. at 596.
Moreover, the directed verdict or summary judgment options could be further checks in the
event that opinion testimony admitted under the new standard amounted only to a mere
scintilla of evidence in support of a party’s position. Id. The Court also noted a concern of
the petitioners and other amici that the screening role envisioned for the trial judge could
lead to “a stifling and repressive scientific orthodoxy.” Id. In response, the Court did not
deny that opinion testimony based on “insights and innovations” that could prove
“authentic” over time might sometimes be excluded because they seem at the time to be so
starkly different from conventional wisdom. Id. at 597. However, the Court pointed out the
flexible nature of the gatekeeping inquiry and expressed confidence in trial judges’ ability to
discern whether proffered opinion testimony would be scientifically valid and pertinent to
the case at hand. See id. at 594-95, 596-97.
54. Id. at 594.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 595.
57. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
58. Id. at 140. The plaintiff sought to offer expert testimony that exposure to PCB’s
had caused or contributed to the development of his lung cancer. Id. at 139-40. The district
court rejected this proposed testimony because, in the court’s view, it was based on animal
studies and epidemiological studies that did not furnish sufficient support for such
testimony. Id. at 140, 143-44, 145-46.
59. Id. at 140, 141.
60. Id. at 138-39, 141.
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Writing for the Court in Joiner, Chief Justice Rehnquist began by
noting the familiar rule that the abuse-of-discretion standard controls the
review of district courts’ rulings on evidentiary matters. 61 He recited
Daubert’s holding that trial courts must play a gatekeeper role in screening
expert testimony for relevance and reliability 62 and observed that nothing in
Daubert addressed the standard to be employed in the review of district
courts’ gatekeeping rulings. 63 The Court saw no reason to depart from the
usual abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing rulings on admissibility
of expert testimony, regardless of whether the testimony was being allowed
or disallowed and regardless of whether the disallowance of the testimony
would prove outcome-determinative. 64 Accordingly, the Court concluded
that the Eleventh Circuit erred in calling for a more stringent review. 65 The
Joiner majority did not stop there, however. It thoroughly reviewed the
record and concluded that the testimony the plaintiff’s scientific experts
would have offered on the critical issue of causation was based on studies
that did not sufficiently support their opinions. 66 Hence, there was no
abuse of discretion on the part of the district court in its decision to exclude
the testimony of the plaintiff’s scientific experts. 67
Near the end of the majority opinion in Joiner, Chief Justice
Rehnquist addressed the plaintiff’s argument that the district court’s
exclusion of the experts’ testimony had been premised more on the court’s
disagreement with the experts’ conclusions than on a concern about the
methodology the experts would have employed. 68 This argument rested on
Daubert’s statement that the trial court’s gatekeeping inquiry was to be
focused “solely on principles and methodology [utilized by the experts],
not on the conclusions that they generate.” 69 The Chief Justice responded
61. Id. at 141-42.
62. Id. at 142; see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590-92, 597.
63. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 142.
64. Id. at 142-43. The Court noted that when a party’s summary judgment motion is
granted—as it was in favor of the defendants in the trial court—disputed factual issues are
to be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. at 143. The Court emphasized,
however, that “the question of admissibility of expert testimony is not such an issue of fact,
and is reviewable under the abuse of discretion standard.” Id.
65. Id. In applying a stringent standard of review to the trial judge’s exclusion of the
expert testimony, the Eleventh Circuit “failed to give the trial court the deference that is the
hallmark of abuse of discretion review.” Id.
66. Id. at 143-46. Justice Stevens, who had joined with the other eight members of the
Court in the portion of the decision holding that abuse of discretion was the appropriate
standard of review, id. at 137, would have remanded the case to the court of appeals for a
review of the record under the abuse-of discretion standard. Id. at 150-51 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67. Id. at 143, 146-47.
68. Id. at 146.
69. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595; see General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146
(1997).
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by observing that
conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one
another. Trained experts commonly extrapolate from existing
data. But nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of
Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence
which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the
expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered. 70
Through this language and the holding that the abuse-of-discretion
standard controls the review of trial courts’ gate-keeping decisions, 71
Joiner extended district judges greater latitude than Daubert might seem to
have given them concerning preliminary rulings on expert testimony’s
relevance and reliability. 72
Justice Breyer’s Joiner concurrence offered useful insights on
procedural techniques for trial judges to employ as they fulfill the
gatekeeping responsibility identified in Daubert and further elaborated on
in Joiner. 73 Noting the “inherent difficulty of making determinations about
complicated scientific, or otherwise technical, evidence,” 74 Justice Breyer
commented on the use of pretrial conferences to narrow the disputed issues
and pretrial hearings in which the court could examine the experts each
side wished to offer. 75 He also suggested the potential usefulness of
appointing special masters and “specially trained law clerks.” 76 Finally,
Justice Breyer noted that courts might want to opt for appointing experts
under Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence or under the courts’
inherent authority. 77 All of these methods, Justice Breyer observed, should
70. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146. Unpersuaded by this statement, Justice Stevens would
have preserved a “categorical . . . distinction” between methodology and conclusions. Id. at
155 (Stevens, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part). He asserted that “Daubert quite
clearly forbids trial judges to assess the validity or strength of an expert’s scientific
conclusions, which is a matter for the jury.” Id. at 154.
71. Id. at 142-43.
72. See id. at 146-47; id. at 154-55 (Stevens, J, concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
73. Id. at 147-50 (Breyer, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 149.
75. Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (setting authority to conduct pretrial conferences); see
also FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b) (providing that court may order “a separate trial of one or more
separate issues”); FED. R. EVID. 104 (stating that “[p]reliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness . . . or the admissibility of evidence shall be
determined by the court).
76. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 149 (Breyer, J., concurring). FED. R. CIV. P. 53 furnishes federal
courts the authority to appoint special masters.
77. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 149-50 (Breyer, J., concurring). Rule 706 provides that a court
may appoint an expert on its own motion or on a party’s motion, and that the expert may be
chosen by the court or pursuant to an agreement between the parties. See FED. R. EVID.
706(a).
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help keep courts’ Daubert-based responsibilities from becoming
excessively difficult to discharge. 78
Justice Breyer authored the majority opinion in Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 79 the third of the Supreme Court’s expert testimony decisions
during the 1990s. 80 The case presented two primary questions: first,
whether the gatekeeping responsibility identified in Daubert applies not
only to expert evidence of a scientific nature but also to expert testimony
regarding technical or other specialized matters, and second, if the
gatekeeping responsibility so applies, whether the factors identified in
Daubert constitute an exclusive list that trial judges must use in seeking to
determine the relevance and reliability of the proposed expert testimony. 81
The Court unanimously answered “yes” to the first question 82 and “no” to
the second. 83
Justice Breyer began the analysis in Kumho by noting that Rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence furnished the basis for the Daubert holding
that the trial judge has a gatekeeping obligation to determine the relevance
and reliability of expert evidence on scientific matters. 84 Rule 702 refers to
an expert’s “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.” 85
Justice Breyer observed that the Daubert majority opinion had spoken in
terms of expert evidence of a scientific nature only because the expert
testimony at issue in the case was of that nature. 86 The same reasoning
calling for trial judges to screen scientific expert testimony suggested a
need for a similar gatekeeping responsibility regarding other types of
expert testimony. 87 Hence, the Court held that trial judges must also
determine whether proposed expert testimony of a non-scientific nature
would meet the necessary requirements of relevance and reliability. 88
Next, the Kumho Court turned to the factors listed in Daubert as

78. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 150 (Breyer, J., concurring).
79. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
80. Id. at 141.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 141, 147-49.
83. Id. at 141-42, 149-53. In a later portion of the opinion subscribed to by eight
Justices, the Court reviewed the record and concluded that the district court had properly
disallowed the testimony of the plaintiff’s technical expert. Id. at 153-58, 159 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The proffered opinion testimony pertained to
causation of a tire failure. Id. at 142-46.
84. Id. at 147.; see FED. R. EVID. 702 (permitting expert witnesses to testify); Daubert,
509 U.S. at 589.
85. FED. R. EVID. 702.
86. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 147-48 (1999); see Daubert, 509 U.S. at
590 n.8 (stating the discussion was limited to the scientific context because it was the nature
of the expertise at issue).
87. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 147-49.
88. Id. at 149.
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relevant to the trial judge’s screening role. Those factors were whether the
expert’s theory or technique had been tested, whether it had been the
subject of peer review and publication, whether it was susceptible to a high
rate of error, whether standards governed the operation of the theory or
technique, and whether the theory or technique was widely accepted. 89
Stressing that Daubert called the reliability inquiry “flexible,” 90 Justice
Breyer noted in Kumho that some or all of the Daubert factors may be
helpful when the trial judge assesses expert testimony of a non-scientific
nature. 91 However, not every Daubert factor will be relevant in every case
and other factors or considerations not specifically listed in Daubert may
prove to be useful to the judge exercising the gatekeeping duty. 92 The
Daubert list “was meant to be helpful, not definitive.” 93
To bolster the conclusion that the list of factors in Daubert was neither
mandatory nor exclusive, the Kumho Court pointed to the Joiner holding
that the abuse-of-discretion standard controls the review of trial judges’
gatekeeping decisions regarding expert testimony.94 In Kumho, Justice
Breyer noted that Joiner’s adoption of the abuse-of-discretion standard
extended latitude to trial judges when they determine “whether or not [an]
expert’s relevant testimony is reliable.” 95 He reasoned that trial judges
“must have the same kind of latitude in deciding how to test an expert’s
reliability.” 96 The “how” latitude would include not only the freedom to
employ some or all of the Daubert factors—perhaps in combination with
other considerations 97 —but also the discretion to “decide whether or when
special briefing or other proceedings are needed to investigate reliability.” 98
Kumho concluded with the Court’s examination of the record and a
ruling that the district court had correctly disallowed the testimony of the
plaintiff’s expert, who would have offered the opinion that the tire failure at
issue in the case resulted from a design or manufacturing defect. 99 The
expert’s proposed methodology was insufficiently reliable because it added
89. Id. at 149-50; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94.
90. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
91. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 150-51.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 151.
94. Id. at 152 (citing Joiner, 522 U.S. at 138-39).
95. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152; see Joiner, 522 U.S. at 138-39 (holding that the abuse-ofdiscretion review is the appropriate standard to review a trial court’s decision to admit
expert testimony).
96. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152.
97. Id. at 150-51, 152-53.
98. Id. at 152.
99. Id. at 153-58. See id. at 142-46 (describing the testimony given by the expert in
deposition). Justice Stevens did not join this portion of the Court’s opinion. See id. at 159
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (dissenting from the portion of the
Court’s opinion disallowing the expert testimony).
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unsupported components to what might otherwise have seemed a more
conventional methodology and because it relied on assumptions that
ignored, or were inconsistent with, facts in the record. 100
Following the Daubert-Joiner-Kumho trio of cases, Rule 702 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence was amended in an attempt to codify key
components of those decisions. 101 After the 2000 amendment, Rule 702
took its current form, stating:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 102
B.

Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Federal Courts, Post-Daubert

As one source notes, “Daubert gives every appearance of having
affected the judicial approach to handling expert evidence in federal civil
cases.” 103 Despite arguments that the courts have too frequently admitted
misleading expert testimony, 104 there is little doubt that district courts are
taking their gatekeeper role seriously in the post-Daubert era. Although
judges rarely raise questions of admissibility not disputed by the parties, 105
a 2002 Federal Judicial Center study of post-Daubert cases indicated that
41% of experts were excluded on motions in limine during 1998, up from
25% in 1991. 106
The Federal Rules of Evidence require a complete statement of all of
the opinion, 107 and a substantial number of judges indicate the requirement
to submit expert reports improves the quality of jurisprudence by limiting
the need for other testimony and discouraging testimony outside of the

100. Id. at 154-57.
101. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note.
102. FED. R. EVID. 702.
103. Carol Krafka et al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns
Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 309, 329
(2002).
104. Lloyd, supra note 25, at 380.
105. Krafka et al., supra note 103, at 321.
106. Id. at 322.
107. See Bill Zimmerman, Knobbe Martens Olson & Bear LLP, Conference on Effective
Development & Presentation of Expert Testimony: Capitalizing on Expertise for Success,
Complying with Standards for Expert Work Product (March 20, 2006) (conference materials
and notes on file with authors); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
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potential witness’ area of expertise. 108 The admissibility of damages expert
reports based upon accepted valuation standards and methodology 109 is
rarely denied absent some disconnect involving assumptions, analysis, or
fit with the facts of the case, 110 and courts have increasingly accepted the
applications of the financial theory in damages estimation in litigation such
as shareholder lawsuits. 111 In attempting to exclude opposing opinions,
astute attorneys will cite all known instances involving the type of situation
represented by the case at hand in order to “give the judge the backbone”
for exclusion. 112
In keeping with Daubert’s mandate to maintain experts within their
proper scope lest they mislead juries, 113 various courts have struggled with
key admissibility issues that sometimes lead to inconsistent outcomes.
These issues include: a) the experience qualifications necessary for an
expert to meet the Daubert criteria, b) whether the reliability of expert
testimony is a question of fact or must be decided by a judge, and c)
whether the particular valuation methods used by an expert are relevant as
long as the methods reasonably reflect the value of the capital in
question. 114
Courts have at times wrestled with the issue of exactly what
background and experience is necessary for a damages professional to be
considered an expert in the context of a particular case, but seemingly favor
some latitude in this regard. 115 In Spray-Rite Service Corp. v. Monsanto
108. Krafka et al., supra note 103, at 323 (maintaining that reports encourage parties to
stipulate to facts and issues more often).
109. For a discussion recognizing that the labels “methods” and “methodology” can be
confusing, mean different things to different people, and lack standards for their practical
application to context in the realm of valuation, see D.H. Kaye, The Dynamics of Daubert:
Methodology, Conclusions, and Fit In Statistical and Econometric Studies, 87 VA. L. REV.
1933, 1978 (2001). With respect to estimating damages, we define “methods” as general
approaches, such as the income method (which, for example, attempts to determine what the
income of a business would have been but for a breach of contract), which can be
distinguished from a discounted cash flow “methodology” (one technique by which the
income method can be implemented).
110. Thomas J. Wiegand, Winston & Strawn LLP, Conference on Effective
Development & Presentation of Expert Testimony: Capitalizing on Expertise for Success,
Challenges to Expert Testimony (March 21, 2006) (conference materials and notes on file
with authors).
111. Jon Koslow, Estimating Aggregate Damages in Class-Action Litigation Under Rule
10B-5 for Purposes of Settlement, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 811, 811 (1991).
112. Wiegand, supra note 110.
113. See DePaepe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 141 F.3d 715, 720 (7th Cir. 1998) (vacating and
remanding a case in which an expert was deemed qualified by the trial court but unqualified
by the appellate court).
114. See generally John J. Stockdale, Jr.'s excellent series of business valuation case
summaries entitled Business Valuation Cases in Brief, published monthly in BUSINESS
VALUATION REVIEW.
115. A similar issue to that of industry experience is whether prior testimony on a given
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Co., the court affirmed the use of a business damages expert who admitted
that he was not an expert in all the fields of study upon which he relied in
preparing his testimony. 116 In Supply & Building Co. v. Estee Lauder
International, Inc., a case involving sole distributorship rights in Kuwait,
the court approved a CPA as an expert despite his lack of experience in
law, sociology, cultural anthropology, demographics, international affairs,
and knowledge of the region. 117 While excluding the testimony of a
technical expert on other grounds, the appellate court in DaPaepe v.
General Motors Corp. noted that “[t]he question is not whether the expert
has hands-on experience but whether his testimony meets scientific
standards.” 118 In Dekker v. Topcon American Corp., the court rejected
arguments that a damages expert was unqualified due to the lack of a CPA
designation, an accounting degree, and industry experience, because the
expert held a valuation certification and had been admitted as an expert by
lower courts. 119 The court in Physicians Dialysis Ventures, Inc. v. Griffith
deemed a business valuation expert competent to testify even though the
case was her first involvement with dialysis centers. 120 In James Medical
Equipment, Inc. v. Allen, the court allowed the testimony of an expert who
had never previously testified. 121
Conversely, in In Re Med Diversified, Inc., the court noted that an
accountant’s 20 years of experience in his profession and as a bankruptcy
trustee were insufficient to qualify him as a damages expert in light of his

issue is required for one to qualify as an expert. In Pabst Brewing Co. v. Comm’r, the court,
in excluding his testimony for a variety of reasons, noted that a valuation expert had not
previously provided testimony with respect to valuing a company in the brewery business.
72 T.C.M. (CCH) 1236 (1996). Application of such a stringent experience criterion would
beg the obvious question of how an expert obtains the required testimony experience the
first time. One can only assume that any court insisting upon a prior-testimony-on-casepoint requirement must presume that some other court with laxer admissibility criteria ruled
in error. This, in turn, begs the logical follow-on question of why a prior court's mistake
would qualify an expert in the first place.
116. 684 F.2d 1226, 1241 (7th Cir. 1982).
117. 95 Civ. 8136 (RCC), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20737, at *17-18 (S.D.N.Y. December
13, 2001).
118. 141 F.3d 715, 719 (7th Cir. 1998). The court also stated that “a judge does not
automatically abuse his discretion in concluding that an expert can offer useful information
without having dealt previously with the product at issue in the case," id.(citing Cummins v.
Lyle Industries, 93 F.3d 362, 369 (7th Cir. 1996)), and that “practical experience is not
essential to expert testimony and sometimes gets in the way of scientific detachment" (citing
Minasian v. Standard Chartered Bank, PLC, 109 F.3d 1212, 1216 (7th Cir. 1997)).
119. Dekker v. Topcon Am. Corp., No. G027150, 2002 WL 1046005, at *4-5 (Cal.App.4
Dist. May 24, 2002).
120. No. 06-2468(MLC), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78879, at *19-27 (D.N.J. October 23,
2007).
121. James Med. Equip., Inc. v. Allen, Nos. 2005-CA-000128-MR, 2005-CA-000272MR, 2006 WL 2788435, at *8-9 (Ky. App. Sep. 29, 2006).
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lack of formal education and credentials in business valuation. 122
Similarly, in In re Imperial Credit Industries, Inc. Securities Litigation, the
court held that a report by an accountant who was not well-versed in stock
price reaction studies was inadmissible. 123 In Rosvold v. LSM Systems
Engineering, Inc., the court rejected an expert as lacking in business
valuation credentials despite a graduate degree from a prestigious school
and prior experience in acquiring businesses, in part because he did not
belong to any organizations issuing business valuation credentials. 124 An
expert was excluded in M.S. Distributing Co. v. Web Records, Inc. because
the court determined that experience in rock-and-roll music was
insufficient to qualify him as an expert in other types of music. 125
Another admissibility issue addressed by courts is whether the
reliability of expert testimony is a question of law or fact. Numerous cases
exist where courts have excluded testimony for reasons of unreliability.
For example, the appellate court in Children’s Broadcasting Corp. v. The
Walt Disney Co. reversed the district court’s exclusion of a damages
expert’s testimony and stated that “[t]he jury was entitled to sort through
the evidence presented at trial and to arrive at what it considered to be the
damages . . . .” 126 In Gross v. Commissioner, the tax court found that the
question was not of appropriate methodology but rather whether it had been
appropriately applied:
“‘The choice of the appropriate valuation
methodology for a particular stock is, in itself, a question of fact.’” 127
In Popham v. Popham, the court held that the choice of valuation
method went to the weight of the testimony, not its admissibility. 128
Similarly, in Downeast Ventures, Ltd. v. Washington County, deciding a
Rule 702 issue, the court found that the reliability of a damages expert’s
income projections again went to weight, not admissibility. 129 Conversely,
122. Chartwell Litig. Trust v. Addus Healthcare, Inc. (In re Med Diversified, Inc.), 334
B.R. 89, 96-98 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006).
123. In re Imperial Credit Indus. Sec. Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1013 (C.D. Cal.
2003).
124. Rosvold v. LSM Systems Engineering, Inc., 2007 WL 3275107, at *3 (E.D. Mich.,
Nov. 6, 2007).
125. M.S. Distrib. Co. v. Web Records, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8078, at *31 (N.D.
Ill. May 12, 2003).
126. Children's Broad. Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 245 F.3d 1008, 1017 (8th Cir. 2001).
127. Gross v. Comm’r, 272 F.3d 333, 343 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Estate of Newhouse,
94 T.C. at 245). Other cases cited on point were O’Malley v. Ames, 97 F.2d 256, 258 (8th
Cir. 1952) and Riss v. Comm’r, 56 T.C. 388, 430 (1971), aff’d sub nom. Comm’r v. Transp.
Mfrs. & Equip. Co., 478 F.2d 1160 (8th Cir. 1973).
128. Popham v. Popham, 607 S.E.2d. 575, 576 (Ga. 2005).
129. Downeast Ventures, Ltd. V. Washington County, No. 05-87-B-W, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14733, at *4-*7 (D. Me. March 1, 2007); see also Clement v. Clement, No. W200302388-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 3396472, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2004) (holding
that the fact that an expert gave a “limited” opinion of value was a matter of weight, not
admissibility).
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in DOT v. Rogers, the appellate court declared the admission of business
damages reversible error as a matter of law because of state law restrictions
on business damages in eminent domain cases. 130 In Mathew Headley
Holdings, LLC v. McCleary, Inc., the court excluded an economic expert’s
testimony for lack of adequate foundation. 131 The appellate court in Jarrell
v. Miller ruled expert testimony inadmissible because of errors, with one
judge dissenting and arguing that the errors went to weight, not
admissibility. 132
A third related issue with which the courts have seemingly struggled is
the issue of how seriously flawed damages expert testimony can be and still
be admitted. 133 Although courts do not require that damages be proven
with absolute precision, 134 testimony not supported by evidence in the
record should be excluded. 135 Testimony that constitutes mere personal
belief is said “to invade the province of the fact finder,” 136 and courts do
not allow damages experts to substitute principles and methods in order to
fill an evidentiary vacuum. 137 In Lippe, et al. v. Bairnco Corporation, et
al., the appellate court decided that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding expert damages testimony concerning which it
found no less than eighteen serious flaws. 138 The court in Audobon
Veterinary Hospital, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guarantee Co. refused to strike
an expert’s report it found seriously flawed and not in compliance with
130. DOT v. Rogers, 705 So. 2d 584 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
131. Matthew Headley Holdings, LLC v. McCleary, Inc., No. 02-0654-CV-W-FJG,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78017 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 19, 2007).
132. Jarrell v. Miller, 882 So. 2d 639 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
133. A related issue is whether the particular valuation methods used by an expert are
relevant as long as the methods reasonably reflect the value of the capital in question. As
with several other questions arising in valuation testimony, courts are not always entirely
consistent in answering this question. Compare Hamby v. Hamby, 547 S.E.2d 110 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2001) (court criticized valuation expert for failure to apply certain methods) with
McCarthy v. McCarthy, C3-00-1650, 2001 Minn. App. LEXIS 679 (June 19, 2001)
(reasoning that valuation methods are not relevant so long as method reasonably reflects
value of assets in question).
134. See, e.g., Colorado ex rel. Woodard v. Goodell Bros., Inc., No. 84-A-803, 1987
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14549 (D. Colo. Feb. 17, 1987); Law v. NCAA, 185 F.R.D. 324 (D. Kan.
1998); Busy Bee, Inc. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 97 CV 5078, 2006 LEXIS 238 (Pa. D.
& C.Feb. 28, 2006).
135. Tyger Constr. Co. v. Pensacola Constr. Co., 29 F.3d 137 (4th Cir. 1994).
136. Chemipal LTD v. Slim-Fast Nutritional Foods Int’l, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 582 (D.
Del. 2004) (citing McGowan v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 863 F.2d. 1266, 1273 (6th Cir. 1987))
(excluding court testimony of valuation expert for failure to meet Daubert requirement that
expert's conclusions be based upon reliable scientific knowledge).
137. See, e.g., Downeast Ventures LTD v. Washington County, No. 05-87-B-W, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14733, 10 (D. Me. Mar. 1, 2007). There, the judge stated, “I am not
simply concerned that that the evidence is weak. I am concerned that there is not sufficient
data upon which to base a projection.” Id.
138. Lippe v. Bairnco Corp., 99 Fed. Appx. 274 (2d Cir. 2004).
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FRCP 26(a)(2) due in part to the absence of an opinion, but imposed
sanctions in requiring the production of the appropriate report content in
order for the report to be admissible. 139 In Chartwell Litigation Trust v.
Addus Healthcare, Inc., the court expressed concern over a number of
perceived flaws in the damages expert’s report, including: the lack of
reasonable convergence among the various methods used by a damages
expert to value damages, the literature cited in the report, the exclusion of
nonrecurring events from some but not all of the analysis, the absence of
support for weighting one valuation method more heavily than others, and
the need for more support for assumptions. 140
In certain types of cases, courts have come to expect particular
methodologies, as is the case with securities litigation wherein statistical
events studies are the norm, and have excluded evidence in the absence of
these methodologies. 141 These court-imposed standards of reliability
notwithstanding, some courts have demonstrated a willingness to accept
damages testimony that might normally be considered substandard when
circumstances beyond the control of the expert prevented the use of optimal
methodology. 142
Despite the courts’ having wrestled with the foregoing matters of
admissibility, among others, considerable confusion remains about
implementing the Supreme Court’s trilogy and about further questions said
to outnumber those answered. 143 In order to place this confusion in its
proper context, it is helpful to know something about the growing market
for damages experts as well as their backgrounds and concerns. The
following part discusses the demand for damages experts, their
qualifications, and the risks they face.
III. DAMAGES EXPERTS
Experts usually fall into two general categories—industry/technical
and damages—and it has become increasingly important for attorneys to
139. Audobon Veterinary Hosp., Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guarantee Co., No. 06-5875, 2007
WL 1853369 (E.D. La. 2007).
140. Chartwell Litig. Trust v. Addus Healthcare, Inc. (In re Med Diversified, Inc.), 334
B.R. 89 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005).
141. See, e.g., In re Executive Telecard Ltd. Sec. Litig., 979 F. Supp. 1021 (S.D.N.Y.
1997). Also, in securities fraud cases, damages experts are generally expected to be able to
distinguish between fraud-related stock price changes and change unrelated to the fraud.
See, e.g., In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
142. See, e.g., RMED Int’l, Inc. v. Sloan’s Supermarkets, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 5587, 2000
U.S. Dist LEXIS 3742 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2000) (allowing a valuation expert's testimony to
be admitted despite her failure to use the accepted events methodology due to a lack of a
control period, when she instead chose an acceptable but less compelling alternative
methodology).
143. Krafka et al., supra note 103, at 3.

316

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 11:2

pair damages experts with technical experts in a way that presents case
themes effectively. 144 The choice of a damages expert is a nontrivial matter
because expert testimony presents an excellent opportunity to bring home
case themes and can make or break a case. 145 Further, an expert’s summary
can be a useful conduit for introducing otherwise inadmissible evidence. 146
Survey research conducted by the Federal Judicial Center indicates that
21.4% of all experts providing expert testimony in federal circuit civil trials
in 1998 were accountants, economists, and other financial experts. 147
Further, experts can function as either testifying experts or consulting
experts, the purpose of the latter being to advise attorneys on case
development rather than to provide independent damages estimates. 148
Although the use of consulting experts in addition to testifying experts may
enhance the quality of a client’s case, it obviously also raises the client’s
cost of litigation. Although there is little evidence on how often attorneys
use consulting experts, approximately one-third of attorneys responding to
a survey regarding federal circuit cases in 1998 reported using consulting
experts. 149
A.

A Growing Market for Damages Testimony

In what has been termed a boom of financial expert testimony,150 the
demand for expert testimony is growing rapidly. 151 A 2002 Federal
144. Steven G. Jones, Marten Law Group, Conference on Effective Development &
Presentation of Expert Testimony: Capitalizing on Expertise for Success, Is an
“Independent” Expert Necessary? (Mar. 20, 2006) (conference materials and notes on file
with authors); see also Krafka et al., supra note 103, at 12 (stating that a financial expert can
be the difference between winning and losing a case).
145. Jones, supra note 144.
146. Honorable Marvin E. Aspen, C.J., U.S. Dist. Ct. No. Dist. Ill., Conference on
Effective Development & Presentation of Expert Testimony: Capitalizing on Expertise for
Success, Special Address: A View from the Bench on Do’s and Don’ts from Expert
Witnesses (March 21, 2006) (conference materials and notes on file with authors).
147. Krafka et al., supra note 103, at 12.
148. See, e.g., Peter B. Frank, et al., The Role of the Financial Expert in Litigation
Services, in LITIGATION SERVICES HANDBOOK (Roman L. Weil et al. eds. 4th ed. 2007), at
1.18; Bill Schuurman & Nicole Stafford, The Art of Using Experts, MANAGING INTELL.
PROP., May 2002, at 17. Consulting experts who do not testify receive special protection
from discovery under FED. R. CIV. PRO. 26(b)(4)(B), which is designed to prohibit a party
from using its opponents' own experts to prepare its own case.
149. Krafka et al., supra note 103, at 3, 18.
150. See Michael J. Mandel, Going for the Gold: Economists as Expert Witnesses, 13 J.
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 2, 113 (Spring 1999) (noting that the past several years have seen
explosive growth in litigation support consulting and estimating a 60% growth over a threeyear period in revenues for three large litigation support firms).
151. One survey showed that for federal civil trials involving experts, the number of
experts testifying rose from 1.85 to 2.47 during the period 1991-1998. Krafka et al., supra
note 103, at 11.
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Judicial Center study indicated that of 299 trials in 1998, 45% were tort
actions involving experts, and 98% of plaintiffs were likely to use
experts. 152 This burgeoning demand is due to a large extent to court
decisions suggesting that expert testimony is highly desirable in cases
involving business damages. For example, the absence of expert testimony
has resulted in courts refusing to accept damage estimates, as is apparent in
divorce cases. In Kelly v. Kelly, neither party presented damages expert
testimony. The appellate court determined that both parties’ opinion
testimony was insufficient to support the lower court’s valuation regarding
a business and remanded the case for appointment of a damages expert. 153
In Camp v. Camp, the court refused to consider tax consequences
emanating from a court-ordered buyout of a business because the husband
had presented no expert testimony calculating such tax ramifications. 154
The appellate court in Markowitz v. Markowitz affirmed the lower court’s
rejection of the husband’s no-evidence argument and acceptance of a
valuation supported by expert business damages testimony. 155 In Schwartz
v. Schwartz, the court affirmed the assignment of no value to a business and
noted that neither party had proffered expert testimony. 156 In Zeptner v.
Zeptner, the appellate court reversed the lower court award against the
husband and ruled that the wife had not presented evidence of an increase
in value in a business she alleged existed. 157 A similar result was obtained
in Franks v. Franks for similar reasons. 158
The court-driven need for experts is not restricted to divorce cases,
however. For example, the court in Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Meraj
International Inv. Corp., affirmed a lower court award that it found vastly
in excess of the company’s historical profits because of a failure of one of
the parties to provide rebuttal expert testimony. 159 The court in Unger v.
Amedisys, Inc. suggested the use of expert testimony in a stock price
reaction situation. 160 In Faris v. Stone, an attorney was found negligent for
not advising his client of her right to have a business valued by a competent

152. Zimmerman, supra note 107.
153. Kelly v. Kelly, No. 19263, 2003 WL 264342 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2003).
154. Camp v. Camp, No. A-02-832, 2003 Neb. App. LEXIS 320 (Neb. Ct. App. Dec. 16,
2003).
155. Markowitz v. Markowitz, No. 14-00-01505-CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 3318
(Tex. App. Apr. 17, 2003).
156. Schwartz v. Schwartz, No. 231266, 2003 Mich. App. LEXIS 749 (Mich. Ct. App.
Mar. 20, 2003).
157. Zeptner v. Zeptner, No. 2-01-254-CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 2388 (Tex. Ct. App.
Mar. 20, 2003).
158. Franks v. Franks, 571 S.E.2d 276 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002)
159. Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Meraj Int’l Inv. Corp., 315 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir.
2003).
160. Unger v. Amedisys, Inc., 401 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2005)
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business appraiser. 161 In Tinnell v. Commissioner, the U.S. Tax Court held
a taxpayer liable for accuracy-related penalties following his failure to use
expert testimony, 162 and the court in Snavely v. Smith noted that the
plaintiff did not present valuation expert testimony. 163
The demand for expert testimony has grown historically even in the
face of complaints about abuses, and no one has seriously suggested its
elimination. 164 At the same time, this demand is helping to drive what one
commentator has termed “an explosion of new entrants to the field.” 165
The damages expert market is splitting into commodity and differentiated
segments, in part because of the economics of the provision of expert
testimony and in part because the costs of a less than cutting-edge expert
can be high in terms of case outcomes. 166 It is not unusual for a damages
expert to cost $50,000 to $100,000 for producing a valuation report and
providing several days of testimony in deposition and trial. 167 Moreover,
expert fees are rarely, if ever, handled on a contingency basis because of
prohibitions by the American Bar Association and many state bar
associations, as well as the obvious implications for bias. 168 In return for
their fees, however, experts face professional risks that are increasing in the
161. Faris v. Stone, 103 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2003).
162. Tinnell v. CIR, T.C.M. 2001-106.
163. Snavely v. Smith, No. A097912, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 12085 (Cal. Ct.
App. Dec. 23, 2003).
164. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Idealizing Science and Demonizing Experts: An Intellectual
History of Expert Evidence, 52 VILL. L. REV. 763, 784 (2007).
165. 2007: A Year of Simplifying, Standardizing—and More Fair Value Statements,
BUS. VALUATION UPDATE (Bus. Valuation Resources, LLC, Portland, OR), Jan. 2008, at 6
(quoting business valuation expert Nancy Fannon).
166. Interview with Ronald Seigneur, Partner and Valuation Specialist with Seigneur
Gustafson Knight, LLP, in Denver, Colo. (March 13, 2008) (notes on file with authors). Mr.
Seigneur, who holds CPA, ABV, and CVA certifications, has over 25 years experience as an
expert witness and has published more than 75 articles on related topics. He is past
chairman of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Credential Committee
and a past member of its Consulting Services Executive Committee. Mr. Seigneur currently
serves as a member of its Business Valuation Education Task Force. He is a fellow of the
College of Law Practice Management and an adjunct professor at the University Denver
College of Law. With respect to the potential cost of questionable expert testimony, see
Brown v. Ruallam Enterprises, Inc., CA01-1423, 2002 Ark. App. LEXIS 477 (Ark. Ct. App.
Sept. 4, 2002), in which the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s rejection of
both parties’ experts for failure to calculate net profits.
167. Vern Krishna, The Risk Of ‘Hired Gun’ Experts: The Existing System Must Be
Improved, NAT’L POST’S FIN. POST & FP INVESTING (CAN.), Feb. 1, 2006, at FP9.
168. Peter B. Frank, et al., The Role of the Financial Expert in Litigation Services, in
LITIGATION SERVICES HANDBOOK 1.23 (Roman L. Weil ed., 2007) (noting that contingency
fees should be avoided by testifying experts even in jurisdictions that permit such fees
because of the appearance of bias). Also, a former damages expert recently pleaded guilty
to perjury for testifying that his fees were not based on case outcomes. Amanda Bronstad,
Former Milberg Weiss Expert Witness Agrees to Plead Guilty to Perjury, LAW.COM, Feb.
29, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1204287427247.
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post-Daubert era, as related later in this part.
B.

Who are the Business Damages Experts?

As a foundation for better understanding the risks borne by damages
experts, it is helpful to understand who the experts are and the
qualifications they typically bring to litigation. One source notes that the
ideal expert is someone who has never previously testified (to rule out
conflicting past testimony) and has no relationship with the retaining
attorneys (to avoid the appearance of bias), but who nonetheless possesses
substantial experience in litigation analysis, testimony, and response to
cross-examination—an obvious non sequitur. 169 Increasingly, experts are
professional “‘hired guns’ who have a reasonably high level of expertise in
a substantive area or a particular type of business.” 170 Testifying experts
must be deemed qualified by the courts, a matter of increasing concern in
the post-Daubert era. 171 After Daubert, as challenges to experts have
increased, 172 taking a risk on an inexperienced expert—or relying on an
improperly prepared report by an inexperienced expert—seems imprudent
to many attorneys because of the danger of not surviving a Daubert
hearing. 173 Perhaps the most important considerations for selecting a
damages expert from an attorney’s perspective are as follows: Will the
expert’s testimony assist the judge and jury? Is the expert qualified to
provide the required type of damages testimony in light of the facts of the
case? Will the expert appear objective and credible? Is the testimony
relevant and reliable? Does the expert have good communication skills,
since it is often the case that the best story teller wins? 174
169. See Frank, supra note 148, at 1.4.
170. Bart A. Lazar, Watch Words Around Potential Witnesses, AM. MKTG. NEWS, Jul. 15,
2005, at 6.
171. See, e.g., PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 3 (showing evidence of growth in the
number of Daubert hearings); see also In re the Marriage of Buruga, No. G034472, 2005
WL 2224967 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2005) (noting that valuation experts are expected to
testify and that their reports may be excluded if they do not testify); Phase 2 Developers
Corp. v. Citicorp Real Estate, No. B160111, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 117 (Cal. Ct.
App. Jan. 8, 2004) (stating that valuation expert testimony must involve meaningful
responses as to the basis for the expert’s valuation).
172. PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 3.
173. It should be noted that Daubert challenges are not without their risk to attorneys
who bring them because Daubert motions give cross-examination strategies away in a
manner similar to the way in which many attorneys show their hand in depositions. In this
regard, the conventional wisdom of "save it for the cross" is often observed in the breach.
Harry Susman, Conference on Effective Development & Presentation of Expert Testimony:
Capitalizing on Expertise for Success, Preparing a Cross Examination (March 21, 2006)
(conference materials and notes on file with authors).
174. Craig T. Elson, LECG, LLC, Conference on Effective Development & Presentation
of Expert Testimony: Capitalizing on Expertise for Success, The Role of the Expert: What
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Some attorneys maintain that an ability to teach jurors without
appearing condescending is more important than credentials. 175 Juries are
said to relate better to credible experts who are good teachers and simplify
complex topics, 176 and judges are said to be weary of boring and biased
experts. 177 Consequently, some judges and attorneys prefer academics as
experts, feeling that academics appear to have greater credibility and an
ability to relate complex subject matter clearly. 178 In addition, damages
experts who have performed independent research that corresponds to their
opinions in cases are perceived as more believable than experts the juries
perceive as hired guns. 179 There is far from universal agreement, however,
on using academics as damages experts. One concern is whether
professors have the time and staff support to dedicate to cases to properly
prepare reports and testimony. 180 Also, using inexperienced academic
damages experts can be risky because of unknown attitudes toward a
variety of matters. 181 Professors have sometimes been known to argue with
themselves, 182 an unfortunate tendency given that wavering on an opinion

Does an Expert Bring to the Table (March 20, 2006) (conference materials and notes on file
with authors); see also Susman, supra note 173 (proposing that 90% of testifying is how an
expert says something as opposed to what is said); Leslie A. Gordon, Technology,
Translated, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2006, at 24 (stating that twenty years ago lawyers would settle
for an expert who knew the subject matter, but today they need an expect who can connect
with the jury); James G. Atkins, Effective Courtroom Testimony, NAT’L. LITIG.
CONSULTANTS' REV., Oct. 2006, at 11 (discussing the mechanics of effective communication
in courtroom testimony by valuation experts).
175. Bill Ibelle, Commentary: Credentials Not As Important As Expert’s Ability To
Teach, LAW. WKLY. U.S.A., May 9, 2005.
176. Jones, supra note 144.
177. Daniel J. Furniss, Townsend and Townsend and Crew LLP, Dave E. Everson, Jr.,
Stinson Morrison Hecker LLP, and Harry P. Susman, Susman Godfrey LLP, Conference on
Effective Development & Presentation of Expert Testimony: Capitalizing on Expertise for
Success, Before and at Trial (March 21, 2006) (conference materials and notes on file with
authors).
178. Margaret M. Duncan, McDermott Will & Emery LLP, Conference on Effective
Development & Presentation of Expert Testimony: Capitalizing on Expertise for Success,
What Kind, and How Much, Expertise is Required? (March 20, 2006) (conference materials
and notes on file with authors).
179. Jones, supra note 144; see Theodore T. Herhold, Townsend and Townsend and
Crew LLP, Conference on Effective Development & Presentation of Expert Testimony:
Capitalizing on Expertise for Success, Effective Development & Presentation of Expert
Testimony (March 21, 2006) (conference materials and notes on file with authors) (stating
that professors are also sometimes preferred as technical experts by plaintiffs' attorneys,
because they are not subject to countersuit inasmuch as they have no affiliation with
companies whose products that compete with the defendant's products).
180. Duncan, supra note 178.
181. Jones, supra note 144.
182. Mandel, supra note 150 (noting the natural tension between the academic mindset
that "one should always be open to the possibility that someone else has a better argument"
and a legal environment that encourages experts to stick with positions even if they might
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is usually a fatal flaw to expert testimony. 183 Professors without practical
business experience may appear too theoretical to juries, 184 and some legal
commentators believe that juries are less impressed than attorneys with
professors. 185 Consequently, although the notion of the academic damages
expert appeals to some attorneys and judges because of a perception that
such experts are less biased, 186 selection of such an expert is not without its
added risks. Some commentators believe that a balance of academic
background and real-world experience is desirable. 187 Certain valuation
firms offer the best of both worlds—providing highly qualified academics
who have testimony experience supported by substantial firm resources to
include purely professional experts, capable staff, and tight quality-control
policy and procedures. 188
Well-qualified professional damages experts typically have a variety
of credentials that include some or all of the following: 1) advanced
degrees in business or economics; 2) professional licenses and
certifications such as bar membership and certified public accountancy
(CPA); 3) valuation designations such as ABV, ASA, and CVA; 189 4)
relevant real-world experience; 5) a knowledge of econometrics and
statistics; 6) a knowledge of sampling techniques; 6) specialized course
work in business valuation; 7) experience in financial analysis, financial
forecasting, and applications of business valuation methods; and 8) relevant
publications in leading academic and practice journals. 190 Sometimes,
given the need for specialized expertise to support defensible valuations,
more than one expert may be needed. This occurs often when a
specialized, technical set of procedures such as statistical analysis is needed
as support for the more usual valuation methodology. 191 In such situations,
attorneys may be faced with a tradeoff between a relatively inexperienced
expert with excellent technical skills versus an experienced expert with
excellent general valuation skills, and occasionally may choose the more
otherwise change them given fresh evidence).
183. Jones, supra note 144.
184. Id.
185. Elson, supra note 174.
186. Aspen, supra note 146.
187. Elson, supra note 174.
188. Examples include Clifton Gundersen, LLP and The Analysis Group.
189. See JAMES R. HITCHNER, FINANCIAL VALUATION: APPLICATION AND MODELS 551-63
(2d ed. 2006) (discussing valuation designations and organizations granting these
designations).
190. Id. at 359-60, 559-61; Robert E. Hall & Victoria A. Lazear, Reference Guide on
Estimation of Economic Losses in Damages Awards, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 277, 282-283 (2d. ed. 2000).
191. Mohan Rao, LECG, LLC, Conference on Effective Development & Presentation of
Expert Testimony: Capitalizing on Expertise for Success, What Experts Should Fear Most
(March 20, 2006) (conference materials and notes on file with authors).
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experienced expert to the detriment of their case because opposing counsel
will attempt to exploit any weakness in the experienced expert’s technical
knowledge. 192
C.

Attorney/Expert Communication and Expansive Discovery

Effective communication between attorneys and experts is essential in
litigation, as evidenced in this statement: “For good economics and other
reasons, the analyst needs to communicate proactively, clearly, and often
with the attorney on many aspects of the engagement.” 193 From an ethical
perspective, attorneys may do the following in communicating with
experts:
• Ask the expert to reconsider an opinion in light of additional
information;
• Suggest ways in which the expert’s opinion may be
strengthened or supported;
• Ask direct questions to ensure that the expert’s opinion is
well-founded;
• Assist the expert in preparing for deposition or trial by
advising on likely questions; and
• Advise the expert when testimony is confusing. 194
On the other hand, attorneys should avoid pressuring experts and not
attempt to pressure the expert to extend an opinion, exaggerate credentials,
or provide opinions outside of the expert’s expertise. 195
Despite the need for experts to know where attorneys are proceeding
with various lines of questioning, 196 independent experts may not invoke
192. Id.; see also Seigneur, supra note 166 (proposing that it is best to use a separate
technical expert's report as an input to the experienced valuation expert's report, and then to
firewall the two experts so that the potential for opposing counsel to elicit conflicting
testimony from the two experts decreases greatly).
193. HITCHNER, supra note 189, at 1027.
194. Dean B. Brown, Beermann Swerdlove LLP, and Stephen G. Pawlow, Managing
Director Litigation Support/Corporate Finance, RSM McGladrey, Inc., Conference on
Effective Development & Presentation of Expert Testimony: Capitalizing on Expertise for
Success, Ethical Issues for Lawyers and Experts (March 21, 2006) (conference materials
and notes on file with authors).
195. Id.
196. Jones, supra note 144. At times opposing experts attend each other’s depositions.
Although a joint decision may allow this to occur, the decision should take place with
proper notice. See, e.g., Ledden v. Kuzma, 858 N.E.2d 186 (Ind. App. 2006). Another issue
that can arise is whether to have staggered or simultaneous expert report submission. Some
argue that staggered reports produce smaller differences in damages estimates, whereas
others argue that simultaneous submission is more equitable. See, e.g., Lane v. Cancer
Treatment Ctr. of Am., Inc., No. 12207-NC, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 67 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27,
2001).
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attorney/client privilege, 197 and anything an attorney says to an expert is
potentially discoverable. 198
Savvy experts should assume that all
communication with attorneys is discoverable. 199 Consequently, for
reasons of both the appearance of bias and potential discovery, it is risky,
but nonetheless useful, for damages experts to be party to strategizing
about trial themes. 200
Although experts’ legal obligation to preserve evidence has long been
established, 201 some recent cases suggest that discovery of damages experts
is becoming more and more expansive and that evidence spoliation 202 is
being more carefully scrutinized by courts, 203 with sanctions sometimes
being imposed. 204 Under the doctrine of omnia praesumuntur contra
spoliatorem, deliberate or negligent destruction usually results in the
inference that the destroyed materials would be contrary to the interests of
the despoiler. 205 An adverse inference is the least drastic and most
197. Jones, supra note 144.
198. Id.
199. Brown & Pawlow, supra note 194.
200. Jones, supra note 144. It is also incumbent upon experts to safeguard client
confidences and to refrain from using confidential information for purposes of selfenrichment. Further, most jurisdictions prohibit attorneys from contacting opposing experts
outside the formal discovery process. See Brown & Pawlow, supra note 194 (giving an
example in which an attorney engaged in misconduct by contacting an opposing party's
witness ex parte) (citing Erickson v. Newmar Corp., 87 F.3d 298 (9th Cir. 1996)); Campbell
Indus. v. M/V Gemini, 619 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1980) (recognizing that ex parte contact with
opposing party's expert in not permitted under federal rules); Heyde v. Xtraman, Inc. 404
S.E.2d 607 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (noting that attorneys cannot circumvent discovery
procedures by engaging in ex parte communications with opposing party's expert);
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING §3.4 (2d ed. Supp.
1994). But see Brown v. Hamid, 856 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. 1993) (holding that the trial court did
not err in failing to sanction improper ex parte contact because there was no prejudice to the
complaining party).
201. Robert W. Hayes, Cozen O’Connor, Conference on Effective Development &
Presentation of Expert Testimony: Capitalizing on Expertise for Success, Implementing
Appropriate Document Control and Retention Policies (March 20, 2006) (conference
materials and notes on file with authors).
202. Id. at 1 (“Spoliation is the destruction, loss, or material alteration of potentially
relevant evidence by the act or omission of a party who was under some duty to preserve
that evidence.”)
203. See, e.g., West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d. 776, 778-80 (2d. Cir.
1999) (analyzing the lower court’s dismissal of a complaint as a sanction for spoliation of
evidence); Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Townsend, No. 3:04-CV-291, 2007 WL 1002317 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 30, 2007) (striking expert testimony even though spoliation was not done maliciously
and was done before reports were contested); Trigon Ins. Co. v. U.S., 204 F.R.D. 277, 284
(E.D. Va. 2001) (discussing punishments for spoliators of evidence).
204. Hayes, supra note 201, at 1-2 (noting that sanctions have varied widely across
jurisdictions) (citing Kippenham v. Chaulk Services, Inc., 697 N.E.2d. 527, 530 (Mass.
1998) and Donohue v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 155 F.R.D. 515, 519 (M.D. Pa. 1994)).
205. Dodson v. Ford Motor Co., No. PC 96-1331, 2006 R.I. Super. LEXIS 113 (noting
that a demonstration of bad faith is not necessary for an adverse inference due to spoliation)
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common sanction. 206 Others include exclusion of evidence, monetary
sanctions, and contempt sanctions. 207 Courts typically impose more drastic
sanctions where spoliation is more culpable and where it has a greater
impact on the adverse party’s ability to prove its case. 208 For example,
Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. v. Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. created
significant concern in legal and financial circles, not only because of the
$1.45 billion damages award but also because the jury was permitted to
draw adverse inferences from the defendant’s destruction of a large volume
of evidence. 209
In the late 1980s, some courts began to expand the reach of spoliation
to include evidence “considered” instead of just evidence “relied upon.” 210
Further, courts have interpreted Rule 26(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to include drafts of expert reports, 211 raising the question of what
exactly constitutes a draft. For example, will a court consider a partial draft
to be a draft? Must an expert produce a copy of every partial draft to
include all changes? There is some belief that copying over something
typed into a partial draft during editing could be considered spoliation. 212
Questions such as these suggest the need for courts to take a commonsense
approach in requiring disclosure of documents. Some experts would prefer
that only documents actually transmitted outside their own offices be
discoverable. 213
Fortunately, not all courts have required experts to produce everything
that might represent internal work product. 214 For example, in Physicians
Dialysis Ventures, Inc. v. Griffith, an expert faced with accusations of
spoliation admitted to destroying notes she had taken throughout an
engagement, in accordance with her firm’s policy. The court determined
(citing Mead v. Papa Razzi Rest., 840 A.2d. 1103, 1109 (R.I. 2004)); Malinowski v. UPS,
792 A.2d. 50, 54 (R.I. 2002) (citations omitted); Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat’l Bank v. E.
Gen. Contractors, Inc., 674 A.2d 1227, 1234 (R.I. 1996)); see Farrell v. Connetti Trailer
Sales, Inc., 727 A.2d 183, 186 (R.I. 1999).
206. Hayes, supra note 201, at 3.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Reversal of Fortune: $1.45 Billion Verdict Vacated for Lack of Fraud-Free
Valuation, BUS. VALUATION UPDATE (Bus. Valuation Resources, LLC, Portland, OR), Jun.
28, 2007, at 14 (citing Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. v. Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc., 955
So.2d 1124 (Fla. App. 2007)).
210. Hayes, supra note 201, at 7 (citing Trigon Ins. Co. v. United States, 204 F.R.D. 277,
284 (E.D. Va. 2001), and Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 384, 393-94 (N.D.
Cal. 1991)).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 17.
213. See Seigneur, supra note 166 (noting one leading expert’s suggestion that a
commonsense approach would be to make only documents that are transmitted “outside the
house” discoverable).
214. Hayes, supra note 201, at 17.

2009]

BUSINESS DAMAGES EXPERT TESTIMONY

325

that spoliation had not taken place because the expert had no reason to
believe that she would be obligated to produce her notes. She had never
received a formal document request or any notice that opposing counsel
wanted the notes until after she submitted her report. The court stated that
experts need not produce every scrap of paper created in the course of an
engagement, but rather what the expert was provided. 215 Nonetheless,
because of a lack of uniformity in decisions, this movement toward tighter
application of the requirements creates an imperative for parties to know
the document retention policies of the court early in case development and
engenders concern that a court might require the production of partial drafts
of reports and mere thoughts expressed on scraps of papers. 216
Although this trend may hold some nebulous benefit from an
evidentiary perspective, it also has the potential to impede attorney/expert
communications and reduce the quality of the evidence presented at trial. 217
Attorneys and experts are now admonished to avoid any unnecessary
paperwork or electronic communication, and attorneys are well-advised not
to show a consulting expert’s work to a testifying expert. 218 Consequently,
less and less is being written down by damages experts in the development
of their reports, and, given the complexity of cases and the limitations on
human cognition, 219 this makes accurate report-writing more difficult. 220
Carried too far, this trend seems likely to result in a burdensome
impediment to attorney/expert communications in ways that will not serve
case preparation well, 221 and could even lead to increased risk of
malpractice liability for experts. 222 One leading damages expert, noting
that the biggest change in the damages expert area is the proliferation of
documents in electronic format, foresees growing document authenticity
issues with which the moral and ethical standards have yet to catch up.
This expert also foresees a conflict involving discovery of opposing

215. Physicians Dialysis Ventures, Inc. v. Griffith, No. 06-2468, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
78879 (D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2007).
216. Seigneur, supra note 166.
217. Id.
218. Aspen, supra note 146.
219. See, e.g., George A. Miller, The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some
Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 81, 81 (1956)
(describing limitations on human cognitive behavior).
220. Seigneur, supra note 166.
221. Id. The interviewee noted that experts now are being admonished by attorneys not
to take notes in meetings for fear of discovery. This raises the question of how experts can
remember what is said and creates obvious negative implications for the quality of their
reports.
222. See, e.g., Kranz v. Tiger, 914 A.2d 854 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (holding
that it was for the jury to determine whether expert witness breached contract to testify in
underlying action or whether expert witness negligently or intentionally permitted his
scheduling manager to lead client to believe he was unavailable to testify).
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counsel’s thought process, theoretically protected from discovery, through
acquisition of an expert’s notes taken in meetings with counsel—notes that
are not protected from discovery. 223 Going forward, it is to be hoped that
courts will at least adopt the approach of one federal judge who deems
common editing of drafts to not be subject to discovery and requires only
drafts in which major reformulations have been made to be subject to
discovery. 224
D.

Damages Experts Increasingly at Risk

In addition to the discomfort many potential damages experts already
feel about stepping into the adversarial process, 225 there is little doubt that
experts are undergoing greater scrutiny by the courts and that their burden
of risk is growing. 226 One damages expert has stated:
From every angle, our profession, our capabilities, and the data
on which we rely are being examined more closely by the courts,
IRS, SEC, FASB, and the public and private equity markets . . . .
Our profession is a high-stakes undertaking on virtually any field
one chooses to play. 227
A recent study by the international public accounting and consulting
firm of PricewaterhouseCoopers indicates that “[t]he number of experts
challenged under Daubert increased by more than one third between 2005
and 2006-–the second consecutive annual increase of more than 30
223. Interview with Thomas E. Hilton, Co-Director of Valuation and Litigation Services,
Anders Minkler & Diehl LLP, St. Louis, Mo., (March 21, 2008) (notes on file with authors).
Mr. Hilton, who holds CPA, ABV, ASA and CVA certifications, has over 31 years of
professional experience in expert testimony and financial matters. He has taught various
courses for the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and is a member of that
organization's Business Valuation/Forensic Legal Services Executive Committee. He is the
immediate past chair of the AICPA's Business Valuation Committee and also of the
National Association of Certified Valuation Analysts Executive Advisory Board. In 2004,
he was inducted into the AICPA Business Valuation Hall of Fame.
224. Aspen, supra note 146; see Stephen Bennett, Taking a Second Bite of the Cherry,
90 MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 42 (1999) (describing how, in 1999, the U.K. adopted new
civil procedure rules for standard disclosure in an effort to replace large tracts of existing
procedural rules).
225. See Gary L. Freed, Training Experts to Testify, NAT’L LITIG. CONSULTANTS REV.,
Mar. 2007, at 6, 6-7 (“It is not unreasonable for a potential or new testifier to be so
concerned about learning to testify that [he] question[s] whether [he has] made the right
decision to practice in this area.”). The author goes on to cite situations in which he has
been yelled and lunged at by opposing counsel during a deposition. He also describes being
forced to sit under an air-conditioning vent and not being allowed to move even after
complaining and subsequently becoming ill.
226. 2007: A Year of Simplifying, Standardizing—and More Fair Value Statements,
BUS. VALUATION UPDATE (Bus. Valuation Resources, LLC), Jan. 2008, at 8.
227. Id.(quoting business valuation expert Nancy Fannon).
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percent.” 228 Motions in limine are common, 229 occurring in 79% of federal
court cases in 1998, a figure up from 32% in 1991. 230 There are strong
indications that the frequency of Daubert hearings is increasing 231 and that
experts are being held to higher standards by judges. 232 Furthermore, the
rate of success of Daubert motions varies greatly across both federal and
state jurisdictions and across the various federal circuits, making venue
another important issue for those damages experts who routinely operate in
multiple jurisdictions. 233
One of the greatest fears for most professionals who make their living
as testifying experts is that they will fail to survive a Daubert hearing,
thereby rendering their reputations as experts forever tainted. 234 Given that
lack of reliability of damages experts’ testimony is the leading cause for
exclusion of this testimony under the Daubert criteria, 235 this fear can at
times present experts with the conundrum of having to choose between
using more accepted valuation methodologies that are safer with respect to
admissibility versus using more leading-edge methodologies that the expert
believes will result in more accurate valuations. 236 Given that each case is
228. PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 3, at 7.
229. Duncan, supra note 178.
230. Krafka et al., supra note 103, at 14.
231. PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 3, at 7-12. The number of Daubert challenges
has been rising every year since 2001, with the year 2006 posting a record number of 348
expert testimonies excluded. This was approximately three times the number in 2000. Id.
Although most of the Daubert challenges occur in the federal courts, as one might expect
given that Daubert and its progeny represent federal standards, Daubert challenges do
occur, albeit with less frequency, in the 17 state jurisdictions that have embraced Daubert.
Id. The most Daubert challenges occur in Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, Delaware, and
Massachusetts. Id.
232. Rao, supra note 191. Interestingly, plaintiffs’ experts are challenged more
frequently under the Daubert criteria than defendants’ experts in federal courts, but both
have similar overall exclusion rates. The exclusion rate varies from year to year with respect
to the party. PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 3, at 22. Also, economists, accountants,
and statisticians are the most frequently challenged, but they are also the most likely to
survive a challenge. Id. at 25. Breach of contract or fiduciary duty lawsuits result in the
most frequent challenges, but with low success rates. Conversely, fraud cases have the
highest exclusion rate. Id. at 28.
233. PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 3, at 17.
234. Rao, supra note 191. In a recent survey, federal judges reported holding Daubert
hearings in nearly half of all cases involving expert evidence. Krafka et al., supra note 103,
at 19.
235. PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 3, at 31.
236. Id. at 34-36. The list of novel and untested methodologies that various courts
excluded during the 2000-2006 period included the following methodologies: the
“proportional trading model” (Kaufman v. Motorola, Inc., No. 95 C 1069, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14627 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2000)); enhancement of a reasonable royalty rate through
the application of a multiplier (Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Gennum Corp., No. 3:01-cv-4204RS, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10604 (N.D. Cal. March 26, 2004)); “consumption theory” (In
re Perry County Foods, Inc., 313 B.R. 875 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2004)); “straight-line ramp-up
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unique, opposing counsel may raise a Daubert challenge to the use of
scientifically acceptable methodologies on the basis that they have never
been applied before in the context of a particular case. This can afford a
means of probing damages analysis prior to trial even if the Daubert
challenge is unsuccessful. 237
For an example of just such a conundrum, consider the current debate
over whether experts can quantify the company-specific risk for publicly
traded companies that are used as comparables in order to value privately
held companies. 238 It has long been held within the business valuation
community that this risk cannot be objectively quantified, but two damages
experts recently proposed a rigorous methodology for doing this. The
Butler-Pinkerton methodology can result in a substantively higher discount
rate in valuing a stream of cash flows generated by a business being valued,
thereby materially lowering the value of the company. 239 Consider the
possible dilemma of an expert choosing whether to use the ButlerPinkerton methodology, which would result in a valuation more favorable
to the expert’s defendant client. The safer path would be to use an accepted
methodology which could result in greater damages for the client but have
a greater chance of not surviving Daubert challenge. 240 Is that the best
choice for the client, however? The answer may well rest with the client’s
risk preferences. Furthermore, suppose the expert chooses the safer path.
Does this expose the expert to possible risk stemming from a malpractice
claim later? Conversely, if the expert chooses the riskier path with a more
favorable valuation for the client but fails to survive a Daubert hearing,
does this likewise have implications for malpractice liability? 241
method” (Haupt v. Heaps, 131 P.3d 252 (Utah Ct. App. 2005)); and a novel methodology
for determining cash flows in computing terminal value (In re Nellson Nutraceutical, Inc.,
356 B.R. 364 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006)).
237. Robert Hall & Victoria A. Lazear, Reference Guide on Estimation of Economic
Losses in Damages Awards, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 277, 283 (2d
ed. 2000).
238. See
Company
Specific
Risk
Calculator
Goes
Live,
BVWire,
http://www.bvresources.com/BVWire/November2007Issue62-2.htm (last visited Nov. 14,
2007) (providing a brief explanation of the controversy regarding an expert’s ability to
quantify company-specific risk).
239. Carole Gailor, The Ethical Conundrum of Attribution: Plagiarism in Valuation
Reports, BUS. VALUATION UPDATE (Bus. Valuation Resources, LLC), Feb. 2007.
240. Courts typically frown upon novel approaches, as in In re Nellson Nutraceutical,
356 B.R. 364 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (disqualifying a valuation expert's report under Daubert
criteria for using a "maverick" discounted cash flow analysis). See Rao, supra note 191
(“This [situation] creates a bit of a dilemma for the damages expert in that new and novel
approaches to analyzing the existence and extent of damages are often not 'established' in
prior case law.”).
241. See Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 780 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997) (holding that financial experts are not immune to malpractice liability with respect to
their clients as a result of their testimony). However, this question would likely have been
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Courts will often ask whether a particular expert, though generally
qualified, is qualified to perform a particular analysis. 242 Here, again, as
with much of expert qualification, the vista becomes a bit hazy because in
some situations courts have allowed experts to testify on the basis of
general valuation credentials, whereas in other cases they have deemed
such background insufficient. 243 The nebulous criterion of being qualified
in a particular analysis presents a judgment problem for both attorneys and
experts in trying to guess how a court may view some particular facet of
the qualifications required to render an expert opinion. 244 So intent are
some opposing counsel on discrediting expert witnesses that they, on
occasion, waste the courts’ time in what might seem to be a search for an
expert with qualifications that do not exist. 245 For example, in Pfizer, Inc.
moot in years gone by because experts have rarely been sued as a result of their testimony.
PETER B. FRANK ET AL., The Role of the Financial Expert in Litigation Services, in ROMAN
L. WEIL ET AL., LITIGATION SERVICES HANDBOOK 1.28 (4th ed. 2007). There is evidence
beginning to develop, however, that this may not be the case in the future and that experts
will be well served to consider the implications of their decisions regarding methodologies
with respect to their own liability. For example, in Nanovation Techs., Inc. v. BearingPoint
Inc., 364 B.R. 308 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007), an international consulting firm that included a
valuation practice was sued by its client for negligence and breach of contract concerning
common stock valuations that it provided for tax purposes but the client used for other
purposes. Although the lawsuit did not arise as a result of BearingPoint’s involvement as an
expert in litigation, it shows that some clients are willing to sue their valuation experts when
events turn sour. In Kranz v. Tiger, 914 A.2d 854 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007), the
court ruled that negligent communication between a client’s medical expert and his
attorneys, which resulted in the client’s acceptance of a settlement solely because the
attorneys wrongly informed the client that the expert was unavailable to testify, may provide
grounds for a professional malpractice action against the expert. Also, in Hoffman v.
Gaglio, No. B181356, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9655 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2005),
the court held that a real estate appraiser could be held liable for malpractice under a
negligent misrepresentation theory even though the third party was not in the class of
persons intended to benefit from reliance on the expert’s report. Further, at least one courtappointed expert has been sued for malpractice, albeit without success. See Riemers v.
O’Halloran, 678 N.W.2d 547 (N.D. 2004). Cases such as these suggest the possibility of a
growing risk of malpractice liability for valuation experts. One leading business damages
expert has noted that malpractice insurers are becoming more concerned about experts’
liability for malpractice and that malpractice liability is growing, especially for casual
experts such as professors unaffiliated with forensic services groups. Seigneur, supra note
166. This could be one reason for the aforementioned trend toward full-time professional
experts. Lazar, supra note 170.
242. Lloyd, supra note 25, at 386-87; see, e.g., Pabst Brewing Co. v. Comm’r, 72
T.C.M. (CCH) 1236 (T.C. 1996); In re Imperial Credit Indus., Inc. Sec. Litig., 252 F. Supp.
2d 1005 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
243. Lloyd, supra note 25, at 386-87.
244. Seigneur, supra note 166 (stating that the interviewee noted that this issue is driving
experts to specialize more and specialists to become subspecialists).
245. Hilton, supra note 223 (providing an account from a qualified expert about how he
recently spent an entire day in voir dire during which opposing counsel unsuccessfully
attempted to establish that he was not an expert on some minute aspect of his report).
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v. Advanced Monobloc Corp., the court deemed a financial expert with
exemplary qualifications unfit to make a twenty-year sales forecast because
he had never developed a twenty-year sales forecast. 246 Development of
sales forecasts is a topic routinely taught in business schools such as the
prestigious school where the expert was a professor. 247 The fact that a
court concerned itself with the length of a sales forecast might be viewed as
either naiveté or extreme pickiness, inasmuch as basic valuation techniques
often assume implicitly a constant growth sales forecast when valuing
damages by capitalizing a cash flow stream. 248
Some would argue that the issue of experts’ qualifications often boils
down to a question of the magnitude of damages at stake and that cases
involving damages of large magnitude should call for a national search for
the very best expert for a given situation, whereas a similar search would
impose an unfair burden on the parties in cases where the magnitude of the
damages is small. 249 This argument, however, has the logical flaw of
assuming that a given magnitude of damages has the same importance to
large and small parties; in reality, $1 million in damages may be more
meaningful to a small party than $10 million to a large one.
Once past the common motion in limine challenge, damages experts
are likely to be challenged in deposition and in court on three basic points:
their assumptions, their analyses, and whether their results make sense
within the context of the case. 250 An expert opinion “is no better than the

246. Pfizer Inc. v. Advanced Monobloc Corp., C.A. No. 97C-04-037-WTQ, 1999 Del.
Super. LEXIS 330 (Sept. 2, 1999), at 15.
247. See, e.g., Clyde P. Stickney, Paul R. Brown & James M. Wahlen, FINANCIAL
REPORTING, FINANCIAL STATEMENT ANALYSIS, AND VALUATION: A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE
730-36 (6th ed. 2007) (including sales forecasting as part of the curriculum).
248. See, e.g., HITCHNER, supra note 189, at 116.
249. See Lloyd, supra note 25, at 391 (inferring that the choice of an expert who is not
preeminent in the field should lead courts to suspect that such an expert was chosen as a
result of willingness to provide more favorable testimony). This position implicitly involves
various assumptions: a) a preeminent expert exists; b) the expert's identity can be learned
with reasonable effort; c) the expert is available; d) the expert is willing to take the case; and
e) the expert is affordable to the prospective client. Perhaps more importantly, from the
perspectives of both the quality of jurisprudence and the client's best interests, it is important
to have an expert who can work well with client's counsel. This may not always be a
characteristic of the preeminent expert, however. Seigneur, supra note 166.
250. Jeffrey H. Kinrich, Analysis Group, Law Seminars International: A Comprehensive
Two Day Conference on Effective Development & Presentation of Expert Testimony,
Ensuring Quality Control in Expert Reports (Mar. 20, 2006) (materials and notes on file
with authors). Valuation experts are usually required to provide support for their
assumptions, and courts sometimes take a dim view of an expert's assumptions if they are
based upon someone else's assumptions. See Lloyd, supra note 25, at 405. See, for
example, Blue Dane Simmental Corp. v. American Simmental Ass’n, 178 F.3d 1035, 104041 (8th Cir. 1999), where a valuation expert's uncontroversial accounting methodology was
excluded for a failure to consider all relevant variables that could affect his conclusion.
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soundness of the reasons supporting it.” 251 In this regard, it is important
that damages experts know the facts of the case, partly to avoid an inability
to defend assumptions used in valuation models. 252 Such assumptions can
be quite problematic for experts, 253 and courts have sometimes been
251. Perreira v. Sec’y of Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 33 F.3d. 1375, 1375 n.6 (Fed.
Cir. 1994).
252. See Susman, supra note 173. It is common for assumptions to be provided by the
client or client's counsel, and testimony has been frequently excluded for a failure on the
part of experts to adequately vet such assumptions. See, e.g., Browning v. Smea, No.
B172371 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Neb. Plastics, Inc. v. Holland Colors Americas, Inc., 408
F.3d 410 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that testimony of an expert could be excluded because it
failed to take into account important facts at issue); see also Nancy J. Fannon, Expert
Testimony in the Courtroom: Is Vigorous Cross-Examination Enough, FINANCIAL
VALUATION & LITIGATION EXPERT, 13, 14 (2007). Also, valuation experts are often forced
into making assumptions because some key documents are never requested in discovery or
never produced by opposing counsel. Further, there is a risk that some assumptions will be
shown to be false because of documents that were never requested. Experts will sometimes
also engage in additional analyses at additional costs to the client because of missing
documents in an effort to shore up their valuation conclusions. Asserting an assumption that
is inconsistent with, or not corroborated by, facts is a frequent reason for criticism, or even
exclusion, by the courts. See Rao, supra note 191. Directly related to this issue is the
matter of reliance upon management forecasts. Although reliance upon data verified by
third-parties such as independent auditors is certainly preferable, such data is frequently not
available, either because it does not exist—perhaps due to the small size of the client—or
because it involves prospective information that cannot be verified. For a discussion of such
data concerns and related cases, see Lloyd, supra note 25, at 396. More generally, courts
have rejected forecasts they found to be speculative. See, e.g., Weissberg v. Peinado, No.
A097102, A097232, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3541, at *3 (Cal. App. Apr. 10, 2003)
(holding that damages supported by speculative expert testimony were unforeseeable and
thus not recoverable); Haff v. Augeson, No. C1-02-1652, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 460
(Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2003).
253. Roy Weinstein, President, Micronomics, LLC, Conference on Effective
Development & Presentation of Expert Testimony: Capitalizing on Expertise for Success,
The Science of Economics Challenges to Expert Testimony (March 21, 2006) (conference
materials and notes on file with authors). At this conference, Mr. Weinstein stated:
Although the correct application of economic theory yields one correct answer
from any given set of facts, economists often disagree outside the courtroom as
to what that answer is. The reason for such disagreements is that modern
economic systems are extraordinarily complex, such that the problems
economists are asked to address often encompass thousands, if not millions, of
moving parts. This leaves the economist with the daunting task of predicting
each of those movements and determining the outcome associated with all of
them. Given this kind of complexity, it is not surprising that economists often
disagree.
Id. Another commentator notes, "[e]xperts may be asked to make assumptions or rely on
the client's representation in lieu of developing the appropriate underlying analyses. The
resulting opinion is subject to criticism, especially if there are countervailing facts." Rao,
supra note 191. A failure on the part of a valuation expert to adequately explain the analytic
assumptions in a valuation can also be cause for exclusion of expert testimony. See, e.g.,
Lippe v. Bairnco Corp., 99 Fed. Appx. 274 (2nd Cir. 2004) (affirming trial judge’s
exclusion of expert testimony on the ground that the testimony was based on assumptions
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inconsistent with respect to what is allowed in the way of such inputs, 254 a
matter that may depend upon the predilections of individual judges. 255 For
example, in Robert Billet Promotions, Inc. v. IMI Cornelius, Inc., the court
stated that the damages expert’s model must not only be appropriate and
acceptable but must also conform to the facts and be properly applied to the
facts. 256 In Lithuanian Commerce Corp. v. Sara Lee Hosiery, the expert’s
assumptions regarding future duration of the business, market share, and
consumption patterns were deemed not credible. 257
In Children’s
Broadcasting Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., the court stated that the expert had
relied upon inaccurate and unreliable financial projections and had offered
projections that went far beyond realistic optimism. 258 Conversely, in In re
Emerging Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, the court allowed
the most contemporaneous management projections to be utilized as inputs
to the damage calculation. 259 Similarly, in In re Commercial Financial
that failed to consider a host of factors vital to the case). Assumptions that form the inputs
to valuation models are the most likely aspect of a damages expert's report and testimony
that opposing counsel will attack. This stems from such assumptions being the part of the
testimony that opposing counsel is most likely to understand and also because "garbage in,
garbage out" is a principal strategy for negating expert testimony. See Fannon, supra note
252, at 12-14; see also Lloyd, supra note 25, at 409-11 (suggesting that expert testimony
relying on numerous assumptions should be suspect). Damages estimates based upon a
hierarchy of assumptions are typically viewed with more skepticism by the courts, and
ignorance of the existence of data that might have made a difference in the valuation is
generally not an acceptable excuse for the expert not having used such data. This presents
yet another risk for damages experts because clients may withhold, from the expert,
knowledge of the existence of information and data unfavorable to the client's case in the
hopes that it will not be discovered. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 732 (1977)
(indicating that the drastic simplifications often made in economists’ hypothetical models
generally must be abandoned in the real world (citing Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 493 (1968)).
254. One leading valuation text notes the following:
Business plans (or [a] litigant’s financial projections) sometimes are used as a
foundation for damage calculations because business plans and projections
created prior to the wrongful actions are independent of the litigation motives of
the parties. However, since some courts have ruled that unproven business
plans and financial projections are not adequate to provide the base assumptions
for damages calculations, the expert should consider evaluating the business
plan or projection.
HITCHNER, supra note 189, at 1030-31.
255. Lloyd, supra note 25, at 408.
256. Robert Billet Promotions, Inc. v. IMI Cornelius, Inc., No. CIV. A. 95-1376, 1998
WL 721081 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 1998).
257. Lithuanian Commerce Corp. v. Sara Lee Hosiery, No. CIV. A. 96-1949, 179 F.R.D.
450, 455 (D.N.J. 1998).
258. Children's Broad. Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 3-96 CIV 907, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17507, at *21 (D. Minn. Jan. 15, 1999).
259. In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 16415, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS
70, at *68 (Aug. 30, 2004).
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Services, Inc., the Delaware Chancery Court held that criticisms of the
assumptions made by a financial expert went to weight and not
admissibility. In In re Elder-Beerman Stores Corp., the court concluded
that a damages expert had sufficiently controlled for externalities such as
competition, weather, and industry financial condition in a statistical
analysis, but that the expert’s failure to consider factors causing a rising
sales trend made the testimony questionable at best. 260
Although some commentators suggest that damages experts should
avoid engagements when relevant economic phenomena cannot be
explained, 261 one difficulty with this is that experts may not know what
data are and are not available until after an engagement is accepted and
discovery is well underway. At that juncture, it may be difficult to escape
the engagement without damaging the client’s case. Considered in light of
the contention that it is best to engage damages experts early in the case,
the possible predicament presented by discovering gaps in data well into
discovery becomes apparent. 262
Inasmuch as courts as gatekeepers under Daubert must exclude
testimony that does not fit the facts of the case, 263 one of the biggest issues
encountered with expert testimony is a lack of fit between the testimony to
be given and the basis for that testimony—a problem more often caused by
the attorney than by the expert. 264 Since experts are often the last witnesses
in trials, it is crucial to align their testimony with the case themes inasmuch
as this testimony may be the last opportunity to sell triers of fact on a
particular position. 265 Another recurring problem in damages expert
testimony is that of experts attempting to testify beyond the scope of their
reports when under direct examination. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
26(a)(2) and 37(c) limit experts to opinions contained in their reports, 266
and courts increasingly enforce these rules. 267 With regard to both of these

260. In re Elder Beerman Stores Corp., 206 B.R. 142, 165-66 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1997).
The failure to subject valuation results to sensitivity analysis in order to determine how
sensitive models are to their assumptions has also been criticized. See, e.g., Kay v. First
Cont’l Trading, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 772, 775-77 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (rejecting an expert opinion
where the assumptions relied upon were not tested with sensitivity analysis).
261. Weinstein, supra note 110, at 14-10.
262. See Jones, supra note 144, at 2; Rao, supra note 191 (noting that it is desirable to
bring experts into the case early on because they usually have the best idea of the data
needed to perform a valuation). The worst time to hire experts is after discovery is closed,
for obvious reasons. See Analyst Convinces Court to Reject Stock Value as “Fair”,
BUSINESS VALUATION REVIEW, Mar. 2006, available at http://www.bvlibrary.com
(discussing the hazards of taking a client’s documentation at face value).
263. Aspen, supra note 146.
264. Zimmerman, supra note 107.
265. Jones, supra note 144.
266. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c).
267. Duncan, supra note 178. If cross-examination opens the door, however, experts
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problems, the damages expert is largely at the mercy of the attorneys with
whom they work because attorneys are the weavers of the story of a case.
The expert testimony represents a thread, commonly an important one, that
must be carefully woven into the story to effect a favorable outcome 268 and
survive possible appeals. 269
To summarize, the foregoing suggests that the nature of damages
expert testimony increasingly requires a level of sophistication and quality
control that is often best supplied by professionals who specialize in this
testimony. Such experts are increasingly at risk of exclusion and attendant
damage to their reputations as a result of a growing trend of Daubert
hearings and a tendency by federal courts to exclude more and more
testimony. Many of the issues around which the admissibility of testimony
revolves are subjective, and courts have not always been consistent in
resolving this subjectivity. Making matters worse, damages experts are
often at the mercy of the attorneys with whom they work in terms of
ensuring a fit of their testimony with the facts of a case. To better
understand these concerns, it is helpful to have a feel for the art versus the
science of damages estimation.
IV. ART VERSUS SCIENCE IN BUSINESS DAMAGES ESTIMATION
Business damages estimation may be most accurately described as an
art that relies on methods borrowed from science—methods that sometimes
create an illusion of objectivity when, in fact, much of the expert’s
valuation decision stems from subjective judgment based upon what
evidence the expert can develop using science. 270 Disagreement over the
may go beyond their reports on cross- examination or redirect, and the requirement to
remain within the boundaries of the report may also be relaxed by stipulation by all sides.
See Jones, supra note 144.
268. HITCHNER, supra note 189, at 1045 (“Business damages are part of a lawsuit and are
subject to statutes, case law, local judicial practice, and legal interpretations. The expert
should look to the attorney to give direction in these areas.”).
269. Assuming valuation testimony survives at the trial court level, experts still face the
possibility of an appeal based upon abuse of discretion. Wiegand, supra note 110.
Although admissibility of expert testimony is often reviewed at the appellate level, the
standard of review places a premium on good decisions at the district court level;
furthermore, federal appellate courts have shown a reluctance to call district courts to task,
affirming 99% of district court decisions. Zimmerman, supra note 107. Valuation experts
are nonetheless at risk of having their reputations tarnished in appeals, however, and there
are instances of appellate courts finding damages to be excessive and unsupported by
evidence. See James Malackowski, Business and Management Practices, BUS. BRIEFING
(LexisNexis Acad., Bethesda, MD), May 13, 2004.
270. Given the complexity of valuation, it is helpful for courts and attorneys to have
some understanding of basic, traditional approaches and methods used by valuation experts
in order to understand issues related to the art and science of valuation. We refer readers to
excellent primers on valuation basics. See, e.g., HITCHNER, supra note 189, at 1-18; Garcia-
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best valuation methods has a long history that continues today. 271 It has
been said that judges and the legal system as a whole have a tendency to
idealize science and that this is a contributing factor to courts’ frequent
dissatisfaction with expert testimony. 272 The application of science in
expert testimony often depends upon the context of the case, 273 and sorting
out what is art from what is science is often complicated by numerous
technical issues that have arisen to challenge the courts. Examples are
whether corporate goodwill can be separated from personal goodwill in
professional practices, what discounts to allow for a lack of marketability
of companies’ stock and minority ownership of stock, and how to apply the
so-called “new business rule” when calculating damages. Precedent
informs these and similar issues, but inconsistent decisions across
jurisdictions complicate the expert’s task and increase the risk that the
expert’s testimony will be found flawed. 274 In this part, we discuss these
technical issues after first considering the art and science of damages
estimation.
A.

Damages Estimation: Art, Science, or Both?

The mere basics of business damages estimation are sufficiently
complex that special efforts have been made to provide simplified
educational tools for those in the legal profession. 275 One appellate court
has summarized the business damages estimation process as “a fiction—the
purpose of which is to determine the price that the stock would change
hands from a willing buyer and a willing seller” and as “a fact specific task
exercise.” 276 This suggests that damages estimation is the art of applying

Ayuso, supra note 6. For more in-depth discussions of specific valuation, see HITCHNER,
supra note 189, and SHANNON P. PRATT, ROBERT F. REILLY & ROBERT P. SCHWEIHS,
VALUING A BUSINESS: THE ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES (4th ed.
2000).
271. See generally Michael O. Finkelstein, The Judicial Reception of Multiple
Regression Studies in Race and Sex Discrimination Cases, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 737 (1980).
272. See Mnookin, supra note 164, at 766 (discussing judges’ general fascination with
science).
273. See Muise v. GPU, Inc., 851 A.2d 799, 827-30 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004)
(affirming trial judge’s decision to admit expert testimony to prove damages in a class
action).
274. See James A. DiGabriele, An Empirical Walk Down Valuation Way: Are the
Valuation Methods of Closely Held Companies Chosen by the Courts a Function of the Type
of Case and Level of Court?, 13 J. LEGAL ECON. 39 (2006) (analyzing comparatively
whether the valuation methods of closely held companies are a function of the level of case
and the type of court).
275. See, e.g., Garcia-Ayuso, supra note 6 (discussing the inefficient valuation of
intangible determinants in business financial forecasting).
276. Gross v. Comm’r, 272 F.3d 333, 356 (6th Cir. 2001).
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science to context, 277 a position with considerable intuitive appeal.
Other courts have not always taken such a discretionary perspective,
however, with valuation matters, seemingly preferring greater certainty in
determinations of that nature. For example, in JCM Const. Co. v. Orleans
Parish School Bd., the court preferred an expert who used generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) to one who had not despite the
arguments about GAAP’s inadequacies with respect to capturing value. 278
Judges may gravitate toward methodologies with which they are more
familiar. 279
This search by the courts for certainty in an uncertain frame is
consistent with judges wrestling with the question of when accepted
financial models can be appropriately applied, a matter sometimes referred
to as model risk. 280 Most often, judges are not experts in financial theory or
valuation methodologies. This had led to frequent compromises in order to
make decisions in a reasonably efficient manner that sometimes results in
“splitting the baby” between high and low damages estimates. 281 Recently,
however, some courts have recognized that this practice “has no
277. A frequent cause of valuation testimony being excluded is the expert’s misuse of
accepted methodologies. PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 3, at 34.
278. JCM Const. Co. v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 860 So. 2d 610, 631 (La. Ct. App.
2003). In valuation, the use of GAAP based upon the accrual method of accounting may not
always render the most accurate valuation, and valuation analysts are not responsible for
attesting to or certifying that information contained in financial statements is correct.
HITCHNER, supra note 189, at 99. GAAP are designed for financial reporting purposes and
not necessarily for valuation purposes; consequently, they are often adjusted in a process
called normalization. Id. at 100. Testimony has been excluded for a failure to normalize.
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Robinson, No. CX-00-1063, 2001 Minn. App. LEXIS 233
(Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2001). Also, mere conformity to GAAP does not assure reliability.
See Marc A. Siegel, Accounting Shenanigans on the Cash Flow Statement, THE CPA
JOURNAL, Mar. 2006, at 38. For an example of how cash flows reported in accounting
statements can be manipulated, see id.
279. DiGabriele, supra note 274, at 40 (illustrating that Delaware judges prefer staying
within a familiar framework to make the valuation process less arbitrary).
280. The term “model risk” as it relates to valuation expert testimony occurs when a
valid model is used inappropriately, when the data inputs to the model are incorrect, or
when the model is under or over-specified (meaning that there are important variables
missing or too many variables in the model to be properly supported by the data). It should
also be noted that there are no perfect models when it comes to valuation. Some are better
or worse than others in a given situation. See, e.g., Susan M. Mangiero, Model Risk and
Valuation, Valuation Strategies, Mar.-Apr. 2003. Another example of model risk issues can
be found in the contrast between Estate of Heck v. Comm’r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1181 (T.C.
2002), in which the tax court affirmed the use of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to
compute a cost of capital in the valuation of a closely held company, and Estate of Hoffman
v. Comm’r, 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1588 (T.C. 2001), in which the tax court specifically rejected
the use of the same model to value a closely held company.
281. DiGabriele, supra note 274, at 41 (citing Stephen J. Leacock, The Anatomy of
Valuing Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Pursuing The Phantom of Objectivity Into the
New Millennium, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 161, 168 (2001)).
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conceptual, theoretical, or intellectually convincing basis and tends to be
grounded, quite simply, in expediency,” thereby tending to “transform the
quest for substantive principles into essentially a form of mediation
conducted by attorneys, seeking to resolve the differences between parties
on a pragmatic and opportunistic basis.” 282
Development of data through surveys and sampling, perhaps the most
commonly used expert testimony in trademark and unfair competition
cases, 283 is one point at which art and science intersect to challenge courts.
For example, in Rowe Entm’t v. William Morris Agency, the court, noting
that necessity sometimes dictates the use of a less-than-optimal sample,
nonetheless held that a damages estimate was unreliable because the
expert’s sample was improperly developed due to reliance on anecdotal
sampling techniques. 284 In Muise v. GPU, Inc., the court wrestled with the
issue of whether customer surveys are a reliable means of obtaining data on
the cost of interruptions of utility services. 285
Those experts who find it useful to utilize samples collected through
surveys are well-advised to follow some basic rules of survey research.
These include choosing the appropriate population from which the sample
is to be drawn, choosing a sample that is representative of the population,
following proper interview or mailing procedures, asking questions clearly,
accurately reporting what data were gathered, analyzing the data in
accordance with accepted procedures, and ensuring the overall appearance
Thoughtful examination of these criteria reveals
of objectivity. 286
numerous opportunities for subjective judgment in deciding such matters as
the appropriate trade area to be sampled in a breach-of-non-competecontract case, or whether to ask redundant questions that may help
demonstrate reliability but reduce the response rate due to lengthening the
survey. 287
In the realm of damages, experts must deal with a host of other
282. DiGabriele, supra note 274, at 41; see Richard M. Wise, Objectivity and Credibility
as a Valuation Expert, BUS. VALUATION REV., Jun. 2005, at 83 (“Rather than, as was more
common in the past, a judge attempting to find a point somewhere between the two extreme
positions of the opposing experts, the tendency now is to totally reject the evidence of one
expert in favor of the other.”).
283. H. Jonathan Redway, The Use of Survey Evidence in Trademark and Unfair
Competition Cases: Insights and Practice Tips, COMPUTER & INTERNET L., Oct. 2005, at 11.
284. Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 8272 (RPP), 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15976 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2003). Some commentators argue that it is
better not to use survey data if the data are flawed. Redway, supra note 283, at 11.
285. Muise v. GPU, Inc., 851 A.2d 799 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
286. Redway, supra note 283.
287. For a discussion of survey methods, see JULIAN L. SIMON, BASIC RESEARCH
METHODS IN SOCIAL SCIENCES: THE ART OF EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 193-99 (2d ed.
1978); see also JAMES L. PRICE & CHARLES W. MUELLER, HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL
MEASUREMENT 6 (1986) (containing a brief explanation of reliability in measures).
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potentially complicated and frequently subjective issues that are
fundamental to valuation. These might include the standard of value by
which to measure damages, 288 various levels of value frameworks that can
result in radically different values, 289 what discounts to use in reducing the
value of a privately-held business, 290 what discount rate to use in
determining the value of a stream of cash flows, 291 and whether the effects
of events subsequent to the date for which a value is being determined
should be incorporated into their analyses, thereby creating a sort of
hindsight bias. 292 These complexities serve to illustrate the difficulties
288. HITCHNER, supra note 189, at 939-40. Consider, for example, whether the standard
of value is that of fair value or fair market value. The two differ in that fair value, as
defined under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, considers synergies and attributes
of specific buyers, whereas fair market value, as defined by the Internal Revenue Service,
contemplates hypothetical buyers and sellers. Moreover, the definition of fair value, in a
legal context of business damages, differs across state jurisdictions. DiGabriele, supra note
274.
289. Robert F. Reilly, Valuation Adjustment in Business and Securities Valuations, VAL.
STRATEGIES, Jul.-Aug. 2005, at 4, 5.
290. HITCHNER, supra note 189, at 60-67. Consider, for example, the following excerpt
from an internal memorandum from a leading valuation forensic services group at a national
public accounting and consulting firm. The excerpt is indicative of the subjectivity inherent
in business valuation with respect to matters that would seem to be primarily quantitative in
nature to the superficially informed:
I did talk with [three leading business valuation experts outside the firm] about
the use of the Asset Approach in situations where you are valuing a minority
interest and the Income Approach resulted in a lower value that the Asset
Approach and what the appropriate DLOM [discount for lack of marketability]
would be. As you might expect I received 4 different answers. . . . I didn’t tell
them I had spoken to the others so as not to color their responses.
E-mail from Ed Morris, to Timothy Muehler (Jan. 7, 2008, 22:53:00 CST) (on file with
authors). Among the experts polled by Ed Morris, the potential range of discounts for lack
of marketability was 10% to 40% of the value. This is obviously a broad range with
potentially significant differences in the magnitude of values. This illustrates the difficulty
courts face in appraising the quality of business valuation when leading experts disagree.
291. An example of such technical issues is the debate over the meaning of “discount
rate,” the rate used to discount future expected cash flows of a business to their present
value. This rate has several different meanings and has caused confusion among experts
and the courts. This issue is summarized in the following statement:
There is little guidance in the finance literature or case law to direct the expert
in selecting the appropriate discount rate for future lost-profit damages. In a
few business damages cases, a risk-free rate has been applied as a matter of law.
However, most courts favor the discount rate as a question of fact instead of a
matter of law.
HITCHNER, supra note 189, at 1038.
292. Id. at 1043-44. An ex ante date, the most common date of measurement, measures
damages as of the date of injury. An ex post date measures damages through the date of the
trial or the closest practical date. This represents another issue regarding which the courts
are not always consistent. Compare Holden v. Holden, 544 S.E.2d 884, 888 (Va. Ct. App.
2001) (using the most recent evidence of value as opposed to divorce date after determining
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associated with separating art from science, a distinction that is important
for the courts “[i]f scientific evidence must clear a hurdle that does not
block the path of other expert testimony.” 293
B.

Contrasting Positions across Jurisdictions

To better understand the difficulties courts face in the demarcation
between the art and science of valuation, it is useful to consider some
recent cases that illustrate the courts’ struggles. For example, valuation of
goodwill in professional practices has received disparate court treatment. 294
Three different approaches have been developed in determining whether
goodwill is an asset that can be considered marital property. Some
jurisdictions make no distinction between business and personal goodwill,
some find neither to be a marital asset, and the majority view differentiates
between the two. 295 In Rolfe v. Rolfe, 296 In re Schneider, 297 and Moretti v.
Moretti, 298 the courts determined that personal goodwill should be excluded
from the value of the practice. Conversely, in Singley v. Singley, 299 the
courts determined that goodwill should be included in the value of the
practice. In In re Watterworth 300 and In re Ceilley, 301 two states’ appellate
courts refused to rule that goodwill should always be included when
valuing a professional practice.
Courts have also differed as to the appropriate date at which to value
damages. For example, in Tatum v. Tatum, the appellate court reversed the

that value of stock had declined) with Lawton v. Nyman, 327 F.3d 30 (1st. Cir. 2003)
(reversing the damages based upon sale of business sixteen months after event of interest),
Skokos v. Skokos, 40 S.W.3d 768, 771-72 (Ark. 2001) (declining to consider post-valuation
date of business even though economic environment of business had changed subsequent to
divorce) and In re Marriage of Harrod, No. H025876, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9420,
*34 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2005) (rejecting the use of post-valuation-date financial data).
Also refer to Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 37 P.3d 1130, 1145 (Utah 2001) (finding
that a trial court is in the best position to determine the date as of which damages should be
measured).
293. Kaye, supra note 109, at 1964.
294. Goodwill is defined as the excess in value of a business beyond the aggregate of the
individual values of separately identifiable assets, less liabilities. HITCHNER, supra note
189, at 943.
295. Stathakis v. Stathakis, 1 CA-CV 05-0094, Ariz. App., at 21 (Ariz. Ct. App. March
3, 2006).
296. Rolfe v. Rolfe, No. C2-00-19, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 868, *8 (Minn. Ct. App.
Aug. 15, 2000).
297. In re Schneider, 824 N.E.2d 177, 190 (Ill. 2005).
298. Moretti v. Moretti, 766 A.2d 925, 928 (R.I. 2001).
299. Singley v. Singley, No. 1999-CA-00754-COA, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 456, *23*24 (Miss. Ct. App Sept. 26, 2000).
300. In re Watterworth, 821 A.2d 1107, 1114-15 (N.H. 2003).
301. In re Ceilley, No. 02-0434, *11 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2003).
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lower court’s valuation of the marital estate at the time of an equitable
distribution hearing and stated that the valuation date should be the date
that most accurately reflects the fair market value of the assets. 302 In
contrast, the court in Bidwell v. Bidwell noted that even though the sale of a
business might be a more accurate measure of its fair market value, the
appropriate time to measure the value is at the time of a divorce. 303 In
Craig-Garner v. Garner, the court elected to value a closely held business
as of the date of the marriage. 304 In East Park Ltd. Partnership v. Larkin,
the court stated that post-valuation date evidence that was not known at the
valuation date was irrelevant to the valuation. 305
The so-called “new business rule” holds that parties cannot rely on
evidence of lost profits where there is no established record of performance
for the subject company. 306 Here, again, the courts have not always been
consistent. 307 In Hyperoam, Inc. v. Valley Wireless Internet, the appellate
court held that the damages found in the lower court were too speculative
inasmuch as the business was new. 308 The court in Doft & Co. v.
Travelocity.com, Inc. ruled similarly. 309 In EBWS, LLC v. Britly Corp., the
court affirmed the denial of damages for lost profits and reversed an award
of consequential damages in a new business rule situation. 310 However, in
M.S. Distributing Co. & Congress Financial Corp. v. WEB Records, the
court upheld the rule while noting that the Seventh Circuit had questioned
its wisdom. 311 The court in Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, LLP,
cited prior case law indicating that the lack of an actual record of past
earnings should not be an automatic bar to recovery of lost profits. 312 In
Abboud v. Robertson, the appellate court affirmed a lost profits award on
the basis that the new business was a continuation of an existing
302. Tatum v. Tatum, No. 0438-00-3, No. 0443-00-3, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 789, at *12
(Va. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2000).
303. Bidwell & Bidwell, 18 P.3d 465, 465 (Ore. Ct. App. 2001). Similar contrasts can
be found in other cases. See, e.g., cases discussed at supra note 292.
304. Craig-Garner v. Garner, 77 S.W.3d 34 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
305. East Park Ltd. P’ship. v. Larkin, 893 A.2d 1219, 1233 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006), at
*26-27.
306. M.S. Distrib. Co. v. Web Records, Inc., No. 00 C 1436, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8078 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 2003).
307. George A. Saitta, Jr., Voluntary Payments Related to Business Decision May Not Be
Recoverable Consequential Damages (U.S. DATA FORENSICS, LLC, BETHESDA, MD).
308. Hyperoam, Inc. v. Valley Wireless Internet, No. 13-04-180-CV, 2005 Tex. App.
LEXIS 6616, at *24 (Tex. App. Aug. 18, 2005).
309. Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., C.A. No. 19734, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, at
*23 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2004).
310. EBWS, LLC v. Britly Corp., 928 A.2d 497, 517-18, 527 (Vt. 2007).
311. M.S. Distrib. Co. v. Web Records, Inc., No. 00 C 1436, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8078, at *27-*28 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 2003) (citing Mindgames, Inc v. W. Publ’g Co., Inc.,
218 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2001)).
312. Kilpatrick v. Wiley, 37 P.3d 1130, 1146 (Utah 2001).
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business. 313 The appellate court in Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of
Southern California reversed a lower court application of the new business
rule and held that the rule did not apply to a business with an operating
history of two years. 314
A leading topic of debate within valuation circles recently has been
that of valuation adjustments to stock value for a lack of marketability due
to the stock not being publicly traded and an absence of control because of
minority ownership. 315 In response to the question of whether courts are
changing their positions on lack of marketability discounts, one
commentator stated: “The tax court holds to a tight standard of fair market
value, while other courts, particularly in divorce matters, tend to use a more
flexible standard.” The commentator noted that family court judges are not
as well-trained as tax court judges to understand the concept of
discounts. 316 In conjunction with this same issue, another commentator
noted that discounts tend to be higher in tax court than in family court
cases. 317 In Petersen v. Petersen, the court upheld the valuation of a
closely held business, including discounts for minority interest and lack of
marketability. 318 The appellate court in Fausch v. Fausch upheld the
application of a discount for lack of marketability in a divorce situation
even though no sale of the business was contemplated, but noted that this
issue has to be approached on a case-by-case basis. 319
On the other hand, in Blitch v. Peoples Bank 320 and In re Vander Zee,
the courts refused to apply any discounts to the values of a holding
company and a professional practice. 321 Likewise, the court in Gottsacker
v. Gottsacker affirmed the use of a lack of marketability discount in valuing
a family limited partnership. 322 Courts have sometimes excluded discounts
because of what they perceive to be flawed reasoning, and, on some
occasions, applied their own discounts.
In Estate of Adams v.

313. Abboud v. Robertson, No. 78028, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3392, at *11-*12, *15
(Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2001).
314. Sargon Enters., Inc. v. Univ. of S. California, Super. Ct. No. BC 263071, 2005 Cal.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 1667, at *30, *49 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2005).
315. Reilly, supra note 289, at 6.
316. AICPA BV ‘Hardball’ Panel Calls for the End of ‘It Depends’, 14 BUS. VALUATION
UPDATE, Jan. 2008, at 9, supra note 227, at 9 (quoting valuation expert Bob Duffy of Grant
Thornton).
317. Id. at 9 (quoting valuation expert Gray Trugman of Trugman Valuation).
318. Petersen v. Petersen, No. 249176, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS 3121 (Mich. Ct. App.
Nov. 16, 2004).
319. Fausch v. Fausch, 697 N.W.2d 748, 752 (S.D. 2005).
320. Blitch v. Peoples Bank, 540 S.E.2d 667, 670 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
321. In re Zee, No. 1-04/99-1116, 2001 Iowa App. LEXIS 286, at *13 (Iowa Ct. App.
April 27, 2001).
322. Gottsacker v. Gottsacker, No. C1-02-615, 2002 Minn. App. LEXIS 1290, at *14-15
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2002).
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Commissioner, the court rejected the estimated discounts of both experts
and instead applied its own. 323 In Estate of Leichter v. Commissioner, the
court found what it deemed to be various flaws in three experts’ reports,
based upon what it believed to be duplicitous discounts. 324 Similarly, in
Estate of Cook v. Commissioner, the court rejected both experts’ analyses
of lack of marketability discounts and applied its own. 325
Another example of a technical issue that has confounded courts and
plagued experts is whether S corporations are to be valued as C
corporations or whether S corporation status makes such corporations more
valuable. 326 For instance, in Gross v. Commissioner, the appellate court
noted that the essence of the argument before it was a battle of experts over
how to value the stock of a closely held S corporation and that appellate
courts have afforded tax courts broad discretion in deciding which position
on whether the stock is tax affected will render the most appropriate
valuation. 327
Sometimes these issues can become entangled, as is the case with S
corporation valuation and the application of discounts. In Casey v.
Brennan, in which dissenting shareholders objected to conversion of an S
corporation to a C corporation, the appellate court affirmed the lower
court’s rejection of valuations that included lack of marketability and
minority discounts, but reversed as to control premiums. 328 In Pueblo
Bancorporation v. Lindoe, Inc., the court concluded that conversion of a C
corporation to an S corporation did not constitute a situation where
discounts should be applied. 329
The foregoing was intended to provide a sense of the substantial
degree of subjectivity inherent in valuation issues and the difficulty courts
experience in wrestling with valuation. 330 The reluctant conclusion is that
few judges and attorneys understand the theoretical underpinnings of
valuation. 331 One commentator has noted that “[a]t times, the expert’s
323.
324.
325.
326.

Estate of Adams v. Comm’r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1421, 19 (2002).
Estate of Leichter v. Comm’r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 991 (2003).
Estate of Green v. Comm’r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 758 (2003).
See Merle Erickson & Shiing-wu Wang, Response to the “Erickson-Wang” Myth, 9
SHANNON PRATT’S BUS. VALUATION UPDATE, Feb. 2003, at 1, 1-5.
327. Gross v. Comm’r, 272 F.3d 333, 338-39 (6th Cir. 2000).
328. Casey v. Brennan, 780 A.2d 553, 559, 570-71 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
329. Pueblo Bancorporation v. Lindoe, Inc., 37 P.3d 492, 494, 499 (Colo. App. 2001).
330. For several issues that have recently posed concerns for valuation experts with
regard to court decisions related to subjectivity in valuation matters, see BVR’s BVWire
Central, http://www.bvresources.com. This subjectivity is highlighted by the likelihood that
pending litigation against a company may itself affect the company's value. William C.
Quackenbush, How Does Litigation Affect Value?, E-LETTER (Bus. Valuation Comm. of the
Am. Soc’y of Appraisers, Herndon, VA), May 23, 2007.
331. Joseph N. Hosteny, The Misuse of Patent Law Experts: An Embarrassment to Our
Profession, PAT. STRATEGY & MGMT., Oct. 2006, at 1, 3. The author also notes that judges
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calculations appear as a black box—it’s hard to tell what’s in there, but it
sure sounds impressive.” 332 The following part discusses how the growing
complexity of business cases is contributing to this subjectivity.
V.

TRENDS IN THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT AFFECTING CASES
INVOLVING DAMAGES

For some time the U.S. economy has been shifting from a
manufacturing orientation to a knowledge-based orientation 333
characterized by a focus on financial services 334 and research and
development of new technologies. 335 The 1980s witnessed the deregulation
of financial institutions and the development of new financial products in
areas such as risk management and asset securitization. 336 The 1990s
observed the rapid growth in the widespread implementation of new
information systems technologies. 337 The beginning of the 21st century has
been marked by the mapping of the human genome and the subsequent
interest in molecular medicine and proteomics research.
These
developments hold great promise for the development of pharmaceuticals
and diagnostics to combat various diseases. 338 In the life sciences alone
there is an explosion in the number of start-up companies engaged in the
development of new healthcare technologies. 339
Companies are
increasingly being looked upon as knowledge-based systems as opposed to
in bench trials typically permit more latitude in educational testimony regarding valuation
concepts by experts than in jury trials, “in the belief that jurors will have little, if any,
knowledge and/or understanding of the technical issues before them." Id. at 5. Financial
concepts are difficult for attorneys and jurors to understand and are often presented toward
the end of trials, when jurors are weary and feel that they have heard enough. Albert
Vondra, Financial Experts’ Experience Vital, CRAIN’S CLEV. BUS., Aug. 7, 2006, at 17.
332. Fannon, supra note 252, at 14.
333. Kaufmann & Schneider, supra note 4 at 380; see also Dick Crawford & Nicholas T.
Miller, Commercial Lending Revenue Growth In The Knowledge Economy: The
Importance Of Intellectual Property, COM. LENDING REV., Nov. 2002, at 1, 4; and John
Reynolds, Economics 101: How Franchising Makes Music for the US Economy,
FRANCHISING WORLD, May 2004, at 37 (stating that many changes in the U.S. economy are
due to the growth of franchising).
334. The service sector constitutes nearly three fourths of the U.S. economy. Id. at 37.
335. See Jankowski, supra note 5, at 335.
336. See generally Bowen H. McCoy, The New Financial Markets and Securitized
Commercial Real Estate Financing, REAL EST. ISSUES, Spring-Summer 1988, at 6-7;
Cristina Lourosa-Ricardo, Winning Lines: Which Professions Scored Big in the ‘90s, WALL
ST. J., April 11, 2002, at B10.
337. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, A Technology Recovery in Post-Exuberant Times, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004 at C1; Cristina Lourosa-Ricardo, supra note 336, at B10.
338. See Rudy M. Baum, Proteomics Builds on Genomics Success, 80 SCI. & TECH. 38
(March 18, 2002).
339. Jonathan D. Root, Patient Capital: How Life Sciences Investments Touch Us All,
VENTURE CAP. J., Dec. 2004, at 44.
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aggregations of bricks and mortar. 340 The shift to a service-based and
research-and-development-intensive economy greatly increases the
frequency with which courts encounter cases involving intellectual
capital. 341 At the same time, there is mounting concern about the legitimacy
of certain expert testimony as more and more complex damages
valuations 342 evolve predicated upon increasingly sophisticated
methodologies. 343
A.

Valuation Issues Resulting from the Rise to Prominence of Intellectual
Capital

There is no doubt that intellectual capital is critical to business
valuation 344 ; likewise, there is ample evidence that extant measures of
intellectual capital are plagued with deficiencies. 345 Although there is
clearly a growing awareness of the importance of intellectual capital, its
study is in its infancy in many ways, and much of the research to date has
been focused upon understanding how intellectual capital affects
operational performance as opposed to financial performance. 346
Nonetheless, the lack of information regarding the value of intellectual
capital can lead to misallocation of resources. 347 Over the past several
years there have been numerous mergers and acquisitions 348 in which a
significant portion of the purchase price was paid for intellectual capital.
340. Per Nikolaj Bukh & Ulf Johanson, Research and Knowledge Interaction:
Guidelines for Intellectual Capital Reporting, 4 J. INTELL. CAP. 576, 582 (2003).
341. Goldscheider supra note 6, at 55; see also Intangibles Are the Tangible Assets Now,
GLOBAL NEWS WIRE—ASIA AFRICA INTELL. WIRE, Dec. 28, 2005, at 1 (stating that
intellectual capital has become the most important resource for companies); A Market for
Ideas, ECONOMIST, Oct. 20, 2005, at 3 (stating that as much as three fourths of the value of
publicly traded U.S. companies results from intellectual capital); Kroll Survey Highlights
Corporate Vulnerabilities to Growing Billion-Dollar Problem of Intellectual Property
Abuse, BUS. WIRE, Apr. 16, 2002, available at http://www.kroll.com/news/releases
/index.aspx?id=151 (noting that intellectual capital “is at the heart of modern business”);
Securitizing the Future, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Sep. 2006, 22, 22 (stating that companies
are increasingly expecting their intellectual capital to create value).
342. For a schematic diagram depicting the complexity associated with valuation of
technology, see F. PETER BOER, THE VALUATION OF TECHNOLOGY xi (1999).
343. Schuurman & Stafford, supra note 148.
344. For example, econometric studies consistently indicate a positive and statistically
significant association between research and development intensity and corporate market
value. Bernard Marr et al., Why Do Firms Measure Their Intellectual Capital?, 4 J. INTELL.
CAP. 441, 448 (2003).
345. See Gopika Kannan & Wilfred G. Aulbur, Intellectual Capital: Measurement
Effectiveness, 5 J. INTELL. CAP. 389, 392 (2004) (providing a list of disadvantages).
346. Bernard Marr, Intellectual Capital at the Crossroads: Managing, Measuring and
Reporting IC, 5 J. INTELL. CAP. 224, 224 (2005).
347. Kaufman & Schneider, supra note 4, at 366.
348. Mandel, supra note 150, at 115.
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An improved and more transparent valuation process is needed to
understand exactly what acquirers are receiving in return for the purchase
price. 349 “Without correct assessment, measurement and valuation of IC
[intellectual capital], the acquirers may overvalue it, thus causing value
destruction for the acquiring firm’s shareholders and other stakeholders.” 350
Given that it is estimated that acquisitions, on average, do not work out
well for acquirers 351 and that failing to adequately understand intellectual
capital leads to incorrect valuations, inaccurate risk assessments, and
potential increases in a company’s cost of capital, 352 there are obvious
implications for litigation involving acquisition transactions. Similarly,
growth in derivative securities and other new types of financial instruments
is fueling more and more litigation. 353
Post-Daubert courts appear to favor more systematic quantitative
analysis in damages testimony, 354 but measurement of intellectual capital is
difficult. 355 Despite the recognition by bodies such as the International
Accounting Standards Board and Financial Accounting Standards Board
that financial statements must do a better job of capturing intellectual asset
values, 356 there is no universally acceptable model to measure intangibles.
“Measuring non-financial data is still [more] an art than a science and in
intellectual capital the choice of indicators can affect the results
substantially.” 357 The majority of research regarding measuring intellectual
capital is still in the theory-building stage, 358 and existing accounting
measures have been criticized for failing to give adequate consideration to
intellectual capital. 359 Although the development of universally accepted
quantitative models of intellectual capital may, at times, seem analogous to
pursuit of the Holy Grail, there are nonetheless those who purport to show
that such quantification is possible. 360
349. Marr, supra note 344, at 452-53.
350. Id. at 447 (citing P.H. Sullivan, Jr. & P.H.S. Sullivan, Sr., Valuing Intangible
Companies—An Intellectual Capital Approach, 1 J. INTELL. CAP. 328, 328-40 (2000)).
351. JOSEPH H. MARREN, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: A VALUATION HANDBOOK (1993),
at 31.
352. Marr, supra note 344, at 447.
353. Mandel, supra note 150, at 117.
354. Id. at 116
355. HITCHNER, supra note 189, at 938; see Benjamin P. Foster et al., Valuing Intangible
Assets, CPA J., Oct. 2003, at 50, 50.
356. Abeysekera, supra note 4, at 426.
357. Id. at 422 (quoting ROOS & ROOS, INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: NAVIGATING THE NEW
BUSINESS LANDSCAPE 6 (1997)).
358. See, e.g., Garcia-Ayuso, supra note 6, at 57; Marr, supra note 344 (discussing one
study attempting to determine a way to measure intellectual capital).
359. Marr, supra note 344, at 447; see Russ Banham, Valuing IP Post-Sarbanes-Oxley,
J. ACCT., Nov. 2005, at 173, 173, available at http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/nov2005/
banham.htm.
360. See, e.g., Litschka et al., supra note 4, at 161.
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Intellectual capital poses certain valuation complexities and problems
of a magnitude that typically greatly exceeds those associated with valuing
physical assets when it comes to estimating damages resulting from the
misappropriation, infringement, or impairment of intellectual capital. 361
For example, it is relatively easy to determine both the lives and values of
physical assets such as production equipment or inventory, compared to
what might have been the longevity of a particular type of customer
account that was terminated prematurely due to breach of contract 362 or the
value of a particular peptide that influences molecular behavior. Even
valuing the property rights to certain physical assets can take on new
complexity when such values are determined to a significant extent by
developments in underlying intellectual assets. 363 Intellectual capital on its
own is often worthless, and its value must be considered in light of the
business that possesses it and the context in which it is being utilized. 364 It
is also often difficult to perform comparative analyses of intellectual
capital 365 to arrive at valuations in a manner analogous to traditional

361. For a discussion of the difficulties in valuing intellectual capital, see HITCHNER,
supra note 189, at 936. “The more complicated the technology, the more complicated the
resolution of intellectual property disputes.” Goldscheider, supra note 6, at 57. Baseman
and Slottje, in providing an example of such complexity in an actual case, assert that
although use of econometrics and statistics has been somewhat limited to date in its
application to cases involving intellectual capital, “[a]s the enforcement of intellectual
property rights grows globally, issues of the quantification of economic damages will grow
in importance around the world.” Robert L. Basemann & Daniel J. Slottje, Copyright
Damages and Statistics, 71 INT’L. STAT. REV. 557, 557 (2003). Another source argues for
the importance of sound evidentiary support in complex cases such as patent infringement
cases. James E. Malackowski & Robert M. Hess, Federal Circuit Damages Decision
Emphasizes the Importance of Sound Economic Models, BUS. MGMT. PRAC., May 13, 2004.
362. For a discussion of the relative ease of valuing “hard” assets as opposed to
intellectual assets, see Crawford & Miller, supra note 333, at 4. An example of this issue
can be found in a recently settled case in which the damages estimates were the central
focus of argument, and the magnitude of the damages mainly turned upon how long
accounts would have survived but for the breach. Since longer-surviving accounts arguably
possessed different survival characteristics than shorter-lived accounts, a problem arose in
determining the appropriate manner in which to estimate lives of accounts that were
prematurely truncated. First Am. Real Estate Info. Servs. v. Consumer Benefit Servs., Inc.,
No. 03CV0633-B(NLS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30317 (S.D. Cal. 2004).
363. For example, the intellectual property rights associated with an automated sample
loader used in proteomics research may be dependent, in part, upon further developments in
proteomics that make such research more commercially attractive, thereby increasing the
value of the reduced sample throughout time and waste reduction afforded by the sample
loader. Such is the case with one of the products developed by a proteomics-related
company, Inproteo, LLC, with which two of the authors were involved in an advisory
capacity.
364. Luiz Antonio Joia, Measuring Intangible Corporate Assets: Linking Business
Strategy with Intellectual Capital, 1 J. INTELL. CAP. 68 (2000).
365. Chris D. Adams & Gerald M. Godshaw, Intellectual Property and Transfer Pricing,
8 INT’L TAX REV. 74, 74 (2002).
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valuation methods that rely on comparisons. 366
To better understand the differences between valuation of intellectual
and physical assets, consider the following. There are several accepted
methods for valuing physical assets, including depreciated cost,
replacement cost, fair market value, and the net present value of the future
cash flows the assets are expected to generate. 367 Depreciated cost is
inappropriate for valuing intellectual capital because its direct acquisition
cost may be insignificant as a result of its being developed through an
expenditure of human resources, the cost of which is expensed immediately
as opposed to being recorded as assets and depreciated. 368 Similarly,
replacement cost is often problematic because, for example, it is unclear
what cost would have to be expended to replace a flash of insight that leads
to a new product. 369 Further, the fair market value of some intellectual
capital is extremely difficult to determine in situations where the
intellectual asset consists of organizational learning such as knowledge of
manufacturing processes. 370 This often leaves the net present value of
discounted future cash flows as the only viable method for valuing
intellectual capital. 371 A difficulty with using this method, however, is that
forecasting future cash flows from intellectual capital is fraught with
uncertainty. 372 Courts have not always looked kindly upon experts’
uncertain forecasts and their reliance upon client management’s forecasts
as supposedly reliable roads to accurate valuation. 373
366. See, e.g., HITCHNER, supra note 189, at 79-82. Some have questioned whether it
even makes sense to attempt to perform industry-specific analyses in order to value
intellectual capital. Kaufman & Schneider, supra note 4.
367. R. Mark Halligan & Richard F. Weyand, The Economic Valuation of Trade Secret
Assets, J. INTERNET L., Feb. 2006, at 19, 19-20. See generally HITCHNER, supra note 189,
(describing these methods in Chapters 4, 6, and 7).
368. Halligan & Weyand, supra note 367, at 19-20.
369. Id.; see ROBERT F. REILLY & ROBERT P. SCHWEIHS, VALUING INTANGIBLE ASSETS
95-117 (2004) (discussing cost-based approaches to valuing intellectual capital).
370. Halligan & Weyand, supra note 367, at 19-20; see REILLY & SCHWEIHS, supra note
369, at 146-158 (discussing the market-based approach to valuing intellectual capital).
371. Halligan & Weyand, supra note 367, at 19-20.
372. Courts tend to take a dim view of excessive speculation in valuation experts’
reports. See, e.g., Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. WH-TV Broadcasting Corp., 395 F.3d 416 (7th
Cir. 2005) (finding an expert’s lost profits testimony unreliable because it was based only
upon experience and not upon statistical or market analyses); Telxon Corp. v. Smart Media
of Delaware, Inc., Nos. 22098, 22099, 2005 WL 2292800 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (holding the
award for damages speculative, in part as a result of its being based upon a post-valuationdate business plan); Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 395 F.3d 921 (8th Cir.
2005) (finding the valuation expert’s damage assessment speculative for failure to analyze
an acquisition price from the perspective of the factors that drove the acquisition); Phase 2
Devs. Corp. v. Citicorp Real Estate, No. B160111, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 117
(finding valuation expert to have relied upon too many contingencies).
373. See, e.g., Haff v. Augeson, No. C1-02-1652, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 460 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2003) (affirming a lower court’s finding of a forecast of the post-breach income of
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This growing complexity, and the concomitant difficulty in estimating
damages associated with litigation involving intellectual capital, affects the
provision of expert testimony in civil actions. 374 As enforcement of
property rights increases globally, 375 the need for quantification of
economic damages associated with the rights is also growing, 376 thereby
exacerbating the courts’ difficulties in assessing the admissibility of such
testimony. Where Daubert’s silence—made arguably more deafening by
Joiner and Kumho—begins, the courts are largely left to case law 377 and
their own judgment in determining whether a particular scientific
methodology as applied to the facts and circumstances of a case is
appropriate or inappropriate. As the nature of the capital being valued
becomes more nebulous and the methodologies used in valuation become
more esoteric, the challenge associated with making this determination
obviously increases. 378 Thus, increased complexity in the nature of the
intellectual capital that forms the basis for civil business litigation makes it
more difficult for courts to interpret expert testimony and determine
whether the experts are in fact using good science. 379
Consider, for example, the problem of valuing the capital structure of
a privately held life sciences company. 380 The greater percentage of

the company too speculative). In Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com, Inc., No. 19734, 2004
Del. Ch. LEXIS 75 (Del. Ch. 2004), the court held that management’s projections were not
reliable. On the other hand, in Union Ill. 1995 Inv. L.P. v. Union Fin. Group, Ltd., 847 A.2d
340 (Del. Ch. 2004), the court held that the valuation expert had deviated from
management’s forecast without adequately explaining the reasoning behind the deviation.
See Cede & Cinerama v. Technicolor, Inc., No. 7129, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 146 (Del. Ch.
2003). In Dunn v. Matrix Exhibits, Inc., No. M2003-02725-COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 652 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), the court found that management’s future projections
were admissible in a but-for analysis.
374. See Seigneur, supra note 166.
375. For a discussion of the role of globalization in creating legal complexities related to
intellectual capital, see Stacey Higginbotham, The Right Recipe, THE CORPORATE
DEALMAKER, (Jan. 2006), http://www.thedeal.com/corporatedealmaker/2006/
02/the_right_recipe.php.
376. Robert L. Basmann & Daniel J. Slottje, Copyright Damages and Statistics, 71 INT’L
STAT. REV. 557 (2003).
377. While stressing the likely growth in frequency and importance of statistics in
estimating damages in cases involving intellectual capital, Basmann and Slottje also note the
limited case law on the topic. Id. at 557.
378. Hilton, supra note 223; see Paloma Sánchez et al., Management of Intangibles: An
Attempt to Build a Theory, 1 J. INTELL. CAP. 312 (2000) (discussing measurement issues
related to intellectual capital).
379. See generally Malackowski & Hess, supra note 361. Basmann & Slottje, supra
note 376, at 558-563, present an actual case study that demonstrates how a case with
substantial damages at stake can turn on the complexities of statistical arguments.
380. It is estimated that 99.5% of all U.S. companies are privately held. These firms
require special treatment for valuation purposes. William P. Dukes, Business Valuation
Basics for Attorneys, 1 J. BUS. VALUATION & ECON. LOSS ANALYSIS 1, Abstract (2006).
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intellectual assets to total assets in privately held companies often means
high potential returns that, in turn, carry high risk. 381 These higher returns
can be very attractive to private equity groups that have experienced a
phenomenal growth in recent years. 382 Private equity groups frequently
consist of sophisticated investors who, in turn, employ sophisticated legal
counsel to assist them in designing capital structures for their investments
to help mitigate their investment risk. 383 As a result, capital structures of
many privately held companies, even relatively small ones, are complex
and can contain various combinations of debt, preferred equity, common
equity, and hybrid securities that have characteristics of both debt and
equity. 384 Common equity can be of various classes and can have various
forms of derivative securities attached, such as stock options and
warrants. 385 To value a company with such a complex structure, it is
necessary to value the entire set of claims to the company’s cash flows in
the descending order in which each class of claimant stands in priority. 386
This requires the use of very sophisticated methodological tools to obtain
accurate valuations—tools with which few damages experts, much less
judges, are likely to be familiar. 387
The Need for Increasingly Complex Valuation Methodologies
As the complexity of business has increased with the rise to
prominence of intellectual capital, so has the complexity of the

381. Travis Chamberlain et al., Navigating the Jungle of Valuing Complex Capital
Structures in Privately Held Companies: An Integrative Simulation Approach, 2 J. BUS.
VALUATION & ECON. LOSS ANALYSIS
1,
2-3
(2008),
available
at
http://www.bepress.com/jbvela/vol2/iss2/art5/.
382. John W. Hill & Thomas L. Zeller, The New Value Imperative for Privately Held
Companies: The Why, What, and How of Value Management Strategy, 51 BUS. HORIZONS
541, 542-43 (Nov.-Dec. 2008).
383. Chamberlain, et al., supra note 381, at 3.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 22.
387. Id. at 9. For additional insight into some of the intricacies of valuing a complex
capital structure, see Robert E. Duffy & David C. Dufendach, Valuing Components of
Complex Capital Structures, AICPA/ASA National Business Valuation Conference
(November 14-16, 2005) (conference materials and notes on file with authors). As higherrisk industries increase with growth in intellectual capital and technology, there exists on a
more micro level the issue of whether company-specific risk, discussed in the previous part,
is subsumed into the risk of the industry in the case of such higher-risk industries. This issue
presents complex questions regarding the adequacy of current finance theory to explain the
manner in which financial markets impound risk into equity prices, and is illustrative of a
micro-level valuation issue (stemming from macro-level, theoretical concerns and the
changing nature of business assets) that confounds damages experts. Gailor, supra note
239, at 27.
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methodologies needed to value this capital. 388 Damages valuation, in
general, is a complex undertaking often requiring the projection of future
financial outcomes and a strong understanding of accounting, financial
analysis, statistics, and forecasting of business outcomes. 389 This, in turn,
requires careful assessment by the bench of not only the reliability of the
methods employed by the expert but also the reliability of their application
in a particular context. 390 This matter is made more difficult because many
such methods have their origin in statistics, the application of which can be
as much art as science. 391 Although there is evidence of some systematic
trends in courts’ preferences for certain valuation methodologies over
others, there is a high degree of variability even among cases with similar
characteristics. 392 This suggests difficulty on the part of judges in assessing
valuation methodologies.
Statistical reasoning is crucial to most scientific inquiry, 393 and there
are few areas of scientific testimony more daunting for courts than the use
of advanced econometric and statistical techniques to develop damage
estimates related to intellectual capital. 394 This challenge is made even
388. Goldscheider, supra note 6, at 62.
389. Steven Kam et al., The Valuation of Litigation, 9 VALUATION STRATEGIES 1, 5-8
(2006).
390. See Sofie Adrogue & Alan Ratliff, Kicking The Tires After Kumho: The Bottom
Line on Admitting Financial Expert Testimony, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 431, 448-50 (2000). See
Interview with Shannon Pratt (Moderator), Alina Niculita & Timothy R. Lee, Business
Valuation Resources Teleconference (Aug. 31, 2006) (notes on file with authors), for an
example of a reliability issue that is fairly commonplace in expert valuation: the adjustment
of multiples (ratios) used to value a company in question). These multiples are obtained by
first selecting publicly traded companies that are believed to be comparable to the company
being valued and then calculating key financial variables that can be expressed as ratios of
some measure of the value of the public companies. Once the ratios are calculated, a value
for the company being valued can be calculated by inserting the values for the company into
the ratios. Adjustment of the ratios comes into play because the public companies are
rarely, if ever, exactly comparable to the company being valued and therefore must be
adjusted to compensate for differences. This valuation issue alone is complex, see, e.g., In
re Nellson Nutraceutical, Inc., 356 B.R. 364 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006); Adjusting Multiples
from Guideline Public Companies, Business Valuation Resources Teleconference (Aug. 31,
2006) (notes on file with authors), and illustrative of the type of expert testimony morass in
which courts may become enmeshed, apart from the even more complex issues that attend
the use of sophisticated statistical methodologies. For example, in Eckelkamp v. Beste, 315
F.3d 863, 868-69 (8th Cir. 2002), the court found the expert’s methodology flawed because
the companies’ use of comparables was unsuitable for this purpose. This position can be
contrasted with the conclusion of a number of courts that the preferred way to value a
closely held company is by the use of appropriate multiples and the acknowledged difficulty
of finding publicly traded comparables. See DiGabriele, supra note 274, at 42.
391. Kaye, supra note 109, at 1965.
392. DiGabriele, supra note 274, at 39.
393. Kaye, supra note 109, at 1965
394. Adrogue & Ratliff, supra note 390, at 486. “The comfort that most lawyers and
judges have with legal principles does not generally extend to numbers.” Id. Basmann &
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more difficult because of the great propensity for each side to present only
evidence favorable to its case and to assert flaws in opposing expertise. 395
Estimation of damages in such cases increasingly requires data analysis
involving advanced econometric and/or statistical methodologies that are
sometimes not well understood even by experts with extensive
backgrounds in the use of statistics. 396 Because of sometimes subtle
differences in business settings, the most appropriate methodology for a
particular context may not be the one used most frequently in similar cases,
so common usage and precedent are not necessarily reliable from a
scientific perspective. 397 Further, the courts may well hear from experts
whose credentials seem impeccable and yet whose knowledge of a
particular technique in question may be errant. 398 Critical turning points
can revolve around issues as seemingly esoteric as the known or potential

Slottje, supra note 376, comment that even elementary statistical matters can cause much
adversarial debate. For example, courts have long struggled to determine whether the
samples used by experts in performing their analyses were representative enough of the
population to which experts are attempting to extrapolate. See, e.g., Currier v. United
Techs. Corp., 393 F.3d 246, 256 (1st Cir. 2004) (affirming a decision to use a broader
sample); cf. Citizens Fin. Group, Inc. v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 383 F.3d 110, 134 (3d Cir.
2004) (affirming exclusion of a broader sample).
395. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1477, 1488 (1999).
396. Daniel McFadden, et al., The Misuse of Econometrics in Estimating Damages, ABA
ECONOMETRICS TREATISE (forthcoming).
397. For example, in First American Real Estate Information Services, Inc. v. Consumer
Benefit Services, Inc., No. 03CV0633-B(NLS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30317 (S.D. Cal.
2004), one expert argued that the most appropriate methodology was a sequential
combination of Cox Regression to estimate past account survival probabilities, followed by
feasible generalized least squares to forecast future account survival probabilities using two
different model specifications, and then subsequent smoothing by use of Granger
Ramanathan Regression. See id. Report of Plaintiff’s Expert (filed pursuant to Jan. 28, 2004
Stipulation and Order). This was a complicated and possibly unprecedented use of the
subject methodologies in litigation that might have presented a substantial challenge to the
court in understanding the econometric arguments if the case had gone to trial. See id.
Report of Plaintiff’s Expert and Report of Defendant’s Expert (filed pursuant to Jan. 28,
2004 Stipulation and Order).
398. See, e.g., id. This case represents one such example, as two experts with exemplary
credentials disagreed over the important distinction of the statistical treatment of
involuntarily terminated accounts with respect to the application of the most appropriate
statistical methodology. Another recent settled case provides additional evidence that the
combination of statistical methodology and business context may complicate courts’
determination of admissibility of expert testimony. Experts’ arguments revolved around
whether a regression analysis could be applied reliably with a relatively small sample size
and whether the absence of certain variables in the model might affect the damage
estimates. Onex, Inc. v. Inrange Techs. Corp., No. 1:03-CV593LJM-WTL (S.D. Ind. filed
April 23, 2003) (later settled). Had the case gone to trial, the court would likely have been
faced with the problem of deciding whether the business context validated the use of the
particular well-established methodology.
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error rate when making statistical comparisons using multiple tests. 399
The use of multiple regression analysis, a particularly powerful
statistical methodology, 400 has now become reasonably common in
business damages cases 401 and has gained considerable acceptance by the
courts. 402 Because of its power and complexity, multiple regression
analysis also carries a significant risk of misleading the courts if its
assumptions are not met and it is not used properly. Courts have recently
had to decide whether damages experts’ regression assumptions were
reliable prior to rendering a verdict. 403 Even if judges achieve a reasonable
grasp of the complexities of multiple regression in its most basic form
(ordinary least squares) 404 to determine whether it has been applied
reliably, they have yet to scratch the surface of the more complex
permutations that include generalized-least-squares, hedonic, weightedleast-squares, tobit, logit, and probit regressions, among others. 405
The debate about the reliability of regression models often centers on

399. David Tabak, Multiple Comparisons and the Known or Potential Error Rate, 19 J.
FORENSIC ECON. 231, 231-33 (2006). The author notes that the likelihood of finding the
same result in multiple tests at the 5% level is 1-0.95 to the power of N where N is the
number of tests. Id. This is true, however, only if the tests are completely independent, a
matter that often depends upon the context of the case performed. The point is that it is
relatively easy for those with only a cursory acquaintance with statistics to be misled
regarding a finding of significant associations when applying statistical methods.
400. Multiple regression analysis is particularly powerful because it facilitates the
assessment of the associations among several possible causal variables with a variable of
interest such as revenues or profits, by sorting out spurious correlations for non-spurious
correlations. See In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 996 F. Supp. 18, 26 (N.D. Ga.
1997) (citing Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., 839 F.2d 18, 35 (2d. Cir. 1988) and Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the Courtroom, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1065-66 (1985)).
401. See, e.g., In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 305 F.3d 145 (3rd Cir. 2002); Conwood
Co., L.P. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002).
402. See, e.g., DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, Reference Guide on Multiple Regression, in
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 179-227 (2d ed. 2000) (devoting an entire
section to regression analysis). In fact, courts’ acceptance of regression analysis has
become so commonplace that in some cases the failure to use regression has been a basis for
excluding expert testimony. See, e.g., Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000).
403. Stephen Mahle, Econometric Issues in Business Litigation Testimony,
http://www.daubertexpert.com/econometric.html.
404. This is no mean feat inasmuch as business valuation experts themselves often
misinterpret some of regression’s output metrics and uses. Compare Mark G. Filler,
Revisiting Regression Analysis and the Market Approach, CPA EXPERT, Summer 2006, at 6
(correcting various alleged deficiencies in a prior article appearing in the same publication)
with James A. Digabriele, A Primer in Valuing Closely Held Companies Using the Market
Approach and Regression Analysis: Not All Variables and Industries Are Created Equal,
CPA EXPERT, Spring 2006, at 7 (advising experts on how to use regression in applying the
market approach to valuation).
405. JEFFREY M. WOOLRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 272
(2d ed. 2003) (generalized-least-squares regression), 138 (hedonic regression), 415
(weighted-least-squares regression), 565 (tobit), 554 (logit), and 555 (probit).
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the variables included or excluded from the models. The difficulties
experienced by courts in dealing with this issue have led to inconsistencies
in decisions, as summed up by one author:
In almost every case it is argued by those opposing regression
findings that the results would have been changed significantly if
additional explanatory variables had been used. Usually the
argument is made with respect to qualitative factors that either
cannot be reflected in quantitative terms, or can be reflected only
by dubious or even obviously imperfect quantitative surrogates.
The courts are not consistent in their treatment of this type of
objection, with the variation in judicial position seemingly best
explained in each case by the consistency of the regression
results with the judge’s view of the case as a whole. 406
This suggests that judges have considerable uncertainty regarding
their assessments of the reliability of regression models, a difficulty that
has sometimes resulted in their resorting to the heuristic of deciding on the
basis of what they believe to be the preponderance of other evidence. 407
In this regard, the courts’ struggles with complex statistical
406. Finkelstein, supra note 271, at 737. Variables have been found inappropriate for
inclusion in some regression models while other regression models have been found flawed
for the absence of variables. In Cullen v. Indiana University Board of Trustees, 338 F.3d
693, 701 (7th Cir. 2003), an expert used regression analysis in support of a faculty
member’s claim of salary discrimination. The defendant university argued that the analysis
was flawed because of correlated, omitted variables. Id. The court found the regression
analysis admissible while nonetheless awarding summary judgment for the defendant after
the finding that the regression analysis was insufficient to establish a prima facie case. Id. at
701-03. In doing so, the court cited Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986), which held
that omission of particular variables in regression analysis ordinarily goes to weight, not
admissibility. Id. at 701, n.4. In a discrimination case such as Cullen, a productivity related
variable that might otherwise be appropriate for inclusion because it normally demonstrates
a statistically significant association with productivity may be excluded on the ground that it
may reflect a qualification that has been denied the plaintiff. See Finkelstein, supra note
371, at 738. Other courts have rejected regression analyses for reasons of omitted relevant
variables or have admitted statistical analysis only because it considered all relevant factors.
See, e.g., Elder-Beerman Stores Corp. v. Thomasville Furniture Indus., Inc., 206 B.R. 142
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1997).
407. It should be noted that the issue of omitted variables is not unique to regression
analysis in litigation and that courts have seemingly achieved a greater degree of
consistency in cases involving less methodological complexity. Consider, for example,
Children's Broadcasting Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 245 F.3d 1008 (8th Cir. 2000) (where an
appellate court affirmed a finding that the expert failed to consider all the variables that
might affect his conclusion despite having used an uncontroversial accounting method);
Sulzer Carbomedics, Inc. v. Oregon Cardio Devices, Inc., 257 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2001)
(where an appellate court rejected arguments that a decline in profits was solely due to local
factors); Fung v. Riemenschneider, No. C6-02-917, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 534 (Minn. Ct.
App. May 6, 2003) (where an appellate court reversed because the expert did not fully
consider losses stemming from fundamental changes in the practice in determining the loss
from a breach using the before and after method of damages valuation).
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methodologies have likely only begun. Consider the example of survival
analysis, used to analyze time-to-event data. 408 Survival analysis, which
has its origins in medical research, is a sophisticated statistical
methodology that is likely to appear with increasing frequency in damages
cases, in part due to advocacy for its use in business damages literature 409
and in part because of the increasing number of cases involving such
intangible assets as customer accounts terminated through a breach of
contract. The lives of these accounts must be estimated to arrive at a
damages estimate. 410 Given the growth of intellectual assets and the
advocacy for its use, 411 survival analysis will likely be used more
frequently in damages cases because it is often the most appropriate
statistical methodology for estimating damages when it is necessary to
estimate the lives of intellectual assets involving censored data. 412
408. See, e.g., DAVID W. HOSMER, JR. & STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED SURVIVAL
ANALYSIS: REGRESSION MODELING OF TIME TO EVENT DATA 1-2 (1999); First Am. Real
Estate Info. Servs. v. Consumer Benefit Servs., Inc., No. 03CV0633-B(NLS), 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 30317 (S.D. Cal. April 22, 2004). Survival analysis has its origins in medical
research. See Jonathan A Barney, A Study of Patent Mortality Rates: Using Statistical
Survival Analysis to Rate and Value Patent Assets, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 317 (2002). See DAVID
G. KLEINBAUM, SURVIVAL ANALYSIS: A SELF-LEARNING TEXT 1-33 (1996), for a basic
primer on survival analysis. Survival analysis has been used with some frequency in labor
relations cases. See, e.g., Lewis v. NLRB, 750 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1985) (affirming a
district court’s decision to admit an expert’s survival analysis comparing employee
statuses); Smith v. Western Elec. Co., 770 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1985) (discussing survival
analysis); Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 765 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1985); Morgan v. United
Parcel Servs. of Am., Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 1143 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (allowing the use of
survival analysis). Survival analysis is a statistical technique that is useful when the
fundamental metric of interest is the time until some event occurs. For example, suppose
defendant breaches a contract in which plaintiff was to provide services to defendant’s
customers for a fee per account each period. A damages estimate requires calculation of the
revenue that would have been obtained but for defendant’s breach, and it is necessary to
determine how long the customer accounts would have survived had not their lives been
artificially truncated. If the lives of accounts opened and closed prior to the breach are
fundamentally different, on average, from those still open at the time of the breach, then a
problem in estimation using historical lives arises. Data artificially truncated in such a
manner are said to be censored. Censored data mean that the lives of the assets are only
partially observed thereby presenting estimation difficulties. Least-squares regression and
other popular statistical techniques often used in damages estimation are ill-suited to such a
situation because they make no allowance for censored data. As a result, damages may be
inaccurately estimated. See KLEINBAUM, supra, at 5-7, 23-25.
409. See, e.g., ROBERT F. REILLY & ROBERT P. SCHWEIHS, VALUING INTANGIBLE ASSETS
218-237 (1998).
410. First Am. Real Estate Info. Servs., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30317 provides one such
example. Survival analysis has found its way into other types of legal cases as well. See,
e.g., Andrew R. Dick, When Are Cartels Stable Contracts? 39 J.L. & ECON. 241, 254
(1996).
411. See REILLY & SCHWEIHS, supra note 409.
412. See Richard K. Ellsworth, Attrition Analysis and Customer-Relationship Life
Expectancy, BUS. VALUATION REV., Winter 2005, at 173, 173-76; KLEINBAUM, supra note
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Although expertise in statistics can spring from a variety of educational and
experiential backgrounds, 413 few experts in statistics outside those routinely
engaged in medical research are likely to be very knowledgeable regarding
So the question arises as to precisely what
survival analysis. 414
qualifications make one an expert in this methodology: is a sound
knowledge of statistics in general sufficient, or is actual experience in using
survival analysis required?
This specific question is an example of the more general question of
what qualifications make a witness an expert when it comes to technical
matters. Based upon court decisions, the often unclear answer would seem
to be both jurisdictionally dependent and a subset of the more general issue
of necessary relevant experience discussed in Part III. For example, Davis
v. Davis, in which the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s rejection
of expert testimony partly on the basis that the expert had never performed
a valuation of the type of business in question prior to the engagement, 415
can be contrasted with Dekker v. Topcon American Corp. There, the
appellate court affirmed a lower court’s decision to admit expert testimony
despite the expert’s apparent lack of technical qualifications and industry
experience, because the expert possessed business valuation experience. 416
Complex methodologies relatively new to the courts do not stop with
advanced regression models and survival analysis. Courts have also
struggled valuing stock options 417 based upon option-pricing theory. 418
Traditional “closed-form” valuation models, such as Black-Scholes, 419 have
408, at 5-7.
413. David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 86-87 (2d ed. 2000).
414. Seigneur, supra note 166. The interviewee, a nationally prominent testifying
expert, noted that he would need to obtain assistance from outside his firm on this issue. Id.
415. No. B156636, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3405 (Cal. Ct. App. April 7, 2003).
416. No. G027150, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1449 (Cal. Ct. App. May 24, 2002).
417. See Robert Feder, Marital Dissolution Courts Continue to Struggle with Stock
Options, DELUXE BVUPDATE, Jun. 2001, available at http://www.bvlibrary.com (discussing
several divorce cases in which the courts have rendered “widely divergent” opinions on
option valuation); see also Maritato v. Maritato, 685 N.W.2d 379 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004)
(affirming use of intrinsic method for valuing options—a method that values the option
based upon what it would bring if it were exercised immediately. Options that are not “in
the money” can have market value but have no intrinsic value. The court also upheld a
decision to exclude unvested options out of the money as having no value at the time of the
divorce action because they would not vest until after the divorce); FRANK K REILLY &
KEITH C. BROWN, INVESTMENT ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 812 (8th ed. 2006)
(defining intrinsic value).
418. For a discussion of options and option pricing theory as applied to option valuation,
see HITCHNER, supra note 189, at 1093-1104. For examples of cases in which stock option
valuation methodology was at issue, see In re Marriage of Harrison, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1216
(1986) and Wendt v. Wendt, 757 A.2d 1225 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000).
419. See HITCHNER, supra note 189, at 1104-12 (discussing the Black-Scholes model in
option valuation).
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attained widespread acceptance in both the finance literature and the courts,
but these models are sometimes inadequate to accurately value complex
stock options that contain what are essentially options within options. 420
Accurate valuation of these securities requires the use of more complex
models such as binomial lattice models. 421 For example, in McCarthy v.
McCarthy, the valuation issue centered on the amount of appreciation that
had taken place during the marriage and required a valuation of options
containing reload features acquired at the beginning of the marriage and
during the marriage. Valuation using the Black-Scholes model resulted in
a substantive undervaluation of the entry values and therefore an
overvaluation of the marital appreciation. 422
Option pricing theory is also useful in valuing businesses whose
complex capital structures contain securities such as convertible debt,
preferred stock, and various classes of common stock. 423 Despite their
sophistication, binomial models are sometimes incapable of accurately
valuing such businesses, and the use of simulations such as Monte Carlo is
required. 424 This can occur when the value depends upon the probability of

420. Chamberlain & Hill, supra note 381, at 4-5 (highlighting the inadequacy that stems
from the inability of closed-form models to consider the additional value that attends
embedded options and results in the potential undervaluation of the basic options containing
such features).
421. See HITCHNER, supra note 189, at 1107-12. A binomial model breaks down the
time to expiration of stock options into a sequence of steps or intervals. At each interval the
price of the security underlying the option can move up or down, with the magnitude of the
movement determined by the security’s volatility. The result is a binomial tree that captures
the possible price movements over the period of the option. The resulting set of values is
then averaged and discounted back to present value to determine the value of the options.
422. McCarty v. McCarty, Johnson Co., Kan. Dist Div. 3, Case No. 05CV08547
(decided Nov. 13, 2006); see Philip H. Dybvig & Mark Lowenstein, Employee Reload
Options: Pricing, Hedging, and Optimal Exercise, 16 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 145, 146 (2003)
(“[A] reload option has the feature that if the option is exercised prior to maturity and the
exercise price is paid with previously owned shares, the holder is entitled to one new share
for each option exercised plus new options which reload or replace some of the original
options.”).
423. See Chatz v. BearingPoint, Inc. (In re Nanotechnologies, Inc.), 364 B.R. 308
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007) (involving the novel use of Monte Carlo simulation to value a
company).
424. See Ravi Jagannathan & Jane Saly, Ignoring Reload Features Can Substantially
Understate the Value of Executive Stock Options, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=110072, at 3, (discussing how ignoring reload features substantially
undervalues options and the requirement to use other methodologies to appropriately value
these options); see also Steve Pomerantz & Bruce G. Dubinsky, Monte Carlo Simulation
Analysis—A Tool for Projecting the Unknown, CPA EXPERT, Winter 2007, at 1, 1-5
(providing an explanation of Monte Carlo simulation and a discussion of its use in
predicting the future path of derivative prices, and noting that Monte Carlo techniques allow
even the most complicated derivative transactions to be valued). See generally Chamberlain
& Hill, supra note 381 (describing the process and value of simulations).
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the occurrence of uncertain future events that are endogenous in nature. 425
For example, the value of a business damaged by breach of contract may be
partly dependent upon the outcomes of future liquidity events such as an
initial public offering (IPO). 426 It follows that, to the extent that a breach
has diminished the likelihood of a successful IPO, the damages may extend
far beyond the immediate effects of the breach. 427
In summary, given that it is all too possible to confuse lay persons
with dubious statistical analyses, 428 the combination of the everintensifying complexity of business and sophistication of the
methodologies necessary to accurately estimate damages is increasing the
difficulty of making sound judgments about the reliability of expert
testimony. 429 It is becoming more and more daunting for business damages
professionals, even those in high-end valuation and forensic services firms,
to keep abreast of the methodologies necessary to achieve the most
accurate valuations. 430 The challenges would seem even greater for judges,
the gatekeepers for expert testimony, whose primary concerns may lie
elsewhere 431 but who bear responsibility for applying—and in some cases
developing—the legal criteria that will be used to separate science from
art. 432
VI. INCREASING PARTISANSHIP IN DAMAGES EXPERT TESTIMONY
Expert testimony is increasingly necessary in a technical society in
which issues involving intellectual capital are becoming more complex,

425. Chamberlain & Hill, supra note 381, at 6.
426. See id. at 5 (discussing the effects of future liquidity events on valuation).
427. In the future, the courts may not face cases involving stock options only but also
real options, because real options impact the value of companies with material amounts of
intellectual capital, and traditional valuation methodologies do not fully capture the value
intellectual capital contributes. Sudy Sudarsanam et al., Real Options and Impact of
Intellectual Capital on Corporate Value, 7 J. INTELL. CAP. 291 (2007). For a discussion of
real options with respect to patent damages, see Jerry Hausman & Gregory K. Leonard, Real
Options and Patent Damages: The Legal Treatment of Non-Infringing Alternatives, and
Incentives to Innovate, 20 J. ECON. SURV. 493, (2006).
428. Kaye, supra note 109, at 1969.
429. Id.; see Victoria A. Platt, Research Tools that Valuation/Economic Damages
Analysts Use in Commercial Litigation Matters, INSIGHTS (Autumn 2006) (describing how
the inexorable march is also fueled, in part, by the increasing availability of data contained
in database accessible via the internet that make rigorous analysis possible more frequently).
But see Donald P. Wisehart, Dangers of Mixing Transaction Databases, FIN. VALUATION &
LITIG. EXPERT 7, 7 (Aug.-Sept. 2006) (explaining that one hazard of using online databases
such as BIZCOMPS and Pratt’s Stats for damages experts lies in improperly mixing
transaction databases that measure financial phenomena in different ways).
430. Seigneur, supra note 166.
431. Kaye, supra note 109, at 1937.
432. Id. at 1965.
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and independent expert testimony is critical to the functioning of the
courts. 433 Against a tapestry of federal and state admissibility rules and
decisions about the reliability of damages testimony, growing complexity
of business litigation, and increasing sophistication of valuation
methodologies, a troublesome trend is complicating courts’ oversight of
expert testimony. This trend involves increasing partisanship by damages
experts, a matter that has caused great frustration for the courts. 434
A.

Recent Evidence of Damages Expert Partisanship

It is widely understood that the current process of party-selected
experts has serious flaws. 435 Litigation itself is an inherently murky
process, as evidenced in the following statement: “The fact patterns that
lead to litigation, and litigation itself, typically end up like Akira
Kurosawa’s Rashomon, in that each party has his own story and the ‘real
story’ often does not get told at trial.” 436 Courts have long expressed
concern that experts can muddy case waters, 437 and that experts with
excellent credentials will sometimes base their valuations on unrealistic
assumptions. 438 Recently, as a result of expert partisanship, the postDaubert percentage of times that expert testimony has been admitted
without limitations in federal courts has fallen from 75% to 59%. 439 In a
1998 survey, judges ranked expert partisanship as the most frequent
problem with expert testimony in civil cases. 440 Consistent with the
fundamental notions that third-party witnesses are more credible 441 and that
experts are independent of retaining counsel, 442 experts are supposed to be
433. Krishna, supra note 167.
434. See, e.g., PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 3; Cimasi, supra note 7; Freed, supra
note 7 (documenting increased partisanship by damages experts).
435. Lloyd, supra note 25, at 424; see Mnookin, supra note 164 (providing a detailed
treatise on the history of concerns about expert testimony).
436. Lazar, supra note 170, at 6.
437. See, e.g., Winans v. N.Y. & Erie R.R. Co., 62 U.S. 88, 101 (1859) (“Experience has
shown that opposite opinions of persons professing to be experts may be obtained to any
amount . . . wasting the time and wearying the patience of both court and jury, and
perplexing, instead of elucidating, the questions involved in the issue.”)
438. Lloyd, supra note 25, at 402.
439. Jones, supra note 144.
440. Krafka et al., supra note 103, at 21.
441. Lazar, supra note 170, at 6.
442. Brown, supra note 194. Consistent with being independent of clients' goals, experts
owe no duty of loyalty to their clients. ABA Formal Op. 97-407 (1997). Attorneys will
often be tempted to use accountants who are already familiar with their client's operations.
Lloyd, supra note 25, at 390. Astute opposing counsel will probe the relationship between
attorney and/or client and the valuation expert in order to explore for inducements to
advocacy. Frequent engagements involving the same parties can be suggestive of bias.
Wiegand, supra note 110. Attorneys whose experts are challenged on the basis of past or
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unbiased and not partisan advocates for their clients instead of being
advocates for the contributions being made by their expertise. 443 The
burden of proving a damages report reliable falls upon the party presenting
the report, 444 and “deliberate, manifest, pervasive and systematic bias” on
the part of the expert is supposed to result in disqualification. 445
Historically, however, anxious pleas against partisanship have been
ineffective, 446 lack of damages expert objectivity appears to be on the
rise, 447 and courts are becoming more critical with respect to experts’ lack
of objectivity. 448

ongoing client relationships may argue that familiarity with client operations and financial
condition is likely to produce more accurate valuations, and sound working relationships
developed over time can make for a better fit between the case and valuation expert
testimony. Such fit is highly important because an absence of fit can result in courts
ignoring valuation testimony. See, e.g., Rashedi v. McCue, No. A095215, A096717, 2004
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4323 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (affirming a decision that plaintiff’s
expert’s valuation was excessive because of a lack of fit between the evidence and the
valuation estimate). Consequently, concerns over attorney/client familiarity are more likely
to go to the weight of the expert's testimony than to result in exclusion. Wiegand, supra
note 110.
Moreover, experts can concurrently work for and against the same attorney on two
independent cases, but experts may not switch sides in a case. See Brown, supra note 194
(discussing Koch Refining Co. v. Boudreaux (In re Boudreaux), 85 F.3d 1178 (5th Cir.
1996)). The court noted that
[C]ourts have not adopted a 'bright line' rule for determining whether an expert
should be disqualified from conflicting engagements which are factually
related," preferring instead a two-part test. Part one asks if it was reasonable for
the first party retaining the expert to assume that a confidential relationship
existed, and if so, part two asks whether the retaining party disclosed any
confidential information. Further, the majority opinion holds that expert
contingency fees are not permitted in order to avoid experts' payment being
dependent upon outcomes; flat fees, retainers, minimum fees, and lock-up fees
(fees intended to forego retention by opposing parties) are ethically permitted,
however, if reasonable. . . .
443. Alan H. Silberman, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP, Mohan Rao, Director,
LECG, LLC, Phillip A. Beutel, Senior Vice President, NERA Economic Consulting, and
John J. McDonnell, McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berhoff LLP, Conference on Effective
Development & Presentation of Expert Testimony: Capitalizing on Expertise for Success,
Moments of Truth: A Discussion of Ways for Expert to Handle Unreasonable Lawyers, and
Lawyers to Handle Unreasonable Experts (March 21, 2006) (conference notes and materials
on file with authors). A failure on the part of experts to deal with alternative information or
data can be grounds for appeal. Lloyd, supra note 25, at 413.
444. See Kay v. First Cont’l Trading, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 772 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (placing the
burden of establishing reliability on the party providing the report).
445. Financial Valuation and the Litigation Expert, Daubert on the Docket, p. 1.
446. Mnookin, supra note 164, at 774.
447. Lane v. Cancer Treatment Ctr. of Am., Inc., C.A. No.12207-NC, 2004 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 108 (Del. Ch. 2004).
448. See, e.g., Wise, supra note 282, at 82-83 (“[Experts] should not be, or be perceived
as, a ‘hired gun.’”).
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In Pabst Brewing v. Commissioner, the court rejected all the experts’
conclusions on the basis that expert testimony is not useful when it is mere
advocacy for a client’s position. 449 The court in Lane v. Cancer Treatment
Centers termed the testimony of the opposing experts “unduly pessimistic”
and “unreasonably optimistic.” 450 In Finklestein v. Liberty Digital, Inc.,
calling one expert’s analysis “simply incredible” and stating that it
contained “so many problems that it is impossible to address them all,” the
court noted:
Men and [sic] women who purport to be applying sound,
academically-validated valuation techniques come to this court
and, through the neutral application of their expertise to the facts,
come to widely disparate results, even when applying the same
methodology. These starkly contrasting presentations have,
given the duties required of this court, imposed upon trial judges
the responsibility to forge a responsible valuation from what is
often ridiculously biased ‘expert’ input. 451
Whether expert bias is intentional or unintentional, court opinions
sometimes suggest frustration with the failure of some experts to provide
plausible valuations. For example, the Henke v. Trilithic, Inc. court noted
that “[t]he parties’ experts have presented remarkably divergent valuations.
As is often the case in an appraisal action, the Court does not find either
party to have fully satisfied its burden . . . . The Court must therefore
conduct its own independent valuation.” 452 In Estate of Adams v.
Commissioner, the tax court rejected both experts’ valuations and
determined some of the quantitative parameters for valuation using its own
judgment. 453 Similarly, in Hess v. Commissioner, the tax court rejected
both experts’ valuations. 454 In Wagner Construction, Inc. v. Commissioner,
the tax court found the testimony of the experts so dissimilar that it deemed
the testimony biased. 455
449. Pabst Brewing Co. v. Comm’r, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 1236 (T.C.M. 1996).
450. Lane, supra note 447, at 131 n.174.
451. Finkelstein v. Liberty Digital, Inc., C.A. No.19598, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 53, at *41
(Del. Ch. 2005).
452. Henke v. Trilithic, Inc., Civil Action No. 13155, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 170, at *19
(Ch. 2005).
453. Estate of Adams v. Comm’r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1421 (T.C.M. 2002).
454. Hess v. Comm’r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 303 (T.C.M. 2003).
455. Wagner Constr., Inc. v. Comm’r. 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1869 (T.C.M. 2001). This
occasional disdain for expert testimony is not always devoid of ironic humor, as suggested
by the opinion in Isaksen v. Vermont Castings, Inc., 825 F.2d 1158, 1165 (7th Cir. 1987):
The jury pulled the figure of $ 100,000 out of a hat in which Isaksen’s expert
witness had done the usual magic tricks; but as there was no evidence of how
much the antitrust violation, as distinct from unrelated market forces,
contributed to Isaksen’s losses, or of how much of the loss was an antitrust
injury as distinct from being deprived of the opportunity to take a free ride on
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It is not just the courts that are frustrated at times but also the experts.
Recently, a damages expert with excellent credentials published what was,
in effect, a rebuttal to a bankruptcy court’s exclusion of his testimony after
the court followed a rather tortuous path that included first admitting the
testimony and then reversing its position. In this rebuttal, quoting from
various statements made by the judge in hearing transcripts, the expert
asserted that the judge “brought an expressed agenda to this case” that
included not only decrying “established business valuation methodology
and authoritative data, which the profession generally accepts as reliable,”

competing dealers, the expert’s efforts to translate his losses into a present-value
figure were irrelevant. . . . So the damage phase of the trial must be retried.
In Chartwell, supra note 122, the judge’s irony is unmistakable in his disqualification of a
health care valuation specialist:
I have a discreet understanding of my limitations, but I also have an
understanding of what my experience tells me in having listened for the past 30
years to appraisers…I have yet to find an appraiser of value of non-real estate
that ever says anything that’s cogent and persuasive. Go ahead. I’m always
willing to be persuaded.
In Gilbert v. MPM Enterprises, Inc., 709 A.2d 663, 666-67 (Del. Ch. 1997), aff’d, 731 A.2d
790 (Del. 1999), court evidenced more disdain for experts:
One might expect the experts’ desire to convince the Court of the
reasonableness and validity of their assumptions . . . would produce a somewhat
narrow range of values, clearly and concisely supported, despite individual
parties’ obvious conflicting incentives. Unfortunately, as this case and other
cases most decidedly illustrate, one should not put much faith in that
expectation, at least when faced with appraisal experts in this Court. . . . In sum,
one report is submitted by Dr. Pangloss, and the other by Mr. Scrooge.
Conflicts of interest involving expert witnesses probably arise more often in using technical
experts. See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. EMC Corp., 330 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (N.D. Cal.
2004); Cordy v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 156 F.R.D. 575, 580 (D.N.J. 1994); Paul v.
Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., 123 F.R.D. 271 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (demonstrating that such
conflicts can sometimes present difficulties for the courts with business valuation experts as
well); Johnson v. Johnson, No. 246484, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS 3153 (Mich. Ct. App.
2004) (holding that the trial court erroneously assumed that an expert, retained jointly by the
husband and wife to determine the value of the business and by the husband only to
determine the tax consequences of a succession plan, was retained by both parties for both
purposes). One judge has noted that being “too cozy” with one side will raise the court's
skepticism, as in a case where the valuation expert was the spouse of an attorney on a case.
BVR’s BVWire Central, http://www.bvresources.com. However, despite the increase in
court scrutiny of experts’ objectivity, some courts do not find bias in places one might
expect. For example, in Crabtree v. Metalworks & Hydra-Assembly, Inc., No. 02AP-450,
2003 WL 42442 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003), the appellate court affirmed a lower court’s
valuation of goodwill based upon the sole expert’s testimony when the expert was the
plaintiff’s son. In Marlar v. Daniel, 247 S.W.3d 473 (Ark. 2007), the state supreme court
denied a negligence claim against an expert when the claim was based on the expert's
relations to a party to the litigation. In Rodriguez v. Pacificare of Tex., Inc., 980 F.2d 1014
(5th Cir. 1993), the appellate court affirmed allowing a party to the litigation to testify as his
own expert.
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but also placing “the validity and credibility of business valuation on
trial.” 456 Regardless of the relative merits of the positions of the judge and
the expert in this case, the obvious tension is both troublesome and
indicative of what may be a growing rift between some courts and business
damages experts arising from actual and/or perceived expert bias. 457
Aside from the obvious structural problem that experts are paid by the
side for which they testify, 458 what is driving this partisanship? Perhaps a
major driving factor is that the distinction between attorneys and experts is
arguably not a compelling one in the first place. 459 Damages experts can be
valuable aides to attorneys in all phases of a case. 460 In complex cases, the
roles of attorneys and experts are similar in that experts are often called
upon to act as investigators of the data from which conclusions can be
drawn and to advise attorneys on whether there is a legitimate case from a
scientific perspective. 461
Moreover, science can be malleable, and
maintenance of impartiality under a system wherein the experts become
like “star players” with “attorneys acting as coaches” 462 seems problematic
at the onset. Some have placed the blame on the prevalence of “hired gun”
experts in this system, but others maintain this argument belies the greater
incentives of professional experts to preserve their reputations by not
rendering inadmissible opinions. 463
Despite expressed opposition to partisanship by some professional
experts 464 and assertions by some attorneys who maintain that experts
should be unbiased and owners of their reports as opposed to advocates for
their clients case, 465 is this really what most attorneys seek in an expert?
Although attorneys expect experts to state that they are unbiased, 466 there is
a growing expectation that experts will represent their parties’ interests. 467
The legal process has been described as adversarial rather than scientific in
nature, with attorneys calling the shots and the goal not being greater
understanding but rather winning. 468 Although some attorneys claim that
456. Cimasi, supra note 7, at 20.
457. Apparently similar instances of partisanship exist in patent cases involving technical
experts. See, e.g., Schuurman & Stafford, supra note 148.
458. Mnookin, supra note 164, at 774
459. Randall G. Block, Disqualifying Expert Witnesses, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Mar.
2005, at 14.
460. Vondra, supra note 331.
461. Block, supra note 459, at 14.
462. Id.
463. Lloyd, supra note 25, 385.
464. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 144.
465. Zimmerman, supra note 107.
466. See, e.g., STEVEN BABITSKY & JAMES J. MANGRAVITI, JR., HOW TO EXCEL DURING
DEPOSITIONS: TECHNIQUES FOR EXPERTS THAT WORK 113 (1999).
467. Fanon, supra note 252, at 13.
468. Mandel, supra note 150.
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biased damages experts can be detrimental to their cases, 469 one legal
commentator has stated, “I would go into a lawsuit with an objective,
uncommitted, independent expert . . . almost as willingly as I would occupy
Another
a foxhole with a couple of noncombatant soldiers.” 470
commentator has stated that “[n]o one expects an expert chosen and paid
by a plaintiff or defendant to present a balanced, unbiased analysis.” 471
Others have stated that there is no reason to hire experts if they are not
advocates, 472 and that research detrimental to their cases is not desired. 473
These opinions may reflect honest advocacy by attorneys for clients, but in
a legal environment that increasingly utilizes professional damages experts
for valid reasons, the message for many experts seems likely to be a clear
call for client advocacy—and experts will not be successful over repeat
engagements if they testify in a manner that supports opposing parties. 474
Attorneys expect damages experts to have a good “theory of the
case.” 475 In other words, attorneys expect damages experts to understand
and support their story about the case. Sometimes this has led attorneys to
ghost write expert reports in detriment to their clients and experts alike. 476
Attorneys are said to strive for experts who will take ownership of their
reports, 477 and although damages experts are supposed to be advocates for
their reports, not advocates for their clients, 478 this seems far from being a
bright-line distinction. 479 It is perhaps telling of both a close working
relationship and damages experts’ willingness to please attorneys that only
469. Jones, supra note 144.
470. See Jones, supra note 144 (quoting PETER N. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK
SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM).
471. Lloyd, supra note 25, at 423.
472. Jones, supra note 144.
473. Zimmerman, supra note 107.
474. Block, supra note 459, at 14.
475. Elson, supra note 174.
476. Aspen, supra note 144; see Brown, supra note 194, (citing Solaia Technology LLC
v. ArvinMeritor, Inc., 362 F.Supp.2d 797 (N.D. Ill. 2005)) (noting that an expert's affidavit
should not merely regurgitate an attorney's arguments); Manning v. Crockett, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16118, 1999 WL 342715 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (stating that ghost writing expert
reports is not permitted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26); Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 139
F.R.D. 611 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Occulto v. Adamar of NJ, Inc., 125 F.R.F. 611 (D.N.J. 1989)
(expressing concern over an expert report drafted by an attorney). In one case, a Nobel
Laureate economist's expert report was excluded because counsel redrafted his report. Rao,
supra note 191.
477. Jones, supra note 144.
478. Kinrich, supra note 250.
479. Babitsky & Mangraviti, supra note 466, at 112 (quoting ROBERT C. HABUSH, ART
OF ADVOCACY: CROSS-EXAM OF NON-MEDICAL EXPERTS § 300(2) (1998)) (saying that “an
honest independent expert who would never dream of giving false testimony under any
circumstances may nevertheless end up inadvertently doing just that. His subconscious
partiality for the side which has sought his services may color his evaluation of the facts of
the case and his opinion.”).
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a small percentage of attorneys cite problems with their own expert reports,
whereas a larger number cite problems with opposing expert reports. 480
So, is the issue simply one of attorneys wanting damages experts to be
biased but not be perceived as biased? If so, is it asking too much of
experts to successfully perform such a bipolar act given that attorneys have
been accused historically by experts and some commentators of going
beyond what is justifiable for their clients? 481 Under the current trial
regime, experts are, in effect, being asked to play their best for a team but
simultaneously disavow any interest in whether the team wins or loses.
Consequently, it is often difficult to draw a bright line where independence
ends and advocacy begins. 482 The implications of this conundrum are
explored in Part VII.
B.

Legacy Remedies for Damages Expert Partisanship

The foregoing examination of damages expert partisanship suggests
first that it exists, second that it apparently always has existed, and third
that it appears to be a growing problem for the courts despite the good
wishes and admonitions of nobler members of the expert community. 483
The tendency of courts to lean toward admitting expert testimony in the
expectation that cross-examination will reveal its flaws has been severely
criticized as frequently ineffective in preventing biased testimony from
reaching juries. 484 As related below, historically, various possible remedies
to the problems presented by partisanship in expert testimony have been
proposed, and all have proven ineffective.
Some commentators have called for tighter ethical and valuation
standards 485 as a solution to closing the distance between the fiction of
unbiased damages expert testimony and the reality of partisanship. 486
Ongoing and proposed changes to business valuation standards, 487 as well
as accounting standards that move financial reporting toward fair value
accounting, hold some promise for easing the burden imposed on damages
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.

Krafka et al., supra note 103, at 17.
Mnookin, supra note 164, at 782.
Krishna, supra note 167.
See supra text accompanying notes 433-82.
See, e.g., Fanon, supra note 252, at 13.
See, e.g., Getting S Corp. Valuates Clearly, Correctly, BUS. VALUATION
RESOURCES: BVWIRE (Sept. 26, 2007), http://www.bvresources.com/BVWire/September
2007Issue60-3.htm.
486. Mandel, supra note 150; Jim Hitchner, AICPA BV Standard Update, FIN.
VALUATION AND LITIG. EXPERT, Dec. 06-Jan. 07, at 1-2.
487. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, VALUATION OF A
BUSINESS, BUSINESS OWNERSHIP INTEREST, SECURITY, OR INTANGIBLE ASSET (2007),
available
at
http://fvs.aicpa.org/NR/rdonlyres/672E1DD4-2304-47CA-8F348C5AA64CB008/0/SSVS_Full_Version.pdf.
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experts by the current failure of financial reporting standards to capture the
value of intellectual capital. 488 These changes, though no doubt welcomed
by many in the valuation profession, seem unlikely to close the gap
completely between the actual value of the firm and the indicated value
because much of the intellectual capital will still not be captured by
financial reporting. 489
One leading expert in business valuation, citing a proliferation of
standards promulgated by organizations such as the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, the American Society of Appraisers, the
Institute of Business Appraisers, and the National Association of Certified
Valuation Analysts, has stated that the problems faced by the courts with
respect to business valuation do not stem from a lack of standards and
guidance. 490 Similarly, one commentator has listed no less than nine
objectionable practices by damages experts that do not adhere to existing
standards, 491 raising the question of the value of additional standards if
many experts are not adhering to existing standards. Another commentator
paraphrased the court in a case (not cited) in which he was a damages
expert: “It appears that objectivity and independence have a greater
significance to those who set the accounting standards than to those who
have to apply those standards in preparing financial statements.” 492 Finally,
examples of standards from the financial reporting environment suggest a
tendency for standards to become increasingly rule-based as opposed to
principle-based, thereby encouraging a check-the-box mentality and a
proliferation of rules that attempt to contemplate every application of the
standards. 493 This is a logically impossible task, given the previously
acknowledged subjectivity of expert testimony. Consequently, the efficacy
of tighter standards in reducing expert bias seems questionable at best.
In the U.K., courts are allowed to impose fines upon experts who
mislead the courts. Although fining experts might intuitively seem to be a
simple way in which to reduce partisanship in expert testimony, this has
apparently not alleviated growing concerns of bias in the U.K. inasmuch as
the Civil Justice Council recommended in September 2005 that experts in
civil trials be prepared to give the same evidence no matter which side is
488. Largest Ever ASA BV Confab Tracks Progress of Profession, BUS. VALUATION
RESOURCES: BVWIRE (Oct. 31, 2007), http://www.bvresources.com/BVWire
/October2007Issue61-5.htm; Fair Value Measurements, DEFINING ISSUES (KPMG Int’l),
Sept. 2006, at 1, 1-2.
489. See, e.g., New Statement Allows Fair-Value Measurements for Financial Assets and
Liabilities, DEFINING ISSUES (KPMG Int’l), Feb. 2007, at 1, 1-4.
490. PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 3.
491. Freed, supra note 7.
492. Hosteny, supra note 331, at 5.
493. Robert K. Herdman, Testimony: Are Current Financial Accounting Standards
Protecting Investors?, Feb. 14, 2002, http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/021402tsrkh.htm.
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paying them. 494 Further, assuming a reasonably efficient market for expert
services, the expected value of fines would ultimately be incorporated into
experts’ fees, raising the costs of providing expert testimony and imposing
a cost on clients. Although it could be argued that clients are the
appropriate parties to bear such costs, the apparent lack of efficacy in
courts in the U.K. makes this potential remedy seem questionable at best.
Finally, the mechanism of fining experts, if employed with sufficient
frequency to represent a real threat, may have a dampening effect on the
numbers of experts willing to testify and on the willingness of experts to
press for new and better methodologies instead of taking the safest path,
thereby raising litigation costs and impeding the progress of science in the
courts.
Judge Richard Posner once proposed a national registry of experts in
which data could be recorded regarding each expert’s past testimony
record. Such a registry already exists for experts in the discipline of
economics. 495 Although obtaining information about experts more easily
might assist attorneys, 496 expanding this registry to include all damages
experts would seem to be of limited additional value in reducing
partisanship. Aside from the obvious resources required to maintain a
national registry of all damages experts containing the most current data on
each expert, a more compelling reason to question this as a remedy for
partisanship is that, despite the existence of databases containing experts
now, attorneys rarely engage experts through such databases. 497 Further,
given the number of large professional firms with excellent repositories of
expert talent, locating damages experts is not inordinately difficult. 498
Finally, some question whether various accreditation organizations would
ever coalesce to agree upon one set of expert standards that would be
needed to determine whether experts within an all-inclusive national
registry were in compliance with professional standards. 499 It is therefore
difficult to conceive how a national registry would alone resolve the issue
of partisanship. 500
There is evidence that judges appreciate the use of conservative
assumptions in developing damages reports. 501 One commentator has
494. John Markoff, A Boom in Expert-Witness Firms; The Idea Economy / Who Owns
That?, INT’L. HERALD TRIB., Oct. 3, 2005, at 6.
495. Lloyd, supra note 25, at 385.
496. Id. at 386.
497. Seigneur, supra note 166.
498. These include a number of major public accounting firms and large expert
boutiques.
499. Krishna, supra note 167 (citing a refusal of United Kingdom expert accrediting
organizations to band together).
500. Hilton, supra note 223.
501. See, e.g., Kay v. First Cont’l Trading, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 772, 776 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
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proposed that experts be required to provide several alternative damages
scenarios based upon different assumptions, but he then partly impeaches
this argument by noting an instance in which a court held that damages had
not been proven because of the presentation of alternative scenarios. 502
Another difficulty with this proposal is that given the multitude of
assumptions often necessary to produce damages reports, how would an
expert choose which assumptions are the most critical and therefore the
ones to vary, and what values would the expert assign for these
assumptions? Moreover, would juries simply become inundated with data
instead of better understanding the nature of the damages, as suggested by
the commentator? 503
Another proffered solution—albeit one that is certainly not new and
has several negative implications—is to make greater use of consulting
experts or special masters to assist judges in determining the admissibility
of scientific evidence. Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides
judges with the power to appoint testifying experts, and Rule 53 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits appointments of special
masters. 504 Outside Rule 706, courts may appoint judicial tutors to aid in
comprehension of expert testimony and assist with admissibility issues. 505
Court-appointed experts can provide independent analysis, critique experts
hired by opposing parties, and tutor juries. 506 Some have argued
analytically that judges should appoint experts when damage estimates by
opposing experts are extremely disparate and that developing a reputation
for doing so will discourage such disparity. 507
Courts have been historically reluctant, however, to use their power to
appoint independent experts, and judges who have used it consider their
actions extraordinary. 508 This reluctance to use court-appointed experts
(explaining how an expert witness provided a worst case scenario).
502. Lloyd, supra note 25, at 418 (citing Grantham & Mann, Inc. v. Am. Safety Prods.,
Inc., 831 F.2d 596, 604 (6th Cir. 1987)). Other courts have, however, allowed multiple
damage scenarios to be presented by the same expert. See, e.g., Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein &
Fielding, 37 P.3d 1130, 1145 (Utah 2001).
503. Lloyd, supra note 25, at 415.
504. Aspen, supra note 144.
505. Id. To a partial extent, a methodological solution to the issue of alternative
valuations may rest on the possibility of capturing the spirit of alternative scenarios through
the use of simulations that distill these to a single value. Two rather obvious difficulties
with this proposal, however, are that sophisticated valuation models such as Monte Carlo
simulations are very complex and difficult to understand, and have outcomes that are a
function of probability estimates that experts will no doubt debate as vigorously as they
currently do other assumptions.
506. Jones, supra note 144.
507. Jonathan T. Tomlin & David Cooper, When Should Judges Appoint Experts? A
Law and Economics Perspective 32-33 (Bepress Legal Series, Working Paper No. 1699,
2006), available at http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1699.
508. Jones, supra note 144. Attorney opposition is often credited for causing this

368

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 11:2

stems, in part, from concern that juries may perceive these experts as
infallible. 509 Their use is not increasing in spite of providing an easy route
for discovery, education of the court, and more rapid settlement, and even
though courts possess the ability to have both parties absorb the attendant
fees. 510 Other matters of concern with the use of special masters and courtappointed experts include, but are not limited to, the belief that there can be
honest disagreements over scientific matters that are best explored and
exposed through the adversarial process and the belief that court-appointed
experts can be biased. 511 If such disagreements arise from “genuine
uncertainty or differing theoretical perspectives,” there is concern that
neutral experts would only suppress, not eliminate, the disagreements. 512
Finally, the cost of court-appointed experts, which must be borne by the
parties to the lawsuit, may be another factor contributing to judges’
restraint in their use. 513 Consequently, these long-noted concerns about
court-appointed experts continue to loom large, making it doubtful that
neutral experts alone are a complete solution to concerns about
partisanship. 514
reluctance, but available data suggest that it is judges themselves who are limiting its use,
perhaps out of concern about its effect on the adversarial process. Ellen E. Deason, CourtAppointed Expert Witnesses: Scientific Positivism Meets Bias and Deference, 77 OR. L.
REV. 59, 142 (1998). Evidence of this reluctance can be found in McCormick v. Brevig, No.
DV-95-86, 1996 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1004 (Mont. Dist. 1996), in which the court, rather than
appointing a special master, instead ordered the parties to address the issue of whether a
special master should be appointed and, absent such an appointment, whether complex
accounting matter should be tried before a jury or the bench. Id. Moreover, the Seventh
Circuit has warned against the overuse of special masters. See Checkers Eight Ltd. P’ship
v. Hawkins, No. 95 C 7708, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7936, at *45 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 1997)
(citing Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d. 698, 712 (7th Cir.
1984)).
509. Jones, supra note 144.
510. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4) addresses fees for expert discovery in federal courts. Rules
for fee recovery in state courts may differ across jurisdictions.
511. Mnookin, supra note 164, at 776.
512. Id. at 778.
513. See, e.g., Rispler v. Sol Spitz Co., NO. 04-CV-1323, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75840
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2006), for a reported instance of "sticker shock" with respect to a courtappointed expert.
514. Some commentators have suggested having both parties agree upon one common
expert, but aside from the obvious issue of how to proceed if parties disagree over which
expert, there is concern as to whether the disclosures required to make such an agreement
workable might conflict with an attorney’s obligation of absolute loyalty to the client.
Krishna, supra note 167. Others might be tempted to argue for movement toward a
specialized court system such as that used in appeals of patent cases. As Judge Posner
notes, however, such a specialized system would bring its own set of problems. RICHARD A.
POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 401 (2001). For a discussion of these problems, see
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM ch. 8 (1996). One
obvious difficulty would be in discerning what types of cases should go to the specialized
courts, since business damages can arise in a variety of settings from commercial litigation
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VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE COURTS, EXPERTS, AND THE QUALITY OF
JURISPRUDENCE
This part explores several concerns raised in the foregoing parts
regarding case complexity and partisanship, and their effect on the quality
of jurisprudence. It then introduces a novel approach that we believe
represents a material step in the direction of reducing courts’ difficulties in
dealing with widely disparate valuation estimates that result from expert
partisanship.
A.

Questions Regarding the Evolving Nature of Damages Expert
Testimony

Collectively, the prior parts raise troubling questions. For example,
will the trend toward greater and greater amounts of businesses’ values
being vested in intellectual capital render extant valuation methodologies
increasingly obsolete? New, developing non-financial models hold some
promise of providing better measures of intellectual capital. 515 These nonfinancial measures should link to the value of firms inasmuch as value is a
leading barometer of the existence of intellectual capital. 516 A challenge
for damages experts will be integrating these models in some fashion with
extant financial methodologies to increase valuation accuracy through a
more integrated and holistic approach to intellectual asset measurement.
This may well require the use of additional, sophisticated methodologies
such as factor analysis and simultaneous equation modeling that have yet to
be utilized by the business valuation community. 517 Courts’ receptivity to
this integrative process is likely to have a great deal to do with the pace of
progress for the integrative process. Complicating this issue, the expert
market’s growing drift into commodity and differentiated segments may
pose problems for the courts as differences in the quality of expert
testimony across cases of different magnitudes become more pronounced.
Issues will also arise concerning the affordability of experts capable of
using cutting-edge methodologies in complex cases regardless of the
potential magnitude of the damages.
Will the complexity of damages estimation ensuing from the growing
preeminence of intellectual capital become so great that a hodge-podge of
to tax to divorce. Another problem is that even if federal business damages cases were tried
in specialized courts, there would still be an issue with those cases brought in state courts.
515. See, e.g., Kannan & Kannan & Aulbur, supra note 345, at § 1.3.1. Examples of
these new models include the intangible asset monitor, the skandia value scheme, and the
knowledge capital scorecard. See id.
516. Abeysekera, supra note 4, at 426.
517. See, e.g., id. (calling for the development of an intellectual capital index); Marr,
supra note 344, § 4.3 (noting the possibility of simultaneous equation modeling).
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decisions stemming from judges’ confusion makes identification of
acceptable methodologies a nightmare of experts? Two notable cases
illustrate the point that courts have not always dealt well with
methodological complexity in business damages cases. In both Estate of
Dunn v. Commissioner and Estate of Jelke v. Commissioner, the court
majorities knowingly opted for simplistic valuations while anticipating
criticism from business damages experts for embracing unsophisticated
methodologies. The Jelke dissent said the court’s decision to take the lesscomplicated road to damages estimation was “the judicial equivalent of the
doctrine of ignoble ease,” a term taken from former President Theodore
Roosevelt’s expressed disdain for living a sedentary life. 518 The dissent
went on to state that the more sophisticated valuation methodology would
produce a more accurate valuation, suggesting that not taking the
intellectually more difficult road impairs the quality of jurisprudence. 519
Will this increasing methodological complexity in combination with
growing partisanship in expert testimony result in more and more extreme
damages estimates, thereby making the “split the baby” heuristic, so often
used when courts are in doubt, even less reliable?520 If increasing difficulty
in surviving Daubert hearings is driving attorneys toward full-time,
professional experts with a demonstrated ability to survive Daubert
hearings, then these professionals whose living depends upon satisfying
attorneys can be expected to want to please because recurrent business is,
to a significant extent, dependent upon past attorney satisfaction.
On the other hand, extreme valuations, no matter how favorable to a
client from the standpoint of their magnitude, apparently carry an
increasing risk of being rejected by the courts, given recent decisions. 521
The balancing act that an expert must seemingly maintain, then, is one of
being biased enough to deliver a good result for the client while not
providing a damages estimate that is so far apart from that of the opposing
expert as to risk the court’s rejecting both valuations. As long as these two
forces of the pressure for bias and the cost of bias are in approximate
equilibrium and there is symmetry of bias, then “splitting the baby” may
not always deliver a poor result for the court. 522 These bias issues
518. Estate of Jelke v. Comm’r, 507 F.3d 1317, 1333 (11th Cir. 2007); Estate of Dunn v.
Comm’r, 301 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2002).
519. See John J. Stockdale, Jr., Legal & Court Case Update, BUS. VALUATION UPDATE,
Jan. 2008, at 14, 14-17, for a discussion of Dunn and Jelke.
520. Tomlin & Cooper, supra note 507, at 11. (noting that this practice becomes
particularly unreliable when triers of fact split the difference between damage estimates
provided by opposing experts even though only one expert renders a biased estimate).
521. See supra text accompanying notes 449-82.
522. See Tomlin & Cooper, supra note 507, at 12 (noting that opposing biases may not
always be present and that asymmetry of bias nullifies the conclusion that courts will reach
unbiased decisions based upon splitting biased estimates). Further, another form of
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essentially constitute a game theoretic problem, 523 and indeed have been
addressed by legal research in that vein with the unfortunate implication
that disequilibrium exists. 524 Given that allegations of partisanship are
increasing despite the proliferation of exclusions of damages expert
testimony, 525 there is further reason to believe that disequilibrium exists
and is growing worse.
B.

A Novel Approach to Addressing Expert Partisanship

Given that the adversarial trial process was not designed for decisions
about the complexities of valuation science 526 and that the foregoing
remedies for expert partisanship all seem at a minimum seriously flawed
and more probably largely lacking in efficacy, it seems appropriate to ask
some fundamental questions. Does the major problem in damages expert
testimony stem from partisanship in general, or is the major problem only
one outcome of partisanship: frequent, large disparities in experts’
damages estimates? Is it really desirable that courts squelch disagreement
in expert testimony to the extent perhaps implied in portions of the recent
rhetoric lamenting bias? Or is such disagreement a natural product of a
highly structured, adversarial process combined with human nature, the
changing of which is tantamount to swimming against an impossibly strong
current? Would the courts be better served instead to, analogously, adopt
the strategy often espoused for those caught in rip tides and find a way to
swim perpendicular to the current? 527 Given that a silver-bullet solution
seems unlikely to kill the beast, would jurisprudence be best served by an
examination of how multiple remedies might be coupled to reduce the
disparity in damages estimates?
asymmetry, a statistically non-normal distribution of the range of damages, makes a biased
outcome almost certain in some cases because of the impossibility of negative damages.
For example, suppose hypothetically that the true damages are $6 million, and the plaintiff's
expert provides an estimate of $20 million. The defense expert can only opine zero
damages, not the negative $14 million required for a "split the baby" heuristic to yield $6
million.
523. Hypothetical negotiation has been admitted as evidence in patent cases as a means
of determining such matters as reasonable royalties. See, e.g., Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron,
Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1390-92 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
524. Lloyd, supra note 25; Jonathon T. Tomlin & David Cooper, The Importance of
Unbiased Expert Testimony (May 3, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
The authors note that two economists did precisely this in finding that expert bias works to
the advantage of the expert's client and that equally biased testimony on the parts of all
parties' experts does not result in a neutral solution.
525. See supra text accompanying notes 433-82.
526. Deason, supra note 508, at 141.
527. See Mnookin, supra note 164, at 789 (“After all, ordinary witnesses, even eye
witnesses to an event, frequently disagreed contradicting one another on points larger and
small. . . .”).
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Before attempting to answer these questions through our proposed
solution, it is useful to consider some of the most salient points in Professor
Kaye’s article on Daubert and the admissibility of scientific testimony. 528
In concluding that the Daubert-like screening of complex statistical
methodologies is a positive development, 529 Kaye raises two major
concerns about Daubert’s legacy that bear directly upon our subsequent
proposal: a boundary problem and a usurpation problem with its attendant
methodological puzzle. 530 The boundary problem refers to the fact that
Daubert’s criteria do not extend to identifying the type of evidence
deserving of special scrutiny, and the usurpation problem arises because
Daubert permits sufficient latitude for trial judges to exclude evidence that
should be presented to a jury. 531 Kaye’s conclusion is that Daubert
requires the articulation of further legal standards by which these problems
may be addressed by the courts. 532
The remainder of this subpart proposes a novel approach built upon
three basic propositions that may aid courts in dealing with these issues
while helping reverse concerns about the intersection of methodological
complexity and expert partisanship, thereby reducing the variance in
damages estimates provided by Drs. Pangloss and Scrooge. This approach
is admittedly neither a panacea for all the ills of expert partisanship nor the
complete answer for dealing with concerns about boundary demarcation
and usurpation. However, it does seemingly hold promise for reducing
these concerns while satisfying Kaye’s caveat that any approach to dealing
with Daubert’s aforementioned deficiencies should be functional, as
opposed to merely philosophical, in nature. 533
The environment of business damages “actively works to seek out a
justification for a centrist view.” 534 In light of this, consider the question of
whether the disparity in damages estimates is the major issue. Historically,
it would appear that violent disagreements among experts over the
magnitude of damages cause the most consternation. 535 This makes both
528. See generally Kaye, supra note 109 (discussing the admissibility of scientific
evidence).
529. Id. at 1937.
530. Id. at 1934.
531. Id.
532. Id. at 1937.
533. Id. at 1966.
534. Nancy Fannon, Fannon Valuation Group, Ethics on the Witness Stand, Presentation
at AICPA Business Valuation Conference, New Orleans, La. (Dec. 2, 2007) (conference
notes on file with authors).
535. See Mnookin, supra note 164, at 775-76 (noting that the divergence of expert
testimony was prompted by testimony not justified by expertise or science, but by partial,
biased, or highly speculative conclusions); Krafka et al., supra note 103, at 328 (showing
survey results from 1998 and 1999 indicating that conflict among experts that defies
reasoned assessment was one of the top problems cited by judges and attorneys).
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intuitive and scientific sense. If a court is presented with two damages
estimates of $10 million and $12 million, then the court might justifiably
assume that a verdict of the mean of $11 million in damages will not be
very far off the mark. On the other hand, if that same court is presented
with estimates of $1 million and $21 million, then the mean of $11 million
carries far less assurance of being accurate. As one source has noted,
“[w]hile bias might well ‘average out,’ variance does not.” 536 This can
result in court making gross errors that produce “who-knows-what
result[s].” 537 Given that courts are not supposed to permit a jury to award a
greater amount of damages than that reasonably supported by the
evidence, 538 the problem, then, would seem to rest with the variance in
estimates. 539 Science idealists may find comfort in that the negative
association between confidence in decisions and the magnitude of the
underlying variance has its roots in statistics. 540 This leads to our first
proposition:
Proposition 1: A major step in reducing the effects of the
problem of expert partisanship is to reduce the variance in
estimates supplied by opposing experts.
Now consider whether it is realistic to ask damages experts to behave
in a manner that is contrary to the logic of the structure of the legal
process 541 and game theory of human behavior. 542 Given that such
admonitions aimed toward reducing expert partisanship have historically

536. David M. Levy & Sandra J. Peart, Econometrics and the Truth-Seeking
Assumption: Ethics and Research Independence, Presentation at the Southern Economic
Association (Nov. 12, 2001) (transcript available at http://edwardmcphail.com/dismal_
science/truth_seeking_assumption_4.pdf, at 12).
537. Fannon, supra note 534 (citing Olympia Equipment Leasing Co. v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 797 F.2d 370, 383 (7th Cir. 1986)) (finding no rational basis for the lower
court’s reduction of damages from $54 million to $12 million).
538. See Montage Group, Ltd. v. Athle-Tech Computer Sys., Inc., No. 2D03-2026, 2004
Fla. App. LEXIS 14973, at *42 (Fla. App. October 14, 2004) (stating that a jury may not
award a greater amount of damages than what is reasonably supported by the evidence at
trial).
539. See RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY, supra note 514, at 406
(noting that the greatest difficulties with expert testimony arise when there is an absence of
common ground among the experts, giving triers of fact little assurance in their decisions).
540. See, e.g., RICHARD M. JAEGER, STATISTICS: A SPECTATOR SPORT, 50-58 (2d ed.
1993) (giving an intuitive presentation of the role of variance in uncertainty and discussion
of uncertainty in the role of expert testimony); Sam L. Savage & Marc Van Allen, The Law
of Averages in Law and Accounting, in LITIGATION SERVICES HANDBOOK 10.1-10.11 (Roman
L. Weil, et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007) (discussing the flaw of averages in law and accounting).
541. See supra text accompanying notes 433-82 (discussing recent evidence of expert
partisanship).
542. See generally Lloyd, supra note 25 (recommending certain questions to be asked of
the testifying expert).
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fallen upon deaf ears 543 and that ethical and valuation standards likewise
have apparently failed to show substantive efficacy, 544 the notion of a
materially changing human nature seems, at best, idealistic, and, more
realistically, a vehicle for self-deception. Moreover, assuming one agrees
with Proposition 1 above, writing standards that would somehow narrow
these spreads seems hopelessly problematic given the subjective nature of
the inputs to the estimates. This is not to say that standards may not have
some positive effect and should not be strengthened, but rather to explicitly
acknowledge their spotty history of success in causing experts to behave
against their self interests. Consequently, our second proposition is as
follows:
Proposition 2: Admonishing damages experts to behave as we
might like and revising standards to better encourage them to do
so are alone insufficient to result in a solution to the real problem
facing courts in damages estimation.
Finally, consider that simple solutions to complex problems are
seldom available, or, quite logically, the problems would be unlikely to
exist. Certainly the longevity and severity of the issue of expert
partisanship in the current trial process 545 suggests that the problem is a
complex one and that a fresh approach is needed. To continue with the
previous analogy, when caught in a rip tide, it is foolhardy and
counterproductive to expend energy by attempting to swim in the most
direct manner toward the beach. Instead, swimming parallel to the beach
can allow the swimmer to escape the grasp of the tide and eventually reach
the shore. Similarly, we believe that it is time to recognize that the sour
fruits of expert partisanship may best be minimized by some trial-process
reconfiguration augmented by the judicious and limited use of some of the
legacy remedies.
Proposition 3: The best hope for a substantive reduction in the
disparity between opposing experts’ damages estimates rests in
trial process reconfiguration augmented by the judicious and
limited use of some of the legacy remedies.
Also, in addressing this issue, amidst all of the discordant rhetoric of
what one legal commentator has termed the “failed romance between law
and science,” 546 we should not lose sight that the leading reason for the
exclusion of expert testimony under Daubert is the validity of the facts and
543. See Mnookin, supra note 164, at 774 (stating that the impassioned pleas of
attorneys and judges were easily outweighed by the hard cash given by a party to an expert).
544. See Herdman, supra note 493 (discussing problems with the financial reporting
system that were made more evident with the Enron scandal); Hitchner, supra note 486, at 1
(addressing valuation issues pertaining to public companies and their stock prices).
545. See generally Mnookin, supra note 164 (discussing the history of expert testimony).
546. Mnookin, supra note 164, at 801.
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the data. 547 As previously noted, damages experts are often at the mercy of
their clients, 548 attorneys, and available data, 549 and often the great
differences in value estimates proffered by experts for opposing parties 550
result from their assumptions about these facts and data that represent the
inputs into valuation models. 551 Consequently, if the specific goal is to
narrow the range of values proffered by opposing experts, and if
assumptions are the leading cause of these differences, then focusing on
ways to achieve a greater degree of consensus on assumptions may hold
some promise of meaningful change. Interviews with leading experts
suggest two important points: first, that the methods experts use to produce
a value are very often the same; 552 and second, that frequently the critical
assumptions creating large differences in value estimates are relatively few,
but their import is often lost in the rancor of cross-examination. 553 As one
expert notes, counsel with a weak case, the facts of which do not refute
critical assumptions in expert testimony, will often attempt to confuse
juries by prolonged argumentation regarding complicated but less material
matters. 554
Based upon the premise that “[t]he factors enumerated in Daubert
work reasonably well with some aspects of the expert’s work, but these
factors are less well adapted to other aspects,” 555 the cornerstone of our
proposed remedy rests in bifurcating the trial process into two segments. 556
547. See PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 3, at 31 (stating that lack of reliability is
the top reason financial experts are excluded).
548. See March 2007 Court Case: In re Nellson Nutraceutical, BUS. VALUATION RES.
(Mar. 2007), at 1, (citing In re Nellson Nutraceutical, No. 06-10072, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS
99, *61 (Del. Bnkr. January 18, 2007)) (discussing how damages experts were “left in the
dark” by deliberately manipulated management projections), available at
http://www.bvlibrary.com.
549. See discussion of assumptions supra at Part III.
550. See Lloyd, supra note 25, at 385 (analyzing the problems of biased expert
testimony).
551. See, e.g., Lane v. Cancer Treatment Ctr. of Am., Inc., C.A. No. 12207-NC, 2004
Del. Ch. LEXIS 108, at *34-56 (Del. Ch. July 20, 2004).
552. See Hilton, supra note 223 (discussing expert testimony and financial matters).
553. See Seigneur, supra note 166 (discussing how the interviewee noted that this rancor,
and that of the trial process in general, is so intimidating at times that it is difficult to induce
young valuation experts to become testifying experts).
554. See Hilton, supra note 223 (discussing expert testimony and financial matters).
555. Kaye, supra note 109, at 1937.
556. Bifurcation of trials is one of the case management tools permitted courts in
damages cases. See, e.g., In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litigation, 280 F.3d 124,
141 (2nd Cir. 2001) (where bifurcation occurred under FED. R. CIV. P. 23). Business
damages trials have been bifurcated on occasion, see, e.g., Imaging Int’l v. Hell Graphic
Sys., Inc., 816 N.Y.S.2d 696, 704 (N.Y. 2006) (stating that defendants had consented to
bifurcate the liability and damages phases of the trial), and decisions to bifurcate have been
upheld on appeal under the abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Mandeville v. Quinstar
Corp., 109 Fed. Appx. 191, 194 (10th Cir. 2004) (affirming the lower court’s decision to
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The first segment would deal with the appropriate methodologies to use in
producing a value, a matter often prescribed by theory and requiring
sophisticated thought. 557 The second segment would pertain to the inputs
to the methodology, often a factual matter. 558 Methodological issues are
usually the most technical in nature and frequently the ones least
understood by judges, attorneys, and juries. 559 Perhaps even more
importantly, they are the place where pure science and valuation meet most
closely and the opportunity for objective demarcation between them is the
greatest. This line of demarcation also has the important effect of
preserving the spirit under which the seminal cases on admissibility have
rested. As Kaye notes, “Daubert works no change in the principle, clearly
established by Frye that the heightened scrutiny [of expert evidence]
pertain[s] strictly to methodology.” 560 He also observes that “[w]hen
heightened scrutiny is confined to methodology, the usurpation problem is
manageable.” 561
Moreover, the arena of methodology is one of two points in the
process where neutral experts, 562 as an adjunct to opposing experts, might
be employed to greatest benefit in the role of advising judges in situations
where opposing experts disagree about complex methodologies. 563 Further,
some courts may be becoming more amenable to neutral experts, 564 as
evidenced by one federal judge’s suggestion that courts should make
innovative use of special masters. 565 Using neutral experts at this juncture
bifurcate a trial because the issues were logically separable).
557. See Kaye, supra note 109, at 1937 (describing the difficulties of identifying
methodological defects in statistical assessments).
558. It is noteworthy that bifurcation of proceedings is an increasingly frequent aspect of
trials involving patent cases in which infringement issues are separated from damages.
Goldscheider, supra note 6, at 56.
559. See Seigneur, supra note 166 (discussing the interviewee’s expert witness
experience).
560. Kaye, supra note 109, at 1975.
561. Id. at 1972.
562. Judge Posner has noted the prospect of using neutral experts as a means of dealing
with the problem of intelligibility in expert testimony. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL
THEORY, supra note 514, at 405.
563. See McCormick v. Brevig, No. DV-95-86, 1996 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1004 (Mont.
Dist. 1996) (citing cases supporting the appointment of special masters when accounting
issues are involved); Reich v. Priba Corp., 890 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Tex. 1995); Sierra Pac.
Ins. Co. v. Am. Sentinel Ins. Co., 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1206 (2d Cir. 2004); Horn
v. McQueen, 353 F. Supp. 2d 785 (W.D. Ky. 2004) (appointing special referees to sort out
complex damages issues in the presence of conflicting expert testimony).
564. See, e.g., Sanders v. Sanders, CA03-738, 2004 Ark. App. LEXIS 114, at *26-7(Ark.
App. February 4, 2004) (accepting the report of a court-appointed damages expert over that
of another expert).
565. See Aspen, supra note 144 and Deason, supra note 508, at 98-136, for a detailed
and thoughtful explanation of the potential problems and abuses that the use of courtappointed experts could create for courts and opposing parties.
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would have several benefits. First, if there were a substantive question
regarding the most appropriate methodologies, both sides would receive a
hearing attended by the neutral expert, who could assist the bench in
deciding whether there exists a question of fact that would dictate jury
involvement. 566
Second, if advised by neutral experts, judges would be far more likely
to be properly informed about the pros and cons of competing
methodologies and would better understand the ramifications of choosing
some over others without the necessity of educating themselves in order to
separate rhetoric from methodological appropriateness. 567 There would
also be less risk of overstepping Kumho’s intellectual rigor standard by
excluding expert testimony that is less than ideal but still scientifically
valid. 568 Third, the difficulty of neutral experts radiating an aura of
infallibility to a jury would be eliminated because the neutral expert would
testify only before the judge, not the jury. 569
Despite these benefits, care would be needed to avoid due process
usurpation and other arguments levied against the use of neutral experts. 570
For this reason, even though our thesis point of bifurcating trials does not
strictly depend upon the use of court-appointed experts, we foresee the use
of such experts to be a salutary adjunct to this trial bifurcation only if
properly controlled. Controls should at a minimum include what we
outline in the following paragraph.
Independent expert advice and testimony should be confined only to
appropriate methodologies in the first segment of the bifurcated process,
and only if the methodological complexity is sufficient to warrant such

566. Courts have, on occasion, appointed experts for the purpose of assessing the
reliability of opposing experts' reports. See, e.g., Horn v. McQueen, 353 F. Supp. 2d 785,
791 (W.D. Ky. 2004) (instructing the special master to consider the reports and testimony of
the experts).
567. There is empirical evidence that judges have difficulty resolving technical issues
associated with complex patent cases, and alternative methods of trial-level resolution and
neutral experts have been proposed as possible solutions. Kimberly A. Moore, Are District
Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 39 (2001).
568. See Deason, supra note 508, at 134 (noting that the possible difficulty of judicial
deference to independent experts becomes greater where judges struggle to adapt existing
law to new technologies). In this context, judges must be careful to confine independent
experts' role to that of proffering opinion on appropriate methodologies and not on the
application of such methodologies to law.
569. Another potentially efficacious aspect of this first component could be to get
opposing parties to stipulate to as many assumptions as possible before proceeding to the
second component. This would have the salubrious effect of reducing the amount of noise
in arguments the jury hears.
570. See generally Deason, supra note 508, for a thorough analysis of court-appointed
expert witnesses in which Professor Deason raises many concerns about the use of such
witnesses and offers several ways of partially mitigating these concerns.
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advice. 571 Conflicting expert testimony alone should not be sufficient to
require an independent expert. 572 In keeping with Judge Posner’s
proposal, 573 there should be a voluntary national registry of independent
experts that includes a complete disclosure of areas of expertise,
credentials, and all prior testimony experience. 574 A high set of standards,
to which all independent experts would be held accountable, should be
developed. 575 Conflicts of interest through prior or existing financial and
other associations with any of the parties or their experts should be reasons
for disqualification. 576
Unless opposing parties agree otherwise,
independent experts should be used only in addition to experts hired by
opposing parties, and opposing parties should have the opportunity not only
to comment upon the qualifications of independent experts prior to
appointment, but also to examine independent experts under oath. 577
Opposing parties and their experts should not be allowed to communicate
ex parte with independent experts, and vice-versa. 578 Although these
controls, even if properly and consistently applied, may not be foolproof,
they do hold the promise of allowing independent expertise to inform
judges without undue risk to the adversarial process. 579
The second segment of our novel approach deals with the inputs to the
valuation models chosen during the first component. It is in this far more
subjective arena that judges and jurors are most comfortable 580 and also
where the spirit of evidentiary truth embodied in both Daubert and Frye is
maintained. In this segment, opposing parties should be first asked to
stipulate to as many of the inputs to the selected valuation model(s) as
possible. Stipulating to inputs is nothing new, and courts typically
appreciate opposing parties stipulating to as much as possible. 581 What is
different, however, is our recommended use of consulting experts to assist
571. This is intended to address concerns about independent experts crossing the line and
intruding upon judicial prerogatives by providing advice on the law. See Deason, supra
note 508, at 134. Moreover, various sources counsel against the use of court-appointed
experts in simple matters. See, e.g., WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE §§ 706.02, 53.10
(citing FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)(1)(C)); William W. Schwarzer & Joel S. Cecil, Management of
Expert Evidence, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 61 (2d ed. 2000).
572. See Deason, supra note 508, at 133.
573. See Lloyd, supra note 25, at 385-86.
574. See Deason, supra note 508, at 148.
575. See id.
576. See id. at 143-47.
577. This control would substantively mitigate several concerns that include even
unbiased experts having disagreements about scientific knowledge. See id. at 118, 153.
578. See id. at 151-52.
579. An additional advantage of court-appointed experts is that they enjoy absolute
immunity from liability. See, e.g., Riemers v. O’Halloran, 678 N.W.2d 547, 550-51 (N.D.
2004).
580. See supra text accompanying notes 555-61.
581. Aspen, supra note 146.
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judges in identifying those inputs which ultimately matter most and least at
the margin in the estimation of damages. 582
Since the valuation
methodology would have already been agreed upon, an independent expert
could likely, without undue difficulty, vary the inputs to the selected
model(s) and perform a sensitivity analysis to identify those assumptions
that make any appreciable difference in the damages outcome, thereby
providing a check on the inclinations of opposing parties not to stipulate to
inputs of minimal import for reasons of partisanship. 583
Of course, an opposing party could still refuse to stipulate and proceed
to trial with inputs of minimal import, but absent some compelling reason,
probably not without risking the judge’s ire. 584 Thus, what would
ultimately be presented to the jury as questions of fact would be most often
those issues related to valuation model inputs that actually affect damage
estimates in some material way. Such screening would, as Kaye puts it,
“prevent[] the jury from relying on a legislative fact” as opposed to
“adjudicative facts.” 585 The distinction between these categories of “facts”
is important. Legislative facts are those that can be asserted across cases as
opposed to adjudicative facts, which are case-specific. For example, a
legislative fact might be whether or not closed-form option-pricing models
may be appropriately applied in valuing options if the options have certain
special characteristics such as reload features. An adjudicative fact might
be whether or not option holders surrender at the optimal time or earlier
than optimal, as some studies have indicated. 586 Thus, legislative facts lend
themselves more generally to methodological issues, whereas adjudicative
facts generally fall into the category of inputs to methodology. Adopting
Kaye’s distinction between the types of facts helps to make a clearer
582. Neutral experts have sometimes been used to recalculate damages, but this is rarely
done. See Lloyd, supra note 25.
583. Court-appointed experts have also been utilized by courts to deal with post-trial
matters involving detailed financial issues. See, e.g., Triple Five of Minn., Inc. v. Simon,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17922 (D. Minn. Sept. 30, 2003).
584. Hilton, supra note 223. The interviewee notes that greatest differences by far in
how expert testimony is handled, and the ones that cause the most problem for experts,
result from differences among judges as opposed to across jurisdictions. He also notes that
one judge in whose court he has testified on multiple occasions routinely holds pretrial
conferences in which he has the experts appear before him in person and asks direct
questions regarding the important differences in their reports. In an effort to reduce the
variance in experts' estimates of damages, this judge sometimes advises the experts
regarding assumptions that he feels are out of line, with the implication that he wants more
conservative estimates in one direction or the other. Such informal coercion of experts
reinforces our recommendation for a new process that will accomplish the ends sought by
this particular judge and will help ensure more homogeneity of process across courts.
585. Kaye, supra note 109, at 1975.
586. Jaksa Cvitanic, et al., Analytic Pricing of Employee Stock Options, REV. FIN.
STUDIES, Dec. 2007, at 1, available at http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content
/full/hhm065v1.
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demarcation between the respective issues to be decided in each segment of
the bifurcated process much clearer.
Extending our previous example of option valuation may assist in
better understanding this proposal. Assume, again, a divorce action in
which the asset of interest is the marital appreciation in stock options
containing reload features granted to one spouse by her employer. 587 Any
valuation method that does not take into account the additional value of the
reloads would result in a low value estimate. Consequently, binomial
models and Monte Carlo simulations might be appropriately proposed as
suitable methodologies, whereas a closed-form model that does not value
the reloads would clearly be inappropriate. Once the models are decided
upon, two inputs into such models would be the price volatility of the
underlying security (the stock) and the amount of time the option holder
takes to sell or convert “in-the-money” options once they are vested. 588
Suppose the opposing parties offer volatility estimates of 18% and 19% 589
and also differ on the issue of whether to assume the option holder would
have held the options until the optimal surrender time. The differences in
volatility estimates may have little effect on the damages and might be
stipulated, whereas the assumed surrender behavior could have a
potentially large effect. Under the proposed trial regime, jurors would not
need to hear expert testimony regarding complex binomial models and
determination of stock price volatility, but instead would hear testimony
focused on such matters as past option surrender behaviors of executives
having similar options.
To summarize, there are several benefits of this approach. Heightened
scrutiny of expert testimony would be reserved for methodological issues,
as Kaye stipulates. 590 This approach might be applied in both Daubert and
Frye jurisdictions, given that the complexities of valuation methodologies
certainly justify heightened scrutiny under both standards. 591 Trials would
be materially shortened in length and costs reduced concomitantly. Juries
could focus on those aspects of business damages cases that matter most in
terms of outcomes and those about which they are likely to be most
comfortable. Materially relevant information would be less likely to be lost
in the smoke of methodological rhetoric and jargon. Judges would be
relieved of some of the responsibility to become educated on the intricacies
587. See supra note 422.
588. An in-the-money option is one in which the option holder could extract a positive
value by immediately exercising the option. FRANK K. REILLY & KEITH C. BROWN,
INVESTMENT ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 812 (8th ed. 2006).
589. Such differences might arise, for example, because experts disagree over the period
over which to measure stock price volatility. For a discussion about measuring stock price
volatility, see id. at 915-18.
590. Kaye, supra note 109, at 2014.
591. Id.
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of increasingly complex valuation methodology. The trend toward greater
and greater discovery requirements that interfere with attorney/expert
communication might be reversed as the number of issues subject to debate
during trial—especially those related to objective science—would be
reduced.
Perhaps most importantly, however, the opportunity for
partisanship would be materially reduced. Attorneys harboring fears of
limitations upon their degrees of freedom and purists who object on the
basis of denial of due process would need to confront the reality that judges
strongly prefer for parties to stipulate to matters that are not really in
question or make minimal difference in consequence. 592
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In the end, when considering the considerable dissatisfaction that
attends the use of expert witnesses, 593 we are left with the following
conclusions. First, there is a particular need to scrutinize scientific
evidence because it is often impenetrable yet more impressive than nonscientific evidence, and the usual safeguards in the trial process are
inadequate to always ensure that juries will see only good science. 594
Second, from a practical perspective, the demarcation separating art and
science in damages estimation is hazy at best; yet, in this regard, Daubert
and its progeny, as well as Daubert’s predecessor, Frye, are largely silent.
Third, Daubert has had a far-reaching effect on damages expert testimony
in several ways, most notably for damages experts by increasing their risk.
Fourth, at the same time the demand for expert testimony and numbers of
experts are increasing, the complexity of business damages cases is also
increasing as a result of fundamental changes in the business environment.
This increased complexity is in turn leading to the use of more
sophisticated methodologies, which makes it even more difficult for courts
to decipher what has been already a confusing mix of art and science.
Fifth, against this backdrop are alarming allegations of burgeoning
partisanship on the part of experts, which is resulting in highly disparate
damages estimates and creating uncomfortable uncertainty about the real
magnitude of damages. Finally, infused in this already vexatious mixture is
a trend toward increasingly expansive discovery that inhibits
attorney/expert communication.
Allegations of expert bias, though growing in intensity, are nothing
new historically, and none of the legacy remedies that have been proffered
have alone proven efficacious in addressing the problem. Perhaps foremost
among the reasons for persistent expert partisanship is a trial regime in
592. Seigneur, supra note 166.
593. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY, supra note 514, at 401.
594. Kaye, supra note 109, at 1967.
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which experts are expected to perform as effective players on a litigation
team, but simultaneously are supposed to be immune from developing any
conscious or subconscious allegiance to that team—and must be willing to
so testify. It might as well be decreed that professional baseball players in
a year prior to free agency should have no interest in their present team’s
winning because they might be playing for the opposition next year.
If real progress is to be made in culling the worst of the sour fruits of
partisanship—highly disparate damage estimates—it is time to declare this
charade as such and take a fresh approach to addressing underlying
structural problems based upon a modified trial regime, analogous in some
respects to that used in complex patent cases. This regime involves the
bifurcation of trials: dividing damages estimation into two components in a
manner that augments expert testimony in complex business damages cases
by incorporating independent experts in a limited, yet productive and
economical way. Such an approach would enable jurors to focus on
material questions of fact that produce much of the real difference in
damage estimates. Although we do not maintain that this proposed
modification is the silver bullet that will kill the beast of partisanship, we
believe that it would greatly reduce opportunities for partisanship to bear
bad fruit and that it represents a workable alternative far preferable to the
present lament.

